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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Officer Fetish.  (December 2004) 
 
Larry A. Van Meter, B.A., Oklahoma Christian College; 
 
M.A., University of Arkansas 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Sally Robinson 
 
 
The Officer Fetish examines the fetishized American military officer and the 
marginalized American enlisted man as they appear in post-World War II 
American film, television, and literature.  The fetishized officer, whose cathexis is 
most prominent in the World War II-era propaganda film, has persisted as a 
convention since the war—a phenomenon that has contributed to the rise of 
militarism in America.  Chapter II lays the foundation of Marxist and Freudian 
definitions of fetishism and fetishization, and then gauges those definitions with 
two films, In Which We Serve (1942), a standard World War II propaganda film, 
and Saving Private Ryan (1997), a film that postures itself as anti-war.  Chapter 
III examines war narratives as a medium that polices class in American culture.  
The military, with its anti-democratic two-tiered rank system, is attractive to 
many novels and films because of its strict class boundaries.  Chapter IV 
examines the degree to which so-called anti-war narratives contribute to 
America’s rising economy of militarism. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There are only two industries in the world,  
 the peace industry and the war industry. 
         —Yoko Ono 
 
I spent most of my time being a high-class muscle-man for 
Big Business, for Wall Street and for the Bankers. In short I   
was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism. 
—General Smedley Butler (1935) 
 
Laying down one's life for America is a poverty issue 
rather than one of honour. 
—Zoe Williams 
 
For this work, I have two projects in mind.  The first is to expose the 
fetishistic investment in the military officer rank, one of the most enduring 
conventions in American narrative history.  The second is to advocate a 
termination of the officer rank in American militaries.  In the absence of an 
officer rank, there would be less impetus for war.  But when one considers the 
fact that when high-ranking officers retire from military service, they often sit on 
the boards of multinational weapons manufacturers (with their associated six- 
and seven-figure salaries to augment their military retirement benefits)—firms 
whose economic survival depends on warmaking—that second project seems 
doomed to failure. 
 
_________________ 
This dissertation follows the style of the MLA Handbook. 
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The arguments presented in this work necessitate an explanation of the 
American military rank system, a system modeled on the European military 
structure, which is divided into officer and enlisted ranks.  For a full discussion 
of this division, one should consult Alfred Vagts’s A History of Militarism.  The 
European system mirrored the machinations of the feudal aristocracy: officers, 
upon whom culture conferred honor (the “sign” of which is/was the ornate 
uniforms they wear/wore), and the soldiery, upon whom culture conferred 
scorn.  The problem with honor being associated with the officer rank, I will 
argue, is that the psychic and spectacular investments in the officer rank works 
toward eroding the resistance American society has toward warmaking.  To find 
compelling evidence of this lack of resistance, one need only examine the Bush 
pere and Bush fils wars in the Middle East.  Though there were strong pockets of 
resistance to these wars, the fact that they nevertheless occurred implies a strong 
desire for those wars and (as I will argue in Chapter IV) an overall incapacitated 
resistance.  But it was not a desire appearing from a mysterious void: it was a 
desire carefully fostered and cultivated by profiteers, unscrupulous politicians, 
and a pliant media.  And, of course, centuries and centuries of narratives 
obsessed with warfare.  In the half-century since World War II, Americans have 
bought (both literally and figuratively) the notion that military force is a sensible 
means of solving political problems.  Instead of perceiving warmaking as the 
worst possible contingency, Americans often see it as a first option (though our 
leaders are careful in asserting that war is the last option).  In this work, I hope to 
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present evidence that the media of war novels and films have conditioned us to 
this end. 
Desire is a crucial word in this work, the a priori of which, borrowed from 
feminist film theory, is that discourse articulates desire.  Officer/enlisted 
representational strategies present, among other things, a desire for a strictly 
segregated class system.  The privileging of the officer rank, one of the most 
enduring tropes in American fictions, appears all too often as a fetish in both 
officially sanctioned discourse and military fictions. 
What I hope to argue effectively in Chapter II is that the officer as he—and 
it is most certainly a he—appears in most American war fictions is a fetish.  A 
large section of Chapter II is devoted to laying a foundation of Marxist and 
Freudian definitions of fetish and fetishism.  Both programs of Marx and Freud 
work well with military fictions because, I believe, those fictions operate within a 
narrative economy where patriarchy, hyperbolic masculinity, and class desire 
rarely have to be encoded.  Indeed, for many war narratives, those are their 
defining virtues. 
As feminist film theorists such as Kaja Silverman, Teresa de Lauretis, and 
Laura Mulvey have demonstrated, what is too often articulated in Western 
discourse is patriarchal desire.  War offers artists a vehicle to, as de Lauretis says 
in a different context, “reaffirm a patriarchal order that has been badly shaken by 
feminism” (Alice Doesn’t 116).  Seemingly the best strategy for avoiding the 
problems posed by feminism (or, perhaps more accurately, the feminine) is to 
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explore a geography free of women.  Susan Jeffords says in The Remasculinization 
of America, “The defining feature of American war narratives is that they are a 
‘man’s story’ from which women are generally excluded” (49).  War narrative 
then becomes a convenient location for articulations of masculinity: “At a time 
when other arenas for masculine bonding in American culture are being 
‘invaded’ [. . .] war can be perceived as the last ‘pure’ theater for the masculine 
bond” (73).  War narratives often pine for a nostalgic version of civilization, the 
model of which one finds in the World War II narrative, wherein men seemed 
not so encumbered by gender (or class) dysphoria.  Ostensibly “liberated,” then, 
those narratives find themselves exploring themes masquerading as apolitical 
and non-ideological—pretending to be disaffected, merely descriptive.  They 
have more important fish to fry.  “Courage,” “honor,” “sacrifice,” and “heroism” 
become the overarching themes of war narratives.  They seek to transcend the 
historical, to recover an epic past where women knew their place, away from the 
important affairs of men: “In the past,” Bakhtin notes of the epic genre, 
“everything is good” (“Epic and Novel” 15). 
The problem, of course, is that war narratives are rife with anxieties; they 
are, to borrow Stephen Heath’s famous film axiom, “a veritable festival of 
affects.”  Theorists such as Joanna Bourke, Katherine Kinney, Silverman, and 
Jeffords have noted that war narratives are all about masculine anxieties.  Though 
many narratives (and their voices within them) willfully fantasize that they 
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function within an ideology-free zone, they nevertheless articulate the gender 
and class anxieties at the heart of so many sociopolitical problems.  
With respect to class anxieties, the threat to capital is easy to measure in 
film.  As Horkheimer and Adorno argue in The Dialectic of the Enlightenment, 
mainstream cinema functions primarily as a weapon of capital.  Film is a multi-
billion dollar industry and doesn’t easily cotton to threats against it.  Mainstream 
cinema neutralizes the threats to capital on both ideological and political fronts.  
Concerning the latter, one should note as examples the literal blacklists during 
the McCarthy era and de facto blacklists during the right wing frenzy of George 
W. Bush’s Iraq War (note the backlash against politically active figures Susan 
Sarandon, Tim Robbins, Sean Penn, and Michael Moore).  With respect to the 
former, the film industry postures itself as part of the so-called “entertainment 
industry,” a term implying a dissociation with any sort of politics.  Because 
mainstream cinema pretends that it is merely an “escape from everyday 
drudgery” (Horkheimer and Adorno 142), it disavows any radical departure 
from the status quo.  Any film may allow for variations, but the overall 
superstructure of the film industry provides too strong an insurance against 
those variations’ materializing.  Though the film may articulate certain anxieties 
regarding the oppressiveness of capital, too often it is doomed to legitimate that 
oppressiveness.  One can find this “cured anxiety” in many narratives: I call it 
the “Ebenezer Scrooge Effect.”  As in Dickens’ A Christmas Carol, many post-
industrial narratives confronting capital attempt to rehabilitate it rather than 
6 
overthrow it.  The artist certainly recognizes that capital is the source of so much 
injustice and misery, but reforming the capitalist provides so much easier a cure 
than anything else.  One can see this narrative rehabilitation in many mainstream 
films, such as Mary Poppins, Back to School, Groundhog Day, Where the Heart Is, The 
Coca Cola Kid, The Kid, Regarding Henry, The Family Man, The Game, Jerry Maguire, 
Annie, Working Girl, Pretty Woman, Sabrina, Secretary, Vanilla Sky, Billy Madison, 
The Emperor’s New Groove, Beauty and the Beast, Charade, About a Boy, Something’s 
Gotta Give, the Spy Kids films, and Trading Places,1 wherein the oppressive boss 
“learns his lesson” and everyone is happier and wiser at story’s end.   
Of course, this program of epistemological closure serves only the 
interests of capital.  However much the boss is “cured,” he is still in charge.  If 
there is any real “curing” effected, it is of the artist and the reader/spectator, 
who become acculturated into the primacy of capital.  Furthermore, insofar as 
many of those narratives—especially the films2—couch their agenda within the 
framework of “comedy,” they can disavow any material relationship with the 
agenda.  This is the fetishist’s disavowal, what Octave Mannoni calls the je sais 
bien mais quand même (“I know very well, but all the same”).  The narrative, so it 
goes, can “connote” whatever it wants, but because it’s just for entertainment 
and just for laughs, its relationship to politics is disguised.  Thus film can be 
deeply reactionary without actually appearing to be so2.   
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War cinema, on the other hand, has the unique luxury of not having to 
disguise its politics: because mainstream cinema in general encodes its 
conservative project, the war film in specific can assert its politics overtly.  
Disavowal is built into the structure of any mainstream film, but the war film 
perhaps benefits most from that phenomenon.  Spectators see the war movie in 
literally the same space as the so-called entertainment movie, so they are 
predisposed to thinking the screen soldiers’ occupying a similar ideological 
space as the singers and dancers.  War films, to be specific, protect certain real 
interests, that is, those in the business of making war.  Herman and Chomsky 
assert that art forms within capitalism “mobilize support for the special interests 
that dominate the state and private activity” (20).  Those interests benefit from 
film’s strategy of concealment, an arrangement that film is all too often willing to 
facilitate. 
It’s a tall order to resist the seductions of war narrative, as innumerable 
texts—ranging from Homer to Malory to Tom Clancy—all too willingly submit 
to the romanticism of the bellicose.  Perhaps more so than any other program, 
feminism has enabled intellectuals to both resist the appeals of war and to expose 
certain political (primarily patriarchal) agendas written into military discourse.  
Many theorists have effectively analyzed the workings of the military, especially 
as they are articulated in novels and film.  Three books providing crucial 
background for this work are An Intimate History of Killing by Joanna Bourke, 
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Friendly Fire by Katherine Kinney, and The Remasculinization of America by 
Jeffords. 
Bourke says, “The characteristic act of men at war is not dying, it is 
killing” (1).  An exhaustively researched book—paying particular attention to 
first-person accounts, diaries, and memoirs—An Intimate History of Killing 
examines the psychology of killing in the two World Wars and Vietnam.  She 
concludes (opposing innumerable military fictions) that there is no special 
warrior trait in soldiers: ordinary men and women can and did kill in war, and 
few of them report any psychic trauma as a result.  In fact, many of them 
reported a certain joy in killing.  Culture sanctions this bloodshed by positioning 
it within a war context—an equal opportunity sanction, as both liberal and 
conservative would agree that, in war, people get killed.   
But it is not just soldiers who get killed, and it is within that context where 
the force of Bourke’s argument lies, because one of the primary foci of her book 
is the My Lai Massacre, one of the most important violations of officer impunity 
in American military history.  On March 16, 1968, an American Army unit, led by 
Lieutenant William Calley, murdered over 500 unarmed civilians4—most of 
whom were “old men, women, children, and babies” (160)—in a village in 
northeast Vietnam.  For his part in the massacre, Calley (who was the only one 
convicted) served three and half years in confinement before being paroled in 
1975 by Richard Nixon.  A shocking aspect of the My Lai scandal was the 
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overwhelming support for Calley on the American home front following his 
conviction: 
Draft boards in Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, and 
Wyoming resigned in protest; flags were flown at half-mast in state 
capitals throughout the nation, and veterans organizations such as 
the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars collected 
money to appeal against the conviction.  At a revival meeting at the 
Columbus, Georgia, Memorial Stadium, the Revd Michael Lord 
proclaimed that ‘there was a crucifixion 2,000 years ago of a man 
named Jesus Christ.  I don’t think we need another crucifixion of a 
man named Rusty Calley’.  (Bourke 118) 
The American socius is so conditioned to the fantasy that armies—specifically 
officers in those armies—occupy a space of virtue that when evidence appears to 
contradict that fantasy, the socius resists.  Though William Calley is now an 
infamous figure, the fact that he is not a household name (on a par with Custer or 
Sherman) speaks less about American culture’s ignorance of history and more 
about its resistance to certain historical strategies.  Combatants, according to 
Bourke, “refused to narrate their war-stories in self-destructive ways” (360).  
Audiences are equally resistant to self-destructive war narrative. 
Katherine Kinney’s Friendly Fire concludes that the story of Vietnam War 
narrative is “friendly fire,” Americans killing Americans.  Friendly fire, “the 
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revealed secret at the heart of war” (112), is both a literal and figurative symbol 
of the Vietnam War.  Literally, of course, friendly fire is a tragic side effect of 
combat, but as a figure, it represents the nation at war with itself.  The ideological 
confrontations on the home front created a tremendous amount of anxiety in a 
nation that was still intoxicated by its success in World War II.  A conservative 
strategy for ameliorating that anxiety was to project the natural virtue of the 
World War II American soldier onto his Vietnam counterpart.  Perhaps the 
biggest manifestation of that desire was John Wayne, who was “the model by 
which young American men learn to accept duty and responsibility” (12).  It 
makes little difference that the John Wayne model was a fantasy—Wayne cited 
age and football injuries to procure a deferment from World War II service, but 
he “played” the hero in dozens of war films.  Those roles repositioned the 
cathexis of the military hero onto Wayne himself (a similar cathexis was enjoyed 
by Ronald Reagan, a stateside journalist during World War II.  An interesting 
feature of this cathexis was that the further away these men got from the war 
temporally, the more their hero cathexis increased)!  Kinney demonstrates how 
that artificiality of the John Wayne mythos was in fact a key feature of its 
efficacy—if not for actual combat soldiers, then certainly for the Hawks back 
home, for whom manifest destiny was a crucial aspect of their self-conception.  
Soldiers themselves went to Vietnam hoping that the war was going to play like 
a John Wayne movie, not quite knowing that “John Wayne was always already 
an illusion” (13).   
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Feminist analysis offers a crucial diagnosis of the patriarchal/misogynist 
projects present in so many military narratives.  Especially helpful to students of 
literature are feminist examinations of military fictions.  What is absent in their 
works, however, is an adequate critique of the strictly delineated class system in 
the military, a feature I see as key to the efficacy of military discourse.  And this 
is where I wish to enter the debate: to show how strongly the two-fold rank 
system plays a role in the mystifying power of military fictions.  Jeffords, for 
example, says that the Vietnam War dissolved class and race barriers amongst 
soldiers.  However true that may have been, it was only within an enlisted rank 
context.  The officer/enlisted distinction persisted in the Vietnam War, and was 
perhaps even more balkanizing and dangerous than in previous wars because it 
was fueled by so much nostalgia.  Such nostalgia can be easily gauged in the 1968 
film The Green Berets, where John Wayne’s Colonel Mike Kirby is a reformulation 
and reassertion of the iconic World War II officer hero5. 
Perhaps the crucial work exposing the vanity and dysfunction of the 
officer rank is A History of Militarism by Alfred Vagts, published originally in 
1937, and then updated after World War II (in 1959).  Prefiguring Benedict 
Anderson’s Imagined Communities, it exposes certain fictions that culture 
entertains that wind up creating and supporting a narcissistic, militaristic State.  
Vagts makes a distinction between “the military way,” that is “a primary 
concentration of men and materials in winning specific objectives of power with 
the utmost efficiency,” and “militarism”: 
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Militarism is so constituted that it may hamper and defeat the 
purposes of the military way.  Its influence is unlimited in scope.  It 
may permeate all society and become dominant over all industry 
and arts.  Rejecting the scientific character of the military way, 
militarism displays the qualities of caste and cult, authority and 
belief.  (13) 
Though militaries should be in the service of the State, they invariably become 
the State’s raison d’être.  Says Vagts, “national policy is military policy, no matter 
in what fine phrases it is couched” (36).  Though Vagts is more concerned with 
specifically military history, he nevertheless notes a disturbing side effect of 
militarism, the enlistment of narrative: 
In both Britain and the United States the general staffs [. . .] agreed 
to let civilian professional historians compose the voluminous 
histories of the Second World War.  It cannot be said that this 
change resulted in a civilianization of war history, but rather in a 
militarization of civilian writers.  (37) 
However tempting it may be to assume that such militaristic histories as Stephen 
Ambrose’s Band of Brothers or Tom Brokaw’s The Greatest Generation represent a 
new trend in chauvinist historiography, they hardly differ from the bellicose, 
nostalgic histories of Vagts’ contemporaries, such as Winston Churchill’s The 
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River War or Lieutenant-Colonel H.F.N. Jourdain’s Ranging Memories.  As I will 
argue, the “civilian writers” Vagts refers to are not limited to historians. 
We tend to attach a romanticism and nostalgia to military affairs, factors 
that distract people from the material realities of war and militarism.  This is the 
phenomenon I trace in Chapter II.  In the 1970 Hungarian film Szerelmesfilm 
director Istvan Szabo integrates flashbacks from 1940s and 1950s Budapest, time 
periods of Nazi and Soviet military occupation.  In the film, there are gritty, 
cinema verité scenes of tanks and soldiers rolling into Budapest.  For Szabo, the 
presence of a soldier is clearly designed to recreate and (re)incite horror and 
terror.  But Szerelmesfilm is not, generically speaking, “war cinema,” and how 
disorienting this film must seem to American audiences, highly skilled in 
recognizing film genre, conditioned to the fantasy that the military is the locus of 
virtue.  There is something lost in the translation to a culture that has not seen an 
invading army in two centuries but is nevertheless obsessed with militarism and 
violence, a culture conditioned to perceiving the soldier as hero. 
I will argue in Chapter III that the romanticism of the bellicose noted by 
Vagts is rooted in society’s distrust of democracy, and a yearning for “purer” 
forms of governance—meritocracy, feudalism, monarchy.  The military is the 
overarching metonymy of those forms, but because the military is also literal, the 
signs of distrust are slightly concealed.  War narrative offers a compelling locus 
for class struggle insofar as it presents a clearly demarcated class boundary, that 
separating the officer and the enlisted classes.  It is a boundary that most war 
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narrative protects.  Chapter III, as suggested by its title, borrows heavily from 
D.A. Miller’s 1988 book, The Novel and the Police.  Though Miller is more 
concerned with how novels participate in the cultural practice of surveillance 
and discipline (Miller’s key reference is Foucault’s Surveiller et Punir), I think his 
thesis is fruitful for an examination of how military fictions participate in class 
management.  My claim in the chapter is that a key attraction to war narrative is 
its protected class system—there is no class warfare in warfare. 
Chapter IV was the most difficult chapter to write.  My claim in the 
chapter is that war narrative, in a way, works to “disarm” both artists and 
readers.  I’ve read, it seems, hundreds of works on war and seen hundreds of 
war films, and though most of them profess to be “anti-war,” their investments 
and participation in the conventions of war narrative (most notably the 
subscription to the glorious officer and divested enlisted man tropes) exposes 
that profession as a sham.  This repulsion/attraction dynamic articulates the 
fetishism often associated with war narrative: we may call ourselves anti-war, 
but we are often turned on by the visceral thrills associated with war stories.  
Freud would call this a classic case of disavowal.  Most war narratives, I argue, 
seem to crumble beneath the weight of the allurements of war: I call the resultant 
phenomenon “epistemological incapacity” in order to describe war narrative’s 
persistent ability to seduce—rather than repel—artists and readers.  To me, the 
artist best equipped to resist those seductions is Tim O’Brien, whose Going After 
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Cacciato and The Things They Carried are models for successfully resisting the 
conventions of war narrative. 
A characteristic of militarism is that it postures its elite members—the 
officers—as paragons of civilization.  “Conservative forces,” Vagts says, “strove 
to re-erect what Edmund Burke called the state of ‘knights and saints,’ and 
sought mass appeals through its romantic appeals” (17).  Those “knights and 
saints” are the officer rank.  When art forms do not interrogate that rank, they 
participate in culture’s secession of control of government to a “caste” of people 
who are in the business of killing. 
Perhaps the key factor in the proliferation of militarism is that the military 
command succeeds in posturing itself as anti-war, despite all evidence to the 
contrary.  It’s not just that art forms collude with this practice; they extend 
militarism by ingesting the prescriptions written by the military command.  Let 
us make no mistake: the military is in the business of exterminating human life.  
Anything less than a sober realization of that fact is a de facto collusion with and 
extension of militarism. 
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Notes 
1 A variation of this theme can be seen in narratives that replace the bad capitalist 
with the good (i.e., younger) one, e.g., “How to Succeed in Business Without 
Even Trying,” “The Secret of My Success,” “Tommy Boy,” and “Monsters, Inc.” 
 
2 “The cinema, particularly the industrial cinema, and most particularly the 
Hollywood studio system cinema.”  Mulvey, Fetishism and Curiosity 8. 
 
3 One can see this phenomenon writ large in a current beer commercial.  In it, 
two guys ponder what would make the perfect beer commercial.  The 
“narrative” melts into a scene wherein two voluptuous women have a “catfight” 
and end up wrestling in mud.  The commercial knows that such a commercial, if 
it actually existed, would be exploitative . . . but it’s not really a commercial; it 
exists only in the minds of the two men.  The commercial further disavows the 
politics of the sous rature commercial by showing the guys’ “real” girlfriends’ 
obvious disapproval of the guys’ fantasy.  Thus the commercial can articulate 
desire for homosocialism, fetishism, and misogyny, but—heh, heh—it’s just for 
laughs, so no harm done. 
 
4 There seems to be no consensus on My Lai casualty figures.  Apparently, how 
one votes governs how many people one thinks died at My Lai.  Bourke’s 
statistics are most likely garnered from Seymour Hersh, Cover-Up: The Army’s 
Secret Investigation of the Massacre at My Lai 4 (New York: Random House, 1973).  
Conservate historian Barbara Tuchman, on the other hand, cites “over 200” in 
The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam (New York: Ballantine, 1984): 365, though 
she does not cite a source.  The Army’s official My Lai document, The Peers 
Commission Report (New York: Free Press, 1976), is deliberately (and 
maddeningly) confusing and distracting, in various passages citing 175-200, 400, 
and 490 deaths.   
 
5 For an in-depth analysis of The Green Berets as a propaganda film, see David L. 
Robb, Operation Hollywood:How the Pentagon Shapes and Censors the Movies 
(Amherst: Prometheus, 2004): 277-85. 
 
 
17 
CHAPTER II 
THE OFFICER FETISH 
 
For the officer, honor is reserved, for the  
                common man obedience and loyalty. 
—1752 Saxon-Polish Field Service Rules 
 
                Fifty gentilhommes have more effect  
                than two hundred soldiers. 
                                                         —Montluc 
                Discuss unto me; art thou officer? 
  Or art thou base, common, and popular? 
                                                      —Henry V 
In the opening sequence of V., a Navy Chief urinates into the fuel tank of a 
Packard.  This sequence functions, as Lucien Dallenbach demonstrates in The 
Mirror in the Text, as an example of mise en abyme du code, an encoded 
doppelganger of the text: the Chief1 within the novel “mirrors” the young 
Thomas Pynchon’s resistant project with the novel—or at least attempts to 
announce that project.  The political effect, however, is ambivalent.  While the 
urinating Chief might function as a signifier of dissension, he is nevertheless a 
reinscription of a strict literary convention—the drunken enlisted man, a 
convention one can trace in Western fictions from The Iliad2 to Henry V to 
twentieth-century mainstream war cinema.  I call the effect in V. ambivalent 
because, though the employment of the convention may on one hand signal—to 
use a term from Barthes—the novel’s writerliness, it on the other hand reinforces a 
centuries-old system of state-sanctioned oppression: an officer/enlisted division 
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fueled by a fantasy that officers are sophisticated gentlemen, their enlisted 
counterparts illiterate drunkards.  In many twentieth-century art forms that 
fantasy materializes as a certain fetish, the officer fetish, one that empowers the 
militaristic State. 
This work will examine the officer fetish and how it materializes in 
American war fictions.  The privileging of the officer rank, while hardly unique 
to American discourse, is a powerful political tool: representing the officer rank 
as virtuous facilitates militarism.  As I write, the American military budget is 396 
billion dollars, six times larger than the military budget of its nearest competitor3.  
One reason the military is able to procure these funds is that officially sanctioned 
discourse conditions the American people to believe that the military is wise, 
competent, and responsible.  But the military does not have to labor intensively 
to achieve that effect.  Laura Mulvey, in the context of film analysis, says, “formal 
preoccupations reflect the psychical preoccupations of the society which 
produced it” (“Visual Pleasure” 16).  American military discourse both 
articulates a specific type of desire and “reflects” that same desire: that 
Americans cultivate an aristocracy—the military officer.  A particular strategy 
one can easily trace within that discourse is the representation of the officer as 
the virtuous gentleman.  Few images are more dazzling than the senior officer, 
replete in his crisply pressed uniform adorned with ribbons and insignia, 
standing before a television camera, more often than not fielding softball 
questions from reporters paralyzed by the spectacle.  American culture 
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simultaneously assumes and desires that image to connote virtue4.  However 
troublesome it may be that American culture desires the military officer to 
signify virtue, it is perhaps even more problematic that art forms are seduced 
by—and ultimately collude with—that signifying practice. 
 The novel, says Lukács, is “a surface riddled with holes” (92), a complex 
of often unmanageable contradictions and ambiguities.  Theorists in the wake of 
Bakhtin are perhaps too hasty in concluding that contradiction—the Russian 
word translated as heteroglossia (raznorechie) means “contradiction”—moves in a 
liberalizing, liberatory political trajectory.  And it is within the framework of 
ambiguity where the ambivalence of Pynchon’s opening gambit comes into play.  
Though the mise en abyme suggests that Pynchon—who in the 1950s served a 
two-year enlistment in the American Navy after his sophomore year at Cornell—
identifies with the enlisted man (the urinating chief is a “yeoman,” whose rate 
insignia consists of two crossed pens), he fails to interrogate the officer/enlisted 
praxis.  As a result, Pynchon cannot contain the trajectories of connotation 
associated with the conventional figure.  Considering the nature of Pynchon’s 
style (encyclopedic, Mennipean, unchained), it seems highly unlikely that he 
would even want to contain those trajectories.  But those trajectories do not exist 
outside of a politico-historical context (as much as, say, actors in blackface would 
like to believe otherwise).  They are in fact culturally and politically motivated.  
A truly resistant narrative, being presumably what Mulvey calls a “formal 
preoccupation,” would therefore challenge the convention.  When narrative does 
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not interrogate the convention, it risks reinforcing the “legitimacy” of the 
convention5.   
In his analysis of Hitchcock’s film Rope, D.A. Miller says of connotation,  
On one hand connotation enjoys, or suffers from, an abiding 
deniability.  To refuse the evidence for a merely connoted meaning 
is as simple—and as frequent—as uttering the words “But isn’t it 
just .  .  . ?” before retorting the denotation.  On the other this 
maneuver is so far betrayed by the spirit of irritation, willfulness, 
and triumphalism in which it is infallibly performed, that it ends 
up attesting not just to the excesses of connotation but also to the 
impossibility of ever really eliminating them from signifying 
practice.  (“Anal Rope” 118)   
When artists fail to interrogate convention—because convention is so overdriven 
with connotation—they collude with the political forces that empower it, though 
it is a collusion with a built-in disavowal.  With respect to military fictions, it is in 
the best interests of the state to present the officer rank as beautiful and the 
enlisted rank as ugly: such “work” in art forms preserves the status quo.   
Thomas Pynchon is not alone.  The overwhelming majority of literary and 
filmic texts submit to this convention, a convention rising from class and 
patriarchal anxieties.  A narrative strategy in these texts is a privileging of the 
officer rank, and the deliberate marginalization of the enlisted rank.   
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What is at stake in military fictions is, ultimately, death.  No matter how 
cleverly or subtly culture tries to disguise the fact, militaries are about killing.  
We might comfort ourselves with the notion that our militaries are organized for 
killing people of other cultures, but militaries—with their officer and enlisted 
rank divisions—are organized in such a way to ensure that casualties occur 
primarily within certain elements of its own culture (primarily the poor and 
minorities), while at the same time preserving the “right sort.”  Art forms 
sanction this practice by “playing along” with conventional figures—primarily a 
fetishization of the officer rank.   
The military command would naturally bristle at the term fetish, but 
cannot deny the fact of officer prerogative.  Though this factor of enlisted rank 
marginalization—both in narrative and in reality—reveals the levels of advocacy 
the officer rank enjoys, it also positions the enlisted rank into a particular space: 
the space marked for death.  The officer is spared that marginalization because 
he (and it is most certainly a “he”—a crucial attraction of war narrative is that it 
is a priori patriarchal) has certain traits that are either inherent or engendered in 
officer training programs (“leadership” is the trait having the most currency in 
today’s military rhetoric), traits that excuse the officer from occupying that space.  
That is not to say that officers do not die in war narratives (or in actual wars), but 
it is a different sort of tragedy when the lieutenant dies as opposed to the 
private.6 
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That officer prerogative/enlisted negativity is deeply structured in officer-
generated discourse.  One does not have to look hard to find it, either.  As 
Herman and Chomsky note in Manufacturing Consent, there are over 1200 
military journals, all of which are generated from officer circles (the enlisted rank 
is rendered mute).  In one of them, Publications of the Strategic Studies Institute (the 
publication of the Army War College), three West Point professors, Don M. 
Snider, John A. Nagl, and Tony Pfaff wrote an article in 1999 called “Army 
Professionalism, The Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century.”  In it 
they bemoan the loss of officer “moral fiber,” a phenomenon they assert arose 
from the Vietnam War and was further exacerbated during the Clinton years7.  
For Doctors Snider, Nagle, and Pfaff, a manifestation of that loss of “military 
professionalism” is the modern officer’s alleged hesitancy to suffer casualties in 
his unit.  The authors write,  
On January 25, 1999, a tall, ramrod-straight young combat-arms 
officer serving in Bosnia with the 1st Armored Division told the 
about-to-graduate cadets at West Point, “I tell my men every day 
there is nothing there worth one of them dying for.” It was a 
startling admission to the cadets who were in the midst of a series 
of classes on the professional military ethic; the lieutenant’s 
admission was utterly contradictory to what they had been 
studying. Their studies had led them to believe that minimizing 
casualties was an inherent part of every combat mission but not a 
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mission in and of itself, particularly one which might impede or 
even preclude success in the unit’s mission—in this case, peace 
operations within the American sector of Bosnia. Queried by a 
cadet in the audience as to why he communicated this to his men, 
the lieutenant responded, “Because minimizing, really prohibiting, 
casualties is the top-priority mission I have been given by my 
battalion commander.”  (1)   
According to the authors, the combat-arms officer exhibited a “corrosion” of the 
military ethic by confessing an unwillingness to sacrifice his men, even within a 
context of so-called “peace operations.”  Two implicit ideas in the above passage 
bear mentioning: 1) Genuine “military professionalism” involves an unflinching 
willingness to kill, and 2) Bureaucracy hampers that willingness.   
The authors’ solution to the “officer corps’ intellectual muddle” (2) is to 
“Reconceiv[e] the Officer as Self-Sacrificing Servant of Society” (34), that is, to 
look backwards to a time when officers were perhaps not so burdened by public 
scrutiny.  One aspect of that reconception is that “Officers are gentle-men and -
women—persons of character, courtesy and cultivation, possessing the qualities 
requisite for military leadership” (37).  This “reconception” of the officer mythos 
is therefore motivated by nostalgia and a deliberate over-valorization8, though of 
course not articulated as such but rather in terms implying that those “qualities” 
are natural and/or engendered.  Slavoj Žižek would call this sort of discursive 
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maneuvering a strategy to make reality mirror a prescriptive fantasy of reality, to 
make the real “appear to be found rather than produced”: 
Although any object can function as the object-cause of desire—
insofar as the power of fascination it exerts is not its immediate 
property but results from the place it occupies in the structure—we 
must, by structural necessity, fall prey to the illusion that the power 
of fascination belongs to the object as such.  (Looking Awry 32, 33) 
Though it may be unclear what precisely “gentle-men and –women” means, we 
can be assured that we’ll know it when we see it.   
The military, with its built-in “power of fascination” and caste system 
disguised as a rank system, provides a convenient locus for conservative forces 
to assert their dominance, a dominance constantly threatened by democracy.  
Keith Nelson and Spencer Olin, in their historiographical analysis of militarism, 
Why War?, say, “the principle of majoritarianism strikes at the heart of 
hierarchical authority” (12).  A problem associated with military discourse is that 
conservative desires are not just dangerous in and of themselves: those desires 
desire.  They are couched in terms of oppression, surveillance, and domination.  
They don’t merely seek to control the Other (both outside and within borders); 
they desire a mechanism of perpetual domination.  In Discipline and Punish, 
Foucault uses the prison as the trope of western culture’s desire for domination.  
Our desire is not only for a domination of others, but also (and perhaps even 
moreso) for a domination over ourselves.  Foucault argues that power is 
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exercised over a socius that desires to be controlled and monitored, and 
furthermore that that power and control are not specifically in the hands of a 
class of controllers: 
This power is exercised rather than possessed; it is not the 
‘privilege’, acquired or preserved, of the dominant class, but the 
overall effect of its strategic positions—an effect that is manifested 
and sometimes extended by the position of those who are 
dominated.  (26-27) 
Though Foucault asserts that power cannot be ultimately—to borrow a term 
from Derrida—“traced” to a particular point, power is nevertheless both 
exercised and possessed.  The American socius produces a class of surveillants 
and punirants that exercises that power.  The military provides a compelling 
model for how power that Foucault describes is literally exercised: the military is 
a mechanism for exerting real power, but is also carefully disguised, so as not to 
appear as such.  The military is an overarching dominating class, and that we do 
in fact glamorize and privilege it—not unlike our treatment of the wealthiest 
segment of culture—bespeaks our desire for domination.  The military officer, 
both as a narrative figure and as a material presence, stands as a constant 
signifier of our need for domination and control.  As for power “extended by the 
position of those who are dominated,” nowhere does that seem truer than within 
military enlisted ranks, whose members are legally—and, perhaps more 
effectively, traditionally—compelled to extend the power of their “superiors” 
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(and the mystification and aura attached to them).  Moreover, the officer class, 
mysteriously liberated from the taint suffered by the preterite enlisted caste, 
brokers, negotiates, and wages war, but enjoys a cathexis that refracts those facts. 
That we endow the military officer with certain immeasurable, nebulous 
characteristics (“leadership,” “gentlemanliness,” “courage”) signifies, in 
Freudian terms, some sort of perceived lack, a lack that necessitates the 
compensation of fetishism.   The frustrating, problematic aspect of Freudianism 
arises from this sort of analysis: does the “monstrous presence of the irrational in 
politics”9 arise exclusively from certain psychological drives, particularly when 
those politics are in the service of class and militarism?10  It was this sort of 
question that has led many theorists (most notably Laura Mulvey in Fetishism and 
Curiosity) towards a synthesis of Freud and Marx. 
The term fetish necessitates a negotiation between Freudian and Marxian 
spaces. With respect to military rank representation in American novels and 
films, one cannot compartmentalize the fetish programs of Marx and Freud, as 
both have converging validities in texts dealing with the military object.  The 
military officer as he appears in most American fictions is, in Freudian terms, “an 
idealized-self image, and an ego ideal, an externally projected standpoint from 
which the subject judges himself or herself in relation to that image” (Krips 75).  
The essential issue is that although the fetishization of the officer rank in 
American fictions reveals a certain cultural anxiety, that fetishization cannot be 
separated from the fact that it is a class phenomenon.   
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Marx views the phenomenon of fetishism as a feature of capitalism, more 
specifically, capitalism-as-opposed-to-feudalism (an important distinction to be 
explored later).  There has been much recent work done in fetish analysis11 
which, at the risk of my essentializing and trivializing profoundly complex 
phenomena, describes fetish and fetishization as strategies designed to attach to 
things a significance belying their real material conditions.  Henry Krips calls 
fetishism the “contradiction between knowledge and practice, between knowing 
and doing” (159).   Fetish has specialized meanings within both the Marxian and 
Freudian programs, but those meanings do not work at cross purposes, a 
concession Laura Mulvey makes in her book Fetishism and Curiosity, where she 
asserts that feminism arising from the 1960s “unbalanced the potential 
alchemical mix [of Marx and Freud] in the direction of Freud.”  Nevertheless, 
because “advanced capitalism consolidates its world power through the 
entertainment and communications industries [psychoanalysis] needs Marx” (1).  
And with respect to texts dealing with the military object, Marx and Freud both 
provide useful ways of understanding many of the disturbing elements in them, 
the most immediate of which is the continuing rise of militarism in the post-Cold 
War age.  Both Marx and Freud define fetish as a “symptom.”  For Freud, fetish is 
a symptom of castration anxiety, for Marx of capital’s voraciousness.   
In a Marxian sense, the “something” of fetish is a thing, a “commodity.”  
But the manifestation of fetish is not limited to commodities, or to be more 
precise—as Marx says—“things qua commodities.”  Though many factors 
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contributed to nineteenth-century industrialists’ wildly successful exploitation of 
labor, one specifically noted by Marx was the phenomenon of commodification.  
Capital is so dominant a force that, ultimately, human interactions become 
indistinguishable from market transactions: “social action takes the form of the 
action of objects, which rule the producers rather than being ruled by them” (86).   
Therefore, it should be hardly surprising that non-commodities such as human 
interactions become “commodified.”  Marx graphically maps out the dark side of 
commodification practice in his exposé of nineteenth-century labor practices, 
Chapter X of Capital, where the products of labor became barely distinguishable 
from—and just as easily exploitable as—the producers of labor, often referred to 
as “hands.”  Though the have-nots were assigned this synechdocic fate, the 
products of their labors enjoyed more success.  The strategy capital uses to 
consolidate power into the correct “hands” is commodity fetishism, that is, 
sublimating the real conditions of labor to conditions of over- and under-
valuation: many of the mundane objects produced became infected with an 
“aura”, but not the laborers—despite the efforts of the Russian Revolution—who 
produced those objects.  More disturbing than the fetishization of the 
commodity, however, is that the exploiters of labor were able to attach that aura 
to themselves.  Thorstein Veblen understood this in The Theory of the Leisure Class 
where he suggested that no revolution would occur in the West because those 
exploited are conditioned to overvalue the exploiters, a phenomenon that 
extended power to those who needed it least: “The possession of wealth, which 
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was at the outset valued simply as an evidence of efficiency, becomes, in popular 
apprehension, itself a meritorious act. Wealth is now itself intrinsically 
honourable and confers honour on its possessor” (29). 
As a result of the commodification practice, the exploiters of labor not 
only enjoy the fetishism attached to the object (for example, the $200.00 per pair 
Nike Air Jordan basketball sneaker) but also attached to themselves (Nike 
founder Phil Knight).12  Walter Benjamin, in “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction,” predicted that the mass production of goods would 
remove the aura attached to them.  He was mistaken.  What he overlooked was 
that the overvaluation of a commodity (and the commodifier) has almost nothing 
to do with the commodity itself but much to do with men’s interrelations, 
interrelations designed to consolidate power within a small arena.  Marx says 
that commodity fetishism is “a definite social relation between men, that 
assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things” (83).  He 
should have added “and between themselves.”  A dangerous aspect of this 
“fantastic form” is that it is not perceived as anything other than normal. 
Slavoj Žižek notes that a phenomenon occurring in fetishization is that we 
come to think that the fetishized characteristic of the commodity is its “natural” 
state, a process he calls “fetishistic misrecognition” (Sublime Object 25).  The 
misrecognition is never haphazard—the misrecognized elements are projected in 
such a way as to empower officially sanctioned ideology.  Noting how this 
phenomenon relates to art, Terry Eagleton says that art participates in that 
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process of misrecognition as a strategy collusive with systems of domination, 
thereby becoming  
part of a society’s ideology—an element in that complex structure 
of social perception which ensures that the situation in which one 
social class has powers over the others is either seen by most 
members of the society as ‘natural,’ or not seen at all.  (5)   
Thus the real conditions of existence (to be precise, the real conditions of 
labor) are engineered in such a way as to appear natural or normal, rather than 
engineered.  This process brings to mind Althusser’s famous assertion that 
“Ideology is a ‘Representation’ of the Imaginary Relationship of Individuals to 
their Real Conditions of Existence” (162).  The germane consideration here is that 
those in the business of exploitation can manufacture an aura, attach it to 
themselves, and simultaneously strip those under their control of that aura, all 
the while profiting from the illusion that it is all a natural process.   
Freud, in fact, describes fetishism in similar terms, that is, as a form of 
misrecognition.  In his 1927 essay “Fetishism,” he notes a patient whose peculiar 
fetish was a “shine on the nose”: the patient saw an imaginary sheen on others’ 
noses.  Freud’s diagnosis was that the English-born patient had attached a 
forgotten English signifier to the German sign, glanz, in the phrase glanz auf der 
nase: 
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The fetish, which originated from his earliest childhood, had to be 
understood in English, not German.  The ‘shine on the nose’—was 
in reality a ‘glance at the nose’.  The nose was thus the fetish, which, 
incidentally, he endowed at will with the luminous shine which 
was not perceptible to others.  (162) 
There was no literal shine; there was only the confusion between sign and 
signifier, the symptom of which was the fetish. 
Though Freud concludes that the fetish is a substitute for the penis (or 
glans, as Freud puns in the previous example)—specifically “a substitute for the 
woman’s (the mother’s) penis that the little boy once believed in and—for 
reasons familiar to us—does not want to give up” (152-53)—it is crucial to 
understand that the effect/affect of fetish, as in the Marxian schema, results from 
the misrecognition13 of a sign.  A pertinent consideration here is that in both 
Freud and Marx, the misrecognition produces the symptom, the sign of the 
fetish. The manifestation of the fetish is thus a way of compensating for a 
perceived lack: producing something to make up for its ostensible non-existence.  
The misrecognition that often occurs in war narrative is that the military 
engenders a culture of virtue (which militaries, as a matter of policy, deliberately 
formulate in nebulous terms, such as “honor,” “leadership,” “discipline,” or 
“responsibility”).  It does not: it engenders a culture of death.  What seems to get 
lost in the shuffle is the simple fact that militaries are designed specifically to 
exterminate human life.  However problematic it may be that militaries imagine 
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themselves as embodying certain qualities of virtue, it is an even more 
dangerous practice that non-military entities become incorporated into that 
zeitgeist.  Perhaps the most famous articulation of that fetishistic misrecognition, 
Helmut von Moltke said, “the army is the most outstanding institution in every 
country, for it alone makes possible the existence of all civic institutions” (22).   
 Freud’s pertinence to military texts (where the distinction between 
historical and fictional is hardly relevant) arises in no small way from feminist 
theory, its efficacy rooted in its twin critiques of both narrative and Freud.  
Feminist theory (particularly film theory) finds in psychoanalysis a fertile ground 
from which to harvest its exposure of hegemonic systems, for Freud not only 
articulates the patriarchal energies present in discourse, he also codifies them.  If it 
be true that psychoanalysis reveals the Oedipal contract present in narrative, it is 
because both narrative and psychoanalysis are overdriven by 
masculine/patriarchal energies, what Teresa de Lauretis calls the “patriarchal 
prerogative written into the psychoanalytical contract” (The Practice of Love xvi).  
Such a devastating a priori enables feminism then to expose that “patriarchal 
prerogative written” into narrative, both filmic and literary.  Near the beginning 
of  “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” Laura Mulvey says, 
“Psychoanalytic theory is thus appropriated here as a political weapon, 
demonstrating the way the unconscious of patriarchal society has structured film 
form” (34).   
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 The problem with psychoanalysis, however, is its apparent ahistoricity, 
observed as early as the 1920s by the Bakhtin Circle.  Valentin Voloshinov asserts 
in Freudianism:A Critical Sketch (1927) that Freud is attractive to the Western 
bourgeoisie because, by locating their drives to the merely sexual, he liberates 
them from any otherwise historical/political anxieties: 
[W]hat really counts in a human being is not at all what determines 
his place and role in history—the class, nation, historical period to which 
he belongs; only his sex and his age are essential, everything else 
being merely a superstructure.  A person’s consciousness is shaped not 
by his historical existence but by his biological being, the main facet of 
which is sexuality.  Such is the basic ideological motif of 
Freudianism.  (10) 
Foucault crystallizes this observation in The History of Sexuality by saying that 
psychoanalysis offers “a scientific guarantee of innocuousness” (5).  The attack 
on psychoanalysis reaches its full articulation in the Anti-Oedipus, where Deleuze 
and Guattari write, “psychoanalysis is taking part in the work of bourgeois 
repression at its most far-reaching level, that is to say, keeping European 
humanity harnessed to the yoke of daddy-mommy and making no effort to do 
away with this problem once and for all” (50). 
   The reductionist critiques of Freud, however, neglect to observe that the 
rise of psychoanalysis is itself a historical phenomenon (and, as many theorists 
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have noted, coincident with the rise of film).  One finds an unexpected apologist 
for Freud in the person of Marxist theorist Terry Eagleton, who says, 
One criticism of Freud still sometimes heard on the political Left is 
that his thinking is individualist—that he substitutes ‘private’ 
psychological causes and explanations for social and historical 
ones.  This accusation reflects a radical misunderstanding of 
Freudian theory.  There is indeed a real problem about how social 
and historical factors are related to the unconscious; but one point of 
Freud’s work is that it makes it possible for us to think of the 
development of the individual in social and historical terms.  
(Literary Theory 163). 
As many feminist theorists have said, Freud’s centrality to twentieth-century 
discourse arises from a masculine/patriarchal dysphoria resulting from women’s 
increasing political strength. 
 Perhaps the most effective synthesis of Marxian and Freudian concepts of 
the fetish is William Pietz’s history of fetishism, appearing in three separate 
issues of Res in the 1980s.14  Pietz traces the word fetish both etymologically and 
historically, suggesting that although the term came into currency as a European 
description of African social, political, religious, and—most importantly—trade 
practices (“Fetisso derives from the Portuguese word feitiço, which in the late 
Middle Ages meant ‘magical practice’ or ‘witchcraft’” [Fetish I 5]), the term seems 
much more apropos of Western practices.  Early Modern European tradesmen, 
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bemused by the “false objective values” of the Africans they exploited in 
business ventures, nevertheless had their own curious habits.  The Portuguese 
tradesman who scoffed at the West African “dressed in a Mandinga smock, with 
amulets of his fetishes (gods) around his neck,”15 himself owned lingueros (“a sort 
of rod on which were suspended serpent tongues or a large number of rare 
stones [. . .] to which were attributed magical virtues”16), the “horn of a unicorn” 
(“to detect envenomed food” [Fetish II 35]), and other objects designed to fend off 
evil spirits.  When Pietz describes mystical objects “worn about the body which 
itself embodied an actual power resulting from the ritual combination of 
materials” (Fetish II 36), it is clear that he is indicting Western practices, practices 
whose traces persist to this day. 
The full array of fetishistic affects—the “Imaginary Relationships” and 
“misrecognition”—clearly materialize in World War II-era Hollywood combat 
films where the narrative attaches a romanticism, a “luminous shine,” to military 
affairs.  The standard trope in these propaganda films is the beautiful, freshly-
shaven officer juxtaposed against the ugly, three-day-stubble private.   
In the film Crash Dive (1943), for example, the film takes great pains to 
position the two overvalued officers (Tyrone Power and Dana Andrews) in both 
social (the New London officer’s club) and combat (the interior of a submarine) 
interiors.  The point of placing them in the social setting is to establish their 
virtue.  In “What Novels can do That Films Can’t (and Vice Versa),” Seymour 
Chatman asserts that “film does not describe at all but merely presents; or better, 
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it depicts” (128).  Because there is no voiceover—or Brechtian sign—saying, 
“These officers represent goodness,” the film resorts to that most tried and true 
semiological link: physical beauty signifies goodness.  As is the case with most 
mainstream war films, Crash Dive exploits the actor’s (in this case Tyrone 
Power’s) physical beauty because once the spectator has decoded the sign, Power 
can then “prove” the validity of the code by demonstrating valor in combat.  The 
film spectator can therefore take the physical beauty of the officer at “face value.”  
Showing Tyrone Power in the officer’s club is a necessary element in the film 
because when he is transplanted to the grubby, claustrophobic interior of a 
submarine, his virtue has already been established—he is certainly not part of the 
mise en scene.  The enlisted sailors aboard the submarine are, conversely, merely 
elements of the mise en scene: their physical ugliness semiologically links them to 
their “natural” marginalized status, a status not at all interrogated by the film.  
The camera may focus on that rank, but only for a moment, and only then to 
neutralize any socioeconomic anxiety the film or the audience may experience: 
those sailors are clearly content in their position as inferiors.  This 
representational strategy, present in the overwhelming majority of mainstream 
war films, is clearly an Ideological State Apparatus: like white hats on Westerns’ 
good guys, the representational tropes in the combat film are comforting (and, as 
we shall see in Chapter III, policing) signifiers for a traumatized nation.  What 
interests me in this study is the persistence of these tropes in contemporary art 
forms.   
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In Officer/Enlisted rank representations, that fetishization of the officer 
rank is the symptom of—and this is where Freud is so crucial—a patriarchal 
nostalgia. As Lacan says, “One has to look for the origins of the notion of 
symptom not in Hippocrates but in Marx, in the connection he was first to 
establish between capitalism and what?—the good old times, what we call the 
feudal times” (106).  The officer caste fantasizes that its special-ness results from 
a rich tradition dating from a glorious past, that is, from the feudal aristocracy.  
This nostalgic fantasy in fact materializes in military institutions’ baccalaureate 
ceremonies where graduates—freshly commissioned military officers—wield 
actual swords. 
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the American mainstream cinema 
machinery has produced numerous films that use the World War II propaganda 
film as the model for the depiction of American virtue.  Films such as Pearl 
Harbor (2001)17, We Were Soldiers (2002), Behind Enemy Lines (2001), Hart’s War 
(2002), and Tears of the Sun (2003) use the fetishization of the officer rank as the 
primary trope in representing American exceptionalism.  The fetishized officer of 
the World War II propaganda film is transplanted into these films in order to 
address the September 11 trauma.  Who better to restore order to chaos than the 
beautiful, virtuous American military officer, an icon untainted by skepticism or 
cynicism?   
To see how officer fetishism presents itself in American fictions, one need 
only tune in to the television program Jag, where patriarchal codes are openly 
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embraced, both as a reinforcement of the male prerogative and as an active 
participant in the disempowerment (and punishment) of women.  It is also as an 
entertainment form that has exploited September 11th to legitimate fantasies of 
American exceptionalism.  The protagonist of the show is Commander Harmon 
“Harm” Rabb, a conventional American officer hero, a reassertion of the World 
War II officer.  Jag seeks to disburden itself from the complications of Vietnam, 
where—in the wake of Lieutenant Calley—the military-as-locus-of virtue was 
called into question.  Jag, overdriven by nostalgia, therefore pretends that 
Vietnam never existed.  Vietnam, however, is the motivating impetus for the 
show.  Looming over every episode is the reactionary fantasy that America’s 
defeat at the hands of a poor third-world army occurred because of a lack of 
military resolve.  This lack materializes in Jag as a virulent form of militaristic 
fetishism that seeks to “correct” that troublesome past.  Disencumbered from the 
baggage of a problematic history, Jag is free then to reclaim 
nationalistic/masculine territories that ostensibly existed before Vietnam.  In Jag, 
the men officers have free reign to embody the characteristics one saw back in 
the good old days.   
One episode, “The Mission,” provides a television version of “Army 
Professionalism, The Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century” 
inasmuch as it presents the anxieties of the officer rank, but of course only as a 
straw man that can be knocked down by the unselfconscious super officer.  In 
this episode, a JAG officer stationed aboard an American aircraft carrier hesitates 
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to order an air strike against a group of gun-toting, camel-riding Afghanis.  
Because it is night, the officer cannot make a positive identification, and he aborts 
the mission.  This completely sane decision is, of course, represented in the show 
as cowardice, an example of the “officer muddle.”  The frustrated commanding 
officer of the aircraft carrier then recruits Harm to fly an attack mission because 
he knows that Harm is not that sort of hesitant officer.   Harm flies the mission, 
blows up the bad guys, and returns to the carrier, thereby restoring the order 
threatened by the “muddled” officer. 
The most disingenuous aspect of Jag, however, is its sexual politics.  Jag is 
a reformulation of 1980s Vietnam buddy programs (Magnum P.I., Miami Vice, The 
A Team) where, according to Susan Jeffords, “[i]n order to ensure that the value 
of the masculine bonds is maintained, women must be effectively and finally 
eliminated from the masculine realm” (xiii).  Jag, though, has a twist: there are 
three major women characters in the show—all officers—but their function in the 
show is to reinforce the primacy of the male officer and to reaffirm their own 
valuelessness in a man’s world: Lieutenant-Colonel Sarah MacKenzie (played by 
Catherine Bell) is a fetishized sex-object, Lieutenant Harriet Sims18 (Karri Turner) 
is the Madonna, and Lieutenant Loren Singer (Nanci Chambers) is the iron 
maiden. 
The biggest in-joke of the show is that Harm’s love interest, Marine 
Lieutenant-Colonel Sarah MacKenzie, actually outranks him.  This rank 
differential threatens to undermine Rabb’s dominance, but that differential is 
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only a ruse: the standard plot complication in the long-running show is 
MacKenzie’s frequent facing off against Harm in court.  Harm invariably wins 
these face-offs, thus signifying his “real” superiority to her. 
Just as prevalent as the patriarchal nostalgia—and this is where Marx 
comes into play—is that Officer/Enlisted rank representations also articulate a 
bourgeois anxiety.  Military fictions juxtaposing the officer and enlisted ranks 
offer clearly demarcated class boundaries.  I say “clearly,” but that is not 
altogether accurate within an American context: Americans’ relationship to 
democracy manifests a discomfort with suggestions of class identification and 
differentiation.  We Americans are, after all, “created equal.”  But those class 
differentiations do exist: the wealthy and beautiful enjoy a higher social status in 
America.  Americans just don’t like calling it a class system.  The military offers a 
sheltered example of that class system-called-by-another-name: officers have 
access to segregated facilities (officers’ clubs, wardrooms19, credit unions), they 
live in segregated military housing, and—of course—they make significantly 
more money (and enjoy vastly superior retirement benefits).  But these features 
of the officer rank are apparently not perceived as evidence of a class system, but 
rather as a natural state of military affairs.  In this manner, the officer rank is a 
sort of Lacanian articulation of fantasy, a “realized hallucination.”  The officer, 
desiring the signifiers of social rank, can manufacture and enjoy them, but 
without any residual anxiety because those signifiers are after all not really there, a 
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phenomenon Lacan calls “the Other of the Other”: a disavowal built into the 
mechanism. 
American military fictions can then play their own game of class: military 
rank clearly signifies class, but it does not have to call it class.  It can even be 
fantasized as representing “democracy.”  The military officer can thus “play” the 
aristocrat, but he is ostensibly disencumbered with connotations associated with 
aristocracy.  The flip side of the coin is that the fictional American officer can 
even play the system-bucking rebel and still enjoy the social position afforded his 
rank.  This sort of John Wayne officer—present in a large number of American 
novels and films—is what Žižek calls a “radical conformist,” that is, one who is 
firmly entrenched in the system but “paradoxically experiences himself as an 
outlaw” (Looking Awry 103).  The dangerous psychological effect of this radical 
conformist is that he has currency: readers or spectators can experience him as a 
rebel as well. 
The fetishization of the officer rank reveals, as a deep structure, a distrust 
of democracy.  The privileging of the officer rank is always at the expense of the 
enlisted rank—art forms often collude with the notion that only the beautiful and 
brilliant (the officer) are fit for the high “office.” On a more dangerous level, 
however, this practice of privileging one class over another reveals a hatred for 
certain elements within a population.  War narratives, and indeed wars 
themselves, cull those “ranks” in order to neutralize certain class anxieties. 
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What we often see in art forms dealing with military subjects is the artist’s 
participation in “fetishistic misrecognition.”  The example used earlier, 
Pynchon’s deployment of the “drunken sailor” convention, participates—
however ironically—in that fetishization.  There are, of course, innumerable 
examples of straightforward articulations of officer fetishism, where the artist 
“writes” the symptom as if it were not the symptom, but rather—as an attempt to 
block interpretation—of “reality.”  What primarily prompts this study, though, is 
the appearance of the fetishized officer in the so-called anti-war fiction.  One 
early example is Hemingway’s A Farewell to Arms, where the fetishization of the 
officer rank undermines the anti-war agenda. 
In Chapter XXVII of A Farewell to Arms, the narrator, Henry, an American 
in the Italian officer corps, expresses a disillusionment with war: 
I was always embarrassed by the words sacred, glorious, and 
sacrifice and the expression in vain.  We had heard them, 
sometimes standing in the rain almost out of earshot, so that only 
the shouted words came through and had read them, on 
proclamations that were slapped up by billposters over other 
proclamations now for a long time, and I had seen nothing sacred, 
and the things that were glorious had no glory and the sacrifices 
were like the stockyards at Chicago if nothing was done with the 
meat except to bury.  (184-85) 
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This oft-cited passage expresses what one might reasonably call an anti-war 
sentiment, but Hemingway problematizes that sentiment only a few pages later 
when Henry confronts the enlisted rank, described in Chapter XXVIII as “two 
sergeants of engineers” (195).  After this curiously rank-specific introduction, 
Hemingway inserts several narrative clues to orient the reader against the two 
sergeants.  The first is the sergeants’ inability to recognize Henry as an American 
(presumably because Henry’s Italian is so fluent)—an ignorance designed both to 
signify their stupidity and to reinforce Henry’s superiority.  Five pages later, 
Henry catches one of the sergeants stealing a clock from an abandoned 
farmhouse.  On the next page, Henry says to one of the sergeants, “An army 
travels on its stomach” (201).  But the sergeant does not recognize the famous 
quote (from Napoleon), further signifying his stupidity.  By the time Henry 
concludes that the sergeants “hated the lot of us,” Hemingway has apparently 
gathered enough textual evidence to justify killing them.  But there is no 
evidence to suggest that the sergeants hated the ambulance crew; there is only 
evidence to suggest that Henry hated the sergeants.   In Chapter XXIX, the two 
sergeants abandon Henry’s ambulance stuck in the Italian mud, whereupon 
Henry takes out his revolver and shoots at them, killing one (204).  The 
fraudulent mitigations inserted into the narrative notwithstanding, the killing of 
the sergeant is an act of murder, but an act that demands the collusion of the 
reader.  Moreover, that murder seems to undercut the anti-war sentiment 
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articulated only a few pages earlier: to Henry, war may be a tragic waste, but 
some men really deserve killing. 
Moreso than in the novel, the libidinal investments present in the film 
medium render it even more subject to fetishization.  Though Mulvey’s analysis 
in “Visual Pleasure” of the phenomenon of fetishization diagnoses a specific 
filmic problem—that women primarily function as objects of consumption in 
mainstream cinema—the larger issue at stake is the persistent disempowerment 
of women.  Mulvey’s thesis is particularly effective with respect to the 
fetishization of women’s body parts: the woman’s objectified position in the film 
reinforces and restates her marginalized political status.  The mainstream film 
mechanism fetishizes the military officer in a similar way.  The major difference 
between the fictional military officer and the objectified woman, however, is that 
the fetishization of the officer buttresses his real power.   
Mainstream film is what Fernando Solanas and Octavio Gettino call 
“cinema of mystification,” that is, it is a commodity that seeks to legitimate the 
status quo by a process of dazzling the spectator.  Everything about mainstream 
film is fetishized: the costumes, the film stock, the sets, the sound, and—most 
importantly—the stable of overvalued actors who are coddled and nurtured by 
the various studios and worshipped by a culture mesmerized by physical beauty.  
A major factor in the success of its mystification is that mainstream film pretends 
to represent the underrepresented and to champion liberal causes.  Baudrillard 
would say that those postures are merely simulations of liberalism.  The 
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Hollywood movie is, rather, as Solanas and Gettino say, “one more consumer 
good” that “succeed[s] in bearing witness to the decay of bourgeois values and 
testif[ies] to social injustice” (44).   
However, one arena where even the simulation of bourgeois values is 
jettisoned is mainstream war cinema, a medium that openly embraces a politics 
of aristocracy and legitimates the social injustice of a class society.  In order for 
these propaganda films to “work,” the ideological strategy must be in direct 
proportion to the representational strategy.  The film mechanism tries to shore 
up any holes in the (primarily visual) program in order to eliminate any gaps 
between sign and signifier.  The military officer must function as a watertight 
icon—to be a full representation of nationalism, he must be unalloyed, racially 
pure. 
But propaganda can only function if it appears as not propaganda—no 
propaganda film can bear the burden of a cast filled with unalloyed icons.  
Fortunately for the symbiotic relationship of mainstream cinema and the state, 
the military provides a dichotomous rank system that provides a release valve 
for filmic anxiety.  Thus the film can ostensibly temper its iconographic strategy 
by displaying a flawed population segment: in war film, the enlisted rank is 
decidedly not beautiful.  The film delights in this representation; because of it, the 
film can appear realistic and non-propagandistic.  The problem, however, is that 
the spectator (and of course the film director) does not identify with this 
“flawed” population segment.  The end result is that war film participates in the 
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marginalization of the largest part of its own population, thereby becoming a 
realpolitiker in eugenics.  War cinema, taking its cues from the military, treats the 
enlisted rank with an unconscionable contempt. 
This section will examine two films, made over fifty years apart from each 
other, that fully exploit officer fetishism and enlisted rank marginalization: In 
Which We Serve (directed by Noel Coward and David Lean, 1942) and Saving 
Private Ryan (directed by Steven Spielberg, 1997).  In these films, there is no effort 
made to challenge the legitimacy or efficacy of the dichotomous rank system.  
Both films, in fact, embrace that system and posit that virtue is specifically located 
within the officer rank, the military’s simulation of aristocracy. 
The primary value of the propaganda film is that, by examining it, we can 
clearly gauge how the state facilitates militarism.  In the propagandistic text, no 
effort is made to conceal how it is in the service of the state.  These narratives are 
joyous: they revel in the “naturalness” and desirability of hierarchical systems.  
Though there are always deaths in these narratives, those deaths do not temper 
the unfiltered joy of the narrator or the camera, both delighting in the perfect 
system of governance promised by military rank.  In war, the best men rise to the 
top of the social chain, and the low elements of society are kept where they 
belong, immediately in front of the bullets.  Any self-consciousness about class 
dissolves in the ideological space between reader/spectator and narrative, a 
space strategically invested with concealing the narrative’s investment in class 
boundaries.  A crucial strategy in the assertion of class in the war film is the 
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unironic engagement of the epic genre, whose key attractions are nostalgia and 
masculine prerogative.  War demands a redistribution of the epic tropes.   
In Which We Serve is a straightforward exemplum of the British World War 
II propaganda war movie.  Like American war cinema of the same time period, 
there is no attempt in the film to disguise the fact that it is in the service of the 
state: it clearly seeks to mobilize public support for the war effort.  A key 
difference is that whereas in American war cinema class anxieties often have to 
be either suppressed or encoded, the British—especially in war time—seem to 
embrace fully the notion that officers and men are people coming from two 
separate worlds, one worth saving, the other sacrificing (primarily for the benefit 
of the former). 
The film is an account of a fictional ship, HMS Torrin, and the exploits of 
its crew during the early days of World War II.  The film’s hero is the ship’s 
stalwart commanding officer, Captain Edward Kinross, played by Coward.  Hero, 
however, is not quite an adequate term to describe him: the film overdrives its 
propagandistic strategy by hyperbolizing Kinross.  He is the perfect officer, but 
the film can only signify that perfection via a process of juxtaposing him—like 
light against darkness—against his “inferiors,” the enlisted rank.  The film uses 
two key sequences to project his heroic superiority. 
The first occurs when Captain Kinross (Coward) pays a visit to the home 
of Ordinary Seaman “Shorty” Blake (John Mills).  Before departing for Seaman 
Blake’s house, Captain Kinross is shown in his home, palatial and opulent.  
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Coward and co-director David Lean then juxtapose the officer home (complete 
with trophy wife Celia Johnson and other objets d’art) with the enlisted home, 
cheap and grubby (without paintings or sculptures, though tidy).  Every element 
in the sequence—clothing, accent, posture, even manners (Captain Kinross’s 
natural, Seaman Blake’s affected)—projects and protects Kinross’s superiority 
and bears witness to the huge socioeconomic gap between the urbane officer and 
the scroungy enlisted man.  There seems to be no specter of economic self-
consciousness in the scene: the semi-literate seaman with his humble house and 
homely wife is in the “proper” condition of the enlisted man, and he is content in 
that environment.  This socioeconomic juxtaposition would seem parodic in 
anything other than a war film, towards which the otherwise self-conscious 
spectator suspends his sensibility. 
The second sequence involves military, rather than social, noblesse oblige.  
Late in the film, as the ship is under attack, a seaman, played by David 
Attenborough (in his first film role), abandons his post, an act of cowardice that 
under British military law is punishable by death.  Kinross, however, spares the 
young seaman’s life.  Though the film desires this sequence to underline 
Kinross’s superior heroic qualities, it also transmits a subtle message to a war-
torn nation: enlisted lives are better sacrificed at the hands of the enemy. 
An interesting feature of Captain Kinross is that he seems to be designed 
to function as a filmic teacher of the “actual” officer rank of the British military.  
Few, if any, actual military officers would act in the way Kinross does in the film.  
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Almost no officer—regardless of rank—would stoop to visit the home of an 
enlisted person (a fact just as true today as it was 60 years ago).  Furthermore, no 
ship’s captain would tolerate an enlisted sailor’s—especially a low ranking 
seaman’s—abandoning his post.  There are far too many libidinal and 
masculinity issues invested in the actual officer rank to permit those social and 
combat fissures.  These sequences in the film are extraordinary, as if Coward 
wishes to project his own fantasy of liberalism onto the military, an impossible 
task, it would seem, within either the genre of epic or the war film.  But it should 
be noted that these bizarre expressions of pseudo-liberalism, however ingenuous 
they may be designed to be, still have as their primary purpose the reinforcement 
of the hierarchical mechanism in the military.  They moreover reveal the 
intellectual/psychological contract between the filmmaker and the object: 
dazzled by the overdriven signifiers of the officer rank—the aura, the power, the 
beauty—, the filmmaker seems powerless to resist.  It is a relationship that profits 
both parties. 
But that powerlessness does not extend to the filmmaker’s relationship to 
the enlisted rank, for which there is no aura.  No fetish.  Devoid of those libidinal 
investments, the enlisted rank can function as the compartment for the film’s war 
anxiety.  Of the two ranks, the enlisted rank has no monopoly on cowardice, 
sloth, drunkenness, bloodlust, and stupidity; but the enlisted rank nevertheless 
bears those burdens in the film medium.  This phenomenon benefits the officer 
rank in two ways: it extends the power and myth of the officer cult (and by 
 
50 
extension militarism, inasmuch as militarism profits from the mystification 
attached to officers), and it provides a medium through which the film can 
articulate its fraudulent “anti-war” sentiment (a development I will examine in 
Chapter IV).  David Attenborough’s unnamed seaman provides a model for 
those benefits: the spectator can hate him because of his cowardice, and this 
indignation can be carefully modulated by the film, especially insofar as the 
spectator in the film (as in most war film) does not get to see the real enemy.  One 
must hate something in a war movie. 
Steven Spielberg’s Saving Private Ryan is perhaps the sine qua non of ersatz 
anti-war film.  It is, to a surprising degree, quite similar to In Which We Serve, 
both thematically and ideologically.  The political project of both films is to 
legitimate the fantasies of nationalism and exceptionalism, two of the most 
prominent features in the proliferation of militarism.   
 Saving Private Ryan’s anti-war project leans on one overweening strategy: 
pushing the envelope of cinematic violence.  But this violence is merely a 
disingenuous strategy of concealment: the film is little more than a nostalgic 
object that restates the themes ever-present in World War II propaganda film.  
Spielberg and cinematographer Janusz Kaminski shot the film using desaturated 
film stock to give the film a grainy texture, a strategy designed to make the film 
seem old.  But not just any type of old: Spielberg engineers the film to look 
precisely like a World War II-era combat movie.  This strategy, ostensibly 
designed to give the film a cinema verité legitimacy, serves rather to underline the 
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film’s artificiality and also its position as a nostalgic object, to reinforce its larger 
project of articulating and extending the myth of American exceptionalism.  The 
film asserts this agenda microcosmically in the character of Captain John Miller 
(played by Tom Hanks), who serves as a reinscription of the stalwart World War 
II film officer: implacable, unflappable, and utterly watertight (and most 
certainly white).  This unalloyed figure is a palimpsest of the World War II-era 
propagandistic officer, moreover a reassertion of the epic hero, of whom Bakhtin 
says, “There is not the slightest gap between his authentic essence and its 
external manifestation” (“Epic and Novel” 34). 
The key difference between the two films is that one is about the present, 
the other the past.  But which one is which?  By utilizing a certain iconography of 
the military officer, Coward projects a “pastness” to his film.  And Spielberg, 
aware of his own preeminence in the history of mainstream cinema, invokes 
America’s shining moment in order to assert his own vision of political 
stabilization.  Both films, for entirely differing political reasons, seek to epicize 
the film “text.” 
Epic as a genre, says Bakhtin in his famous essay “Epic and Novel,” has 
three distinct features: 
(1) a national epic past [. . .] serves as the subject of the epic; (2) 
national tradition (not personal experience and the free thought 
that grows out of it) serves as the source for the epic; (3) an absolute 
epic distance separates the epic world from contemporary reality, 
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that is, from the time in which the singer (the author and his 
audience) lives.  (13) 
An important consideration with respect to “Epic and Novel” is that Bakhtin’s 
project is to trace how the novel seeks to escape from the prescriptions of the 
epic.  But both Coward and Spielberg—and, it would seem, the overwhelming 
majority of artists working in the genre of war narrative—desire those 
prescriptions, because, as their works attest, those prescriptions promise stability 
in a destabilized world.  For both Coward and Spielberg, invoking their nations’ 
great pasts is a means by which they reinforce their fantasies of national/natural 
primacy.  The films become ideological fortresses where destabilization threats—
figurative and literal, allegorical and political—are kept out.  War re-presents 
and re-states “the national heroic past [. . .], a world of fathers and founders of 
families, a world of ‘firsts’ and ‘bests’” (“Epic and Novel” 13).  For Spielberg 
especially, World War II is a sacrosanct text, an epic where “the tradition of the 
past is sacred” (“Epic and Novel” 15). 
 Filmed in the late 1990s, Saving Private Ryan is a profoundly reactionary 
film that invokes America’s epic past and, from a technical perspective, the epic 
genre in order to de-problematize the past.  That particular past—unlike 
American specters like slavery, the extermination of Native Americans, and the 
brutal exploitation of labor—stands for Spielberg impervious to analysis.  That 
epic past is “in the zone [. . .] beyond the sphere of possible contact with the 
developing, incomplete and therefore re-thinking and re-evaluating present” 
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(“Epic and Novel” 17).  Spielberg’s full deployment of film technology serves to 
reinforce the untouchability of the epic past, to seal it against the threats of re-
evaluation. 
 The plot of the film is an adjustment of the biography of, and more 
specifically the biographical film, The Sullivans (1944), where five brothers all 
perished aboard a U.S. Navy warship in World War II.  Saving Private Ryan seeks 
to redress the Sullivans tragedy—and correct that problematic history—by 
sparing the life of the last son, Private Ryan, whose brothers have died in 
combat.  Spielberg frontloads that adjustment or correction at the beginning of 
the film where we see the elderly Ryan weeping at the gravesite of the officer 
who saved him.  Having thereby pre-articulated the successful project of the 
film, Spielberg transitions directly to a flashback of that mission, beginning of 
course with the famous Omaha Beach sequence.  The spectator then witnesses 
scenes of almost indescribable horror, but the horror is only a straw man that 
Spielberg has already knocked down, the spectator’s anxieties having been 
conveniently removed beforehand. 
The most disingenuous aspect of Saving Private Ryan is the fact that James 
Ryan is a private, the lowest enlisted rank, and the film leads one to believe that 
a key feature of America’s exceptionalism is that we care so much for our lower-
class that we will spare no effort or expense to save it.  This feature may in fact be 
true, but not in the way one might think: the fact of America’s dichotomous 
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military rank system speaks more for our desire for class separation than for the 
survival of any one member of that class. 
Spielberg writes the full program of epicization into the character of 
Captain John Miller, whose moral superiority the film presents by contrasting 
him against the enlisted soldiers under his command, a strategy identical to In 
Which We Serve.  The enlisted soldiers’ function in Saving Private Ryan, as it is in 
most war film, is to follow orders—to kill and be killed.  Spielberg complicates 
this arrangement by allowing two enlisted soldiers to articulate their 
dissatisfaction with the mission—but the film makes it clear that that dissension 
is a threat that must be neutralized.  Like all skilled mainstream film directors, 
Spielberg is a master at recruiting the spectator into a collusion with his project: 
in this particular case, collusion with the neutralization of that threat.  What the 
enlisted soldiers understand—specifically the characters Private Richard Reiben 
(Edward Burns) and Private Stanley Mellish (Adam Goldberg)—is that the unit’s 
mission is insane: sacrificing the many for the benefit of the few.  After the death 
of the unit’s medic, the third of the unit’s casualties during their mission, the 
disgusted Private Reiben threatens to abandon the unit.  The question of the 
sensibility of this abandonment is moot.  The film has already worked its magic 
on the spectator—it has rendered the spectator incredulous.  Spielberg, so expert 
in utilizing pathos to direct the spectator’s sensibilities, now only has to convert 
the skeptical Reiben.  We spectators know that such a mutiny threatens the trust 
that the film has invested in the character of Captain Miller.   
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Miller, like many cinematic heroes, is what Christian Metz calls a “diegetic 
illusion,” a willful distortion that the spectator nevertheless pretends to believe in: 
“it is of vital importance for the correct unfolding of the spectacle that this make-
believe be scrupulously respected” (72).  The film, as a result, will simply not 
allow that trust to be violated: Miller’s greatness, like Odysseus’s or Aeneas’s, is 
too powerful, too dazzling for those under his command to really resist, certainly 
too dazzling for the spectator to resist.  The film then projects this greatness in an 
absurdly artificial and cloying fashion: Miller—whose past has been to that point 
in the film a carefully guarded secret—tells his past (that he was a schoolteacher 
in Pennsylvania before the war) so that Reiben will return.  Having learned this 
truth, that the captain’s greatness is mystical rather than literal, reorients Reiben, 
and he returns to the unit contrite.  It seems to matter very little in this crucial 
sequence that Reiben’s conversion/reorientation is fraudulent; rather, the 
germane issue is that he come to the condition that the spectator is already in. 
For Spielberg, the late 1990s was a time apparently far enough from 
Vietnam to bring back the stalwart officer-hero.  Saving Private Ryan simply could 
not exist in the jungles of Vietnam, a locus where the officers were apparently 
not quite noble enough, their enlisted inferiors not quite comfortable enough in 
their subordination.  Compare Captain Miller with the incompetent Lieutenant 
Wolfe in Oliver Stone’s Platoon (filmed a decade prior to Saving Private Ryan), so 
obviously a figure of ridicule, wearing his “Wisconsin Wrestling” sweatshirt 
while “hanging out” with the enlisted soldiers.   
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Saving Private Ryan, because of its divorce from the complications of 
Vietnam and its unironic engagement with the World War II propaganda film, 
ushered in a new era of American war cinema.  In its wake, filmmakers now 
exploit nostalgia to its fullest extent.  In films such as Pearl Harbor, We Were 
Soldiers, Hart’s War, and Tears of the Sun, nostalgia becomes a sort of currency by 
which the filmmaker can negotiate a settlement between materiality and 
ideology, now even possible within the context of Vietnam film: via nostalgia, 
insofar as it articulates and simultaneously disavows its subject matter, there is 
no real price to be paid for the insanity and horror of war. 
One would reasonably expect “anti-war” cinema to be against war, but 
Saving Private Ryan and its offspring are not against war; they are, in fact, very 
pro-war—provided, of course, that Americans are waging it.  For it is within war 
fictions than Americans can entertain the fantasy of their own exceptionalism: 
they alone are immune to history.   
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Notes 
 
1 Though it is perhaps not germane to my argument, I should nonetheless note a 
mimicry phenomenon associated with the Navy Chief.  The Navy Chief is an 
American military version of Homi Bhabha’s “Mimic Man.”  Mimicry, for 
Bhabha, is both a simulation and non-simulation of power: “the sign of a double 
articulation[:] a complex strategy of reform, regulation, and discipline, which 
‘appropriates’ the Other as it visualizes power” (86).  The mimicry associated 
with the Navy Chief, a senior enlisted rank (E-7), is that he gets to wear a 
simulated officer uniform.  This is not to say, however, that the Navy Chief 
enjoys the same social rank as officers—he is still barred from officers’ clubs, 
wardrooms, officers’ housing, and even the Naval Postgraduate School.  He has 
no more authority than his sergeant counterparts in the Army and Air Force (and 
certainly just as little advocacy in Washington: an O-7 earns three times more 
than an E-7 [http://www.dfas.mil/money/milpay/pay/01-2002.pdf]), but his 
uniform bolsters the power of the officer rank by a process of “appropriating” a 
segment of the enlisted rank—thus extending its power into spaces otherwise out 
of its purview.  Though Bhabha asserts that the “partial presence” of the Mimic 
Man disrupts hegemonic authority, no such disruption has yet to appear—after 
100 years—in Navy circles. 
 
2 Note the contrast between the proto-enlisted “young men”—who 
filled the mixing bowl with pure wine 
And passed it to all, pouring first a libation in goblets. 
Then when they had poured out wine, and drunk as much as their hearts 
wished, 
They set out from the shelter of Atreus’ son, Agamemnon.  (9.175-78) 
—and the more “officerly” Hector, who tells his mother, “lift not to me the 
kindly sweet wine,/ For fear you stagger my strength and make me forget my 
courage” (6.264-65). 
 
3 http://www.cdi.org/issues/wme. 
 
4 The American is conditioned to believe that the officer uniform is a signifier of 
virtue, intelligence, and wisdom.  The second Iraq war has, however, seen an 
evolution in that conditioning.  In the constant barrage of television news 
coverage of the war, a steady stream of military officers (most of them retired) 
was paraded into television studios to provide expert analysis.  Almost none of 
them wore their military uniforms because their military rank, suffixed to their 
names at the bottom of the TV screen, surrogated the uniform.  Thus the officers’ 
merits were pre-connoted, those officers’ astounding ignorance of Iraqi geography 
and language notwithstanding. 
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6 Wolfgang Peterson uses a similar device at the beginning of his 1982 film, Das 
Boot, where two officers run a gauntlet of urinating sailors. 
 
6 This “relative” tragedy can be seen in two movies filmed 60 years apart.  In the 
1943 film Action in the North Atlantic, the stalwart commanding officer of a 
merchant ship, Lieutenant Joe Rossi (played by Humphrey Bogart), administers 
the eulogy for a group of sailors who died in a Nazi submarine attack.  As he 
stands over the bodies of the subaltern sailors, he says their names—but only 
their last names.  The last body, however, is that of an officer, so Rossi says his 
entire name, “Cadet Robert Parker.”  This scene is repeated in the 2003 film 
Master and Commander: The Far Side of the World, where Captain Jack Aubrey 
(played by Russell Crowe), the stalwart commanding officer of a nineteenth 
century British warship, administers the eulogy for a group of sailors who died 
in a skirmish with a French ship.  As in Action in the North Atlantic, the captain 
mentions only the last names of the fallen subalterns, but he pauses and, stifling 
sobs, mentions the full name of the young officer, “Midshipman Peter Calamy.” 
7 E.g., “It has been the unwillingness, or inability, of the Clinton administration 
to create an elite consensus that leaves their policy ‘hostage’ to the public’s 
recoiling from the loss of American soldiers’ lives” (24).  This passage brings to 
mind Alfred Vagts’ complaint that “Although military men are often disgusted 
with the necessity that compels them to argue their case with anybody [. . .] they 
recognize the necessity and accept it, especially when they are on the defensive” 
(94). 
 
8 Not to mention a petitio principii logical fallacy: officers are gentlemen, and 
because of that fact have the “qualities requisite for military leadership.” 
 
9 Laura Mulvey, Fetishism and Curiosity (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 
1996) 1. 
 
10 Herman and Chomsky note, “The citizenry pays to be propagandized in the 
interests of powerful groups such as military contractors and other sponsors of 
state terrorism” (22). 
 
11 E.g., Laura Mulvey, William Pietz, Jean Baudrillard, Teresa de Lauretis, 
Jacques Derrida, Frederic Jameson, Kaja Silverman, and Henry Krips. 
 
11 The Nike Air Jordan basketball shoe provides an object lesson for the voracious 
appetites of capital.  In the mid-1980s, the Nike machinery hired independent 
filmmaker Spike Lee (fresh off the underground success of She’s Gotta Have It, 
which he had to self-finance) to film a series of black and white television 
commercials to pitch the Air Jordan.  Spike Lee was a clever choice: in She’s Gotta 
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Have It, the character Mars Blackman (played by Lee) wears a pair of Air Jordans 
while having sex with the lead character, Lola.  The ads (starring Lee as Mars 
Blackman and Jordan as himself) were extremely successful, propelling shoe, 
athlete, and filmmaker to international stardom.  In the three decades since those 
ads, the Air Jordan has become—other than the automobile—perhaps the most 
fetishized male-associated object in American culture; Michael Jordan has 
become the most fetishized objects in history (thus challenging Laura Mulvey’s 
famous assertion that the male body cannot bear the burden of the fetishized 
gaze); and Spike Lee has become a film director dutifully following the path of 
absorption so graphically mapped out in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, as his overtly political films disappear in the spectacle of Lee’s 
own public life as a famous basketball fan and peddler of Pizza Hut pizza. 
 
12 Within Freud’s essay there appears a strange example of mise en abyme.  In the 
fourth paragraph, he says, “If I am not mistaken, Laforgue would say in this case 
that the boy ‘scotomizes’ his perception of the woman’s lack of a penis,” but then 
retracts that assertion in a footnote.  Several sentences later, realizing that he has 
“misrecognized” Laforgue’s definition of “scotomization,” he says, 
“’Scotomization’ seems to me particularly unsuitable” (153).  This 
misrecognition/disavowal scenario would have been avoided if Freud had 
simply erased the Laforgue sentence.  Amazingly, he repeats the “scotomization” 
mis-definition in a diagnosis of two boys who had repressed the memories of 
their father’s death: “In the analysis of two young men I learned that each [. . .] 
had failed to take cognizance of the death of his beloved father—had 
‘scotomized’ it.”  Then, in the next paragraph, he says, “It turned out that the two 
young men had no more ‘scotomized’ their father’s death than a fetishist does 
the castration of women” (155-56).  
 
13 William Pietz, ”The Problem of the Fetish, I,” Res 9 (1985): 5-17; “The Problem 
of the Fetish, II,” Res 13 (1987): 23-45; “The Problem of the Fetish IIIa,” Res 16 
(1988): 105-123.  A shorter version appears as “Fetishism and Materialism” in 
Fetishism as Cultural Discourse, Eds., Emily Apter and William Pietz (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1993): 119-151. 
 
14 Andre Donelha, qtd. in Pietz, “Fetish, II” 38. 
 
15 Oliveira Marques, qtd. in Pietz, “Fetish, II,” 35. 
 
17 Pearl Harbor was filmed prior to the September 11th tragedy, but its 
extraordinary popularity is, I believe, directly linked to its temporal proximity to 
9/11. 
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18 She plays the wife of Lieutenant Bud Roberts, a character whose 
demasculinization is symbolized by his amputated leg. 
 
16 On U.S. Navy submarines, where space is allegedly limited, officers have their 
own separate dining facility, the wardroom.  At mealtimes, the officers are 
attended by the cooks (called Mess Specialists, mostly African Americans) who 
are forced to wear simulated waiter uniforms.  I witnessed these phenomena 
myself aboard three American submarines: Albuquerque (SSN 706), Scranton (SSN 
756), and Springfield (SSN 761). 
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CHAPTER III 
THE OFFICER AND THE POLICE 
 
The capitalist state cannot be anything other than an 
instrument of class domination because it is organized to 
sustain the basic relation between capital and labor.  
     —David Harvey 
 
The soldier becomes an individual only in moments of 
danger, or when he attains high rank; the rest of the time he 
is subordinate, and stereotyped. 
     —Alfred Vagts 
 
When the rabbit is caught, the hunter kills, boils, and eats 
his hunting dog. 
   —Korean proverb 
 
The primary attractions of war narrative are violence and class 
management.  Violence is the medium through which order is restored, an 
insidious fantasy that is one of the crucial constructions of American masculinity, 
but also one of the primary means by which the military and “the security elite”1 
exercise their ideological power: any uneasiness about the graphic depiction of 
death and suffering dissolving in the assurance that what the soldiers are doing 
is the right thing.  Equally as important is the notion that, in the military, people 
know their place.  These attractions are key elements in the proliferation of 
militarism: in the armed forces there is a rigid rank structure, a system that is 
extraordinarily attractive to a society which, as Keith Nelson and Spencer Olin 
note in their book Why War?, “believe[s] in the desirability of hierarchy and 
differentiated status” (11). 
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I derive the title of this chapter from D.A. Miller’s The Novel and the Police 
(1988), a work that examines the regulatory function of narrative, or more 
precisely, of narrative that does not necessarily present itself as regulatory.2  
Miller notes that although “the novel is felt to celebrate and encourage 
misconduct” (3), often it instead performs a policing function that is a more 
effective regulator than the actual police.  In many novels, “no other role for the 
police is possible than that of a patrol which ineptly stands guard over a border 
fated to be transgressed” (2).  In the absence of a competent police, then, the 
novel steps in to preserve order, with its implication of laissez faire politics: an 
“always already” ordered society, surrogated by the novel, is obsessed enough 
with surveillance and discipline to work well enough without a meddlesome 
police force.   
While Miller does some impressive “detective work” to reveal the covert 
regulation performed by the narratives he examines, most war narratives make 
no effort to conceal their agenda of censure and discipline.  They in fact revel in 
that agenda insofar as it promises order in a world turned upside down.  One of 
the disturbing phenomena of American war narrative—particularly war 
narrative in the post World War II era—is the persistence of the mystical aura 
surrounding military affairs.  The military officer stands as one of the last 
bastions of signified virtue in a culture obsessed with the notion that its moral 
foundations are crumbling.  Unlike nostalgic objects such as the western hero or 
the knight in shining armor, the military officer is really there; thus his “power of 
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fascination” within narrative is bolstered by his material presence in American 
culture.  But as Slavoj Žižek says, “the power of fascination exerted by a sublime 
image always announces a lethal dimension” (Looking Awry 84).  Nowhere is that 
lethal dimension more present than in the military. 
The military officer as trope within the context of post-World War II 
American narrative is one of the most convenient semiological devices for 
representing virtue.  Not coincidentally, the currency of the trope works in the 
service of an insidious class system—the class system that is not there.  The 
officer can function as a symbol of virtue, but that symbolism can be disavowed 
because the narrative officer is after all not a figure, but an entity having an 
analog in the real world.  This sort of narrative disavowal symptomatizes the 
fetishization practice in narrative.  Mulvey says that fetishization “epitomizes the 
human ability to project value onto a material object, repress the fact that the 
projection has taken place, and then interpret the object as the autonomous source 
of that value” (“The Carapace That Failed” 49).  The incessant barrage of 
narratives bearing witness to the virtues of the officer rank performs two major 
functions: it legitimates the socioeconomic prerogative of the leisure classes (for 
which the officer stands as a sort of objective correlative) and it re-presents a 
material desire within culture, that is, of the naturalness and stability of 
hierarchical systems—all the while occurring under the pretense that it is not 
occurring. 
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 The primary regulation that occurs in many military narratives is an 
articulation of class desire: keeping the ranks separated.  Military fictions—and 
to be precise, the military way—jibe perfectly with any regulatory powers 
narrative may possess.  To both artists and audiences, the military provides a 
model for order, not only because of its built-in powers of fascination and 
mystification, but also because of its literal organization.  The military rank 
system seeks to improve on the Great Chain of Being, which is flawed because it 
is only a single chain.  It ultimately excludes no one.  The military system is a 
double chain, the first for its elites, the officers; the second for its preterite, the 
enlisted rank.  This is a very attractive arrangement in a post-industrial economy 
where the threat of vertical movement creates a significant amount of anxiety to 
entrenched systems of power.  In the military system, the enlisted rank is 
explicitly excluded from the important chain, thereby presenting no threat to the 
military’s elitist praxis, an aristocracy simulation that is, in the words of Ejub 
Kučuk, an “obedient instrument for protecting the general conditions of the class 
system suited to the ruling class” (149).  That separation of ranks functions as a 
very effective policeman, keeping as it does the proper pigs in their proper pens. 
 Military organizations in the United States operate their class system as a 
sort of open secret.  It operates in the full view of the society it purports to serve.  
However incredible it may seem that the military rank division is predicated on 
and fueled by exclusion (all American military facilities—even submarines—
have segregated quarters and dining facilities), that division nevertheless 
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persists, largely unchallenged.  This feature of exclusion, as it turns out, is for 
many a compelling attraction, the military offering a haven for many antiquated 
practices (“The Middle Ages,” says Anatole France in Le Lys Rouge, “are nowhere 
ended except in the history handbooks”).  And, of course, it is more than just 
people in the military who are bedazzled by this rank fetishization; many in the 
civilian sector are fascinated by the glamour and prestige of the officer rank and 
attach a romanticism to America’s version of “knights and saints.”  This 
fascination would seem merely curious or quaint if it did not have such a lethal 
dimension. 
The litmus test for this sort of attraction is to be found in non-military 
narratives.  Two examples come to mind, one from film and one from literature.  
In the 2001 film The Royal Tannenbaums (dir. Wes Anderson), a film whose 
dramatic action takes place in a New York winter, Henry Sherman (played by 
Danny Glover), the African-American boyfriend of Etheline Tenenbaum, a white 
middle class divorcee (Angelica Houston), must prove his worthiness to 
Houston’s ex-husband, Royal Tenenbaum (Gene Hackman), and thus by 
extension to the spectator, whose loyalties have been carefully steered by the film 
toward Royal, who is a cad.  Late in the film, Henry introduces his son to Royal.  
The son is an officer, a Navy pilot wearing his dress white uniform.  Royal is 
genuinely impressed with both the officer and the deeper implication that Glover 
must have been a terrific father to have raised such an overachieving son.  The 
spectator is enlisted into this incredulity primarily via the visual spectacle of the 
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officer uniform, so clearly presented to signify “good.”  The film here “deploys” 
the officer uniform to neutralize all kinds of anxieties, perhaps the most 
immediate of which is the mixed-race relationship between Etheline and Henry. 
Surely there had to have been a consultant on the film set to point out the 
complication that Navy personnel do not wear white uniforms in the winter, but 
the filmmakers’ exploitation of this overweening symbol in the film overrules 
that complication.   And more so than the symbol, the film exploits the 
predisposition of the spectator, who is not likely to interrogate that symbolic 
impact in the film. 
 The second example comes from Sloan Wilson’s 1955 novel, The Man in the 
Gray Flannel Suit.  The story involves a Harvard-educated combat veteran, Tom 
Rath, who struggles to make ends meet in post-World War II corporate America.  
A subplot in the novel juxtaposes Rath, who was a captain in the Army 
paratroopers during the war, with one of his combat subordinates, “Caesar” 
Gardella, a conventional army private, complete with overexposed stupidity and 
ethnicity (two of the standard tropes in the representation of the enlisted rank).  
That juxtaposition occurs, however, not on the battlefield, but in the corporate 
world, six years after the end of World War II.  Both characters find themselves 
facing financial difficulties in post-war New York, an accurate microcosm of 
America inasmuch as it faithfully records the huge gap between the haves, the 
have-nots, and that in-the-margins population segment (represented by Rath) 
that imagined itself economic outsiders.   
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Wanting more money, Rath “risks everything” by quitting his $7,000-a-
year job at a charitable foundation to work as a PR man for a multinational 
media conglomerate, The United Broadcasting Corporation.  It is within this 
context of the UBC where Rath’s relative have-not status comes into focus because 
there he finds Gardella, working as one of the elevator operators, certainly 
earning far less than even Rath’s previous salary (interestingly, the omniscient 
narrator—who faithfully records the salaries of Rath and his boss Ralph 
Hopkins—does not mention Gardella’s salary).  The novel implies that both Rath 
and Gardella live outside the comfort zone of American corporate wealth, but the 
novel isn’t concerned with Gardella’s socioeconomic position, only Rath’s.  The 
narrative strategy in the novel is to align Rath’s socioeconomic position with his 
ethical condition: Rath is honest, forthright, and hard-working, but not so hard-
working that he neglects his family (as does the miserable workaholic Hopkins, 
the president of the UBC, who earns over 20 times what Rath does).  Thus the 
reader perceives that Rath’s material reward in the narrative—a Connecticut 
mansion inherited from his blue-blood grandmother—is a reward proportionate 
to his character.  Gardella, who is no less virtuous than Rath in the narrative (and 
probably even more so: it is he, after all, who informs Rath of the child he 
fathered in Italy during the war, the mother of whom Gardella has even been 
sending money to ever since), also receives a material reward, but it is on a 
different scale than Rath’s: management—but certainly not ownership—of an 
apartment building.   
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Here we see how officer fetishism is translated outside of the war 
narrative: both Rath’s and Gardella’s socioeconomic conditions outside the 
context of war mirror those conditions inside the context of war.  To the reader, 
this relationship seems natural insofar as it invokes a meritocratic a priori 
regarding “officers and men.”  
 The point of these two examples is that military rank has currency in the 
American political consciousness, and that currency has no less relevance outside 
the context of war narrative than inside.  The virtuous officer as a trope may in 
fact have more currency outside of war narrative because non-war narrative 
doesn’t suffer from the same generic problems as war narrative—war narrative is 
an unstable economy, a “festival of affects” where the stalwart officer’s cathexis 
is often threatened.  While The Royal Tannenbaums and The Man in the Gray 
Flannel Suit are a far cry from the over-the-top officer fetishism present in World 
War II propaganda film or in popular novels such as the Master and Commander 
series by Patrick O’Brian or The Hunt for Red October by Tom Clancy, they 
nevertheless participate in the class desire presented by the officer rank.   
Thus many military narratives fantasize that they operate within a 
protected ideological zone where elitism and class prerogative reign unfettered.  
However tempting it may be to assume that those phenomena are inconvenient 
side effects of narratives that have other fish to fry, we should nonetheless note 
that those phenomena “work” as a component of the superstructure of 
capitalism—class desire symptomatizes in the cultural praxis of war narrative.   
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The larger problem of military organizations’ increasing dominance in American 
political culture does not occur in a vacuum.  Patrick Regan says,  
A unique aspect of the militarization process is that when a society 
becomes highly militarized, it may no longer require a specific set 
of domestic institutions that manipulates perceptions in order to 
sustain public support for the policies of the security elite [. . .] The 
larger society may itself become the engine driving the continued 
militarization of its political, social, and economic fabric.  (82) 
Though Regan implies that, after a certain point, it is militarization itself that 
fuels militarization, there are, to be sure, agents at play in that intrigue.  Though 
we may rightly look to the usual suspects contributing to that process—military 
and paramilitary journals, GI Joe and George W. Bush dolls, the persistent 
production of flag-waving mainstream movies, combat video games, the plague 
of right-wing radio and television commentators—we should not overlook how 
militarism rises as a symptom in ostensibly non-militaristic narratives.  The Man 
in the Gray Flannel Suit and The Royal Tannenbaums, for example, are not 
“militaristic narratives,” but their investment in the cathexis of the military 
officer symptomatize a dangerous fetishism. 
But it seems odd that an American culture so sensitive to outward 
displays of wealth and power would be so accommodating to a military praxis 
that is so overarching in its elitism and anti-democratic spirit.  The 
Officer/Enlisted distinction is strictly policed within military circles: according to 
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Article 134, paragraph 60 of the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice, 
fraternization between officer and enlisted ranks is strictly forbidden.  The 
policing does not end there: many films and novels collude with the military 
practice of keeping the ranks separated.  The presence of the enlisted man within 
officer circles creates anxiety similar to the subaltern’s presence within 
imperialist circles (subaltern, after all, is a military term meaning “of inferior 
rank”).  In many cases, the narrative reinforces the strict code of the UCMJ by 
repositioning the enlisted man back to his “proper” circle.   
 Perhaps the overriding fantasy of war narrative is that, on the battlefield, 
man finds himself in his natural condition.  But on this so-called even playing 
field, not all men are created equal.  Some men are created more equal than 
others.  So the war narrative fantasizes, and so the war narrative functions: both 
as an ostensible gauge of the differences amongst men, and as an empowerment 
of that differentiation.  The officer/enlisted distinction is an overweening 
articulation of both class and patriarchy: soldiers and sailors have strictly defined 
roles in fictions that reify their material condition in a culture desiring the 
military to function as both locus of virtue and efficient killing machine.  The 
private or sergeant is, after all, free to be a bloodthirsty killer during the day and 
a drunken whoremonger at night.  The model for this figure is Sergeant Stryker 
from the film The Sands of Iwo Jima3, a character whose over-the-top neurosis, 
instability, and violence are projected in the film as virtues, provided of course 
that those traits are fenced within the enlisted caste.  But those virtues bear 
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witness to the unstable economy of war: a subtext of the Sergeant Stryker model 
is that his “place” is in the army, which can best utilize his pathological 
behaviors.   
The officer, on the other hand, cannot be associated with those traits.  The 
term that the officer caste has engineered to dissociate itself from those violent 
pathologies is “leadership,” the efficacy of which is directly related to its 
nebulousness.  Thus the captain can “lead” his men to victory on the battlefield, 
thereby rhetorically distancing himself from the fact of warfare, killing. 
“Sadism demands a story,” Mulvey famously says in “Visual Pleasure and 
Narrative Cinema” (14).  War is the ultimate expression of sadism, but so much 
killing produces a degree of anxiety that culture has difficulty coming to terms 
with4, thus prompting the “story.”  One of those terms is the rank distinction: can 
a real man be both killer and gentleman?  Yes, but only if he is fetishized.  War as 
it is presented in narrative form is an unstable economy, but often that instability 
functions as merely the vehicle—the straw man—by which the artist negotiates 
epistemological closure.  More so than physical boundaries, what is under threat 
in war narratives is “real” masculinity.  Fetishization addresses the threat by 
legitimating (and making appear natural) affected masculine behaviors such as 
homocentrism, homosocialism, homophobia, and homoeroticism (with those 
behaviors’ associated misogyny, a phenomenon brilliantly analyzed in 
Sedgwick’s Between Men), behaviors given a sort of diplomatic immunity in the 
free fire zone of war narrative.   
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What should be clear from an examination of Marx and Freud is that 
fetishization is deployed to protect certain interests.  In the case of military 
fictions, the fetish appears, not as a prophylactic against threats to the state, but 
rather against threats to hegemony—specifically against threats to capital and 
patriarchy.  With respect to Freudianism, the fetish serves the interests of 
patriarchy specifically.  The fetishist, after all, can have it both ways: he gets to 
have the substitution (the woman’s foot, for example, surrogating the missing 
phallus) and the thing it is substituted for.5  The officer as he is conventionally 
presented in narrative functions as that substitution.  Such praxis, on both small 
and large scales, reinforces the primacy of the male. 
Correlative to the narrative strategy for buttressing the officer class via 
fetishization is the presentation of the enlisted rank in strictly enforced 
conventions.  A sort of anti-fetishization.  This negative strategy is most clearly 
seen in the mainstream World War II film, where the enlisted rank occupies a 
completely different space—physically and ideologically—than the officer.  The 
film, having initiated the visual presentation (the private is, after all, uglier than 
the officer) compounds the private’s not-to-be-looked-at-ness with enlisted-rank 
conventions: ethnicity (the exaggerated Bronx or Texas accent, or, for example 
Corporal Klinger’s Lebanese accent and Semitic nose in the long-running 
television program M*A*S*H), poor grammar (exploited to a cloying degree in 
the novels From Here to Eternity and The Naked and the Dead), and drunkenness 
(true for almost all war narratives—it is their unifying convention).  It makes no 
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difference whether those characteristics have real analogs in the real military—
cinema verité is not the point: the point is to position the enlisted rank in the space 
marked for death, and furthermore to coerce the spectator into a collusion with 
that positioning. 
Many war novels are equally adept at this coercion/collusion project.  But 
rather than leaning so heavily on the visual ugliness of the enlisted rank, the 
novel deploys certain linguistic signifiers to extort a collusion from the reader.6  
There is a sharp contrast between the language of the officer class and that of the 
enlisted class, a contrast especially attractive for the novelist who wishes to 
present a “gritty” and “realistic” story.  James Jones’ novel, From Here to Eternity 
(1951), provides a model for this program.  For example, when the novel’s hero, 
Private Robert E. Lee Prewitt, is introduced to the platoon corporal, “Ike” 
Galovitch, Jones overdrives the sequence with dialectal signifiers to trigger an 
alliance between the novel and the reader: 
The apparition stopped before them, at the foot of Prewitt’s bed.  
Old Ike stood looking at them, the red eyes set in a well of 
wrinkles, and worked his loose-hung lips in and out ruminatingly, 
like a toothless man. 
 “Prewitt?” Galovitch said. 
 “Thats me.” 
 “Sargint Galovitch, platoon guide am I of dis platoon,” he 
said, proudly.  “When assigned to dis platoon you are, you become 
74 
under me.  Consequential one a my men.  Am coming to give for 
you the lowdown setup.”7 
The comedy of this sequence rests on the collusion between the novelist and the 
reader, both understanding the incongruous power dynamics at play: Prewitt, a 
“smart” private, is subordinate to an idiot8, a power incongruency that parallels 
the power play between the enlisted and officer rank (examined below). What 
we should understand here is that the currency of this sort of linguistic or 
dialectal representation in the text relates directly to the reader’s sensitivity to 
military rank.  It is only within the context of the enlisted rank that this sort of 
sequence can work.  Bakhtin asserts in “Discourse in the Novel” that “the style of 
a novel is to be found in the combination of its styles; the language of a novel is 
the system of its ‘languages’” (262); but one should not infer from this sort of 
combination that From Here to Eternity is dialogic.  Jones’ highlighting of dialectal 
incongruity does not challenge differentiated status; it seeks rather to underline 
and legitimate it for the purpose of establishing the relative superiority of one 
character over another, thereby exposing the novel as monologic rather than 
dialogic.  Bakhtin says, “[E]very struggle of two voices for possession of and 
dominance in the world in which they appear is decided in advance—it is a sham 
struggle” (Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 168). 
 What this sort of monologism reveals is the American war narrative’s 
anxiety about class difference.  That anxiety is not about the fact of rank 
separation, but rather about the danger when the lower rank encroaches on the 
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upper—a struggle decided in advance.  A persistent convention in military 
narrative that exposes class anxiety is the wheeling-dealing enlisted man who 
exploits his “position” (i.e., outside the jurisdiction of regular law) to conduct 
illegal activities under the nose of an incompetent commanding officer.  The 
model for this character is Sergeant Bilko, a regular feature in the 1950s Phil 
Silvers Show9.  Other versions of this character appear as Sergeant O’Hayer in 
From Here to Eternity, Seaman Bodine (who appears in Pynchon’s V. and Gravity’s 
Rainbow), Ex.-PFC Wintergreen in Heller’s Catch-22, John Winger in Stripes (1981, 
dir. Ivan Reitman), Otto Sharkey in the 1970s sitcom CPO Sharkey, and Specialist 
Ray Ellwood in Buffalo Soldiers (2001, dir.  Gregor Jordan).  Cynicism is the 
energy that drives the representational strategy of this convention, which 
appears as a symptom of class dysphoria. 
Sergeant Bilko is the realized threat when the lower class doesn’t know its 
place.  He is what happens when officers are not vigilant enough in their 
management of military affairs.  But we mustn’t infer from the persistence or the 
relative novelty of this convention that the “uppity” private or seaman fantasizes 
itself as a statement of democratic values, nor even that narrative condemns their 
transgressive behavior.  The narrative regulation effected by this convention is 
not of the enlisted rank per se, but rather of the class system that it surrogates.  
Unlike the incompetent policemen in the Victorian novels Miller analyzes—who 
are there to be brushed aside by the more competent text—Sergeant Bilko is 
decidedly not neutralized.  But it is not freedom he exercises but rather a 
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submission to an insidious prescription—transgressive behavior, after all, being 
reserved for the enlisted rank, as proof for the necessity of keeping them 
separated from the officer rank.   
A model for this transgression/reward dynamic is the Jim Trueblood 
sequence in Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man, where an impoverished black 
southerner impregnates his teenage daughter.  Condemned and spurned by his 
neighbors, he seeks help from the local whites, who are mysteriously 
accommodating and generous to him: 
Things got to happenin’ right off.  The nigguhs up at school came 
down to chase me off and that made me mad.  I went to see the 
white folks and they gave me help.  That’s what I don’t understand.  
I done the worst thing a man could ever do in his family and 
instead of chasing me out of the county, they gimme more help 
than they ever give any other colored man, no matter how good a 
nigguh he was.  (64-65)   
What we see as a result this sort of transgressive behavior is that people are 
willing to pay good money to see their deepest prejudices confirmed.  Thus 
transgression is a reward, somewhat akin to a doublewide mobile home, for the 
lower ranks10. 
 This is not to say, however, that the enlisted rank does not have certain 
appeals.  Narratives such as The Sands of Iwo Jima and From Here to Eternity are 
attracted to certain conventional features of the enlisted rank, primarily violent 
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behavior and an overdriven sexual virility.  Though John Wayne played far more 
officers than enlisted men in his Hollywood career, his most famous non-cowboy 
role was Sergeant John Stryker in the 1949 film, The Sands of Iwo Jima, a role that 
landed him an Academy Award nomination.  It is a role that, according to 
Katherine Kinney, provides the model for American masculinity in post-World 
War II America.  Sergeant Stryker is a violent drunk with a gun—an 
extraordinarily pathological model of masculinity.  What Kinney is not sensitive 
to is that the efficacy of the Sergeant Stryker model is rooted primarily in the fact 
of his being an enlisted man.  It is well documented that The Sands of Iwo Jima was 
a carefully controlled propaganda film in the service of militarism in general, and 
the U.S. Marines in particular11; so it may seem curious that the filmmakers and 
the Department of Defense would permit the over-the-top behaviors exhibited by 
Sergeant Stryker in the film.  Of course, those behaviors are not presented as 
pathological, or even distorted—but they are rank sensitive.  A crucial aspect of 
the military’s control over the film was ensuring that the spectator infer that the 
military can only countenance the Stryker model if it is in the enlisted caste.  His 
belligerence, bloodthirstiness, and drunkenness are virtues in the film, but only 
in certain very clear contexts—primarily that of turning enlisted men into killers.  
The film tells the story of a Marine unit from its basic training in New Zealand to 
its victory on the Pacific island of Iwo Jima, culminating in the famous American 
flag raising on Mt. Suribachi.  Stryker’s efficacy in his job, turning his unit into 
tough soldiers, is specifically related to his rejection of feminine influences.  
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Indeed, though there are barely five minutes where women are actually in the 
film, the wholesale rejection of women seems to be its motivating energy.  The 
spectator learns early in the film that Stryker’s belligerence and alcoholism are 
exacerbated by the fact that his wife has recently left him, taking “his son” with 
her (one can, if one were so disposed, even infer that she “caused” his behaviors).  
Never appearing in the film, Mrs. Stryker nevertheless serves as an important 
terminus for spectator hatred.  Stryker hires a prostitute later in the film, but in a 
clever twist, does not have sex with her when he finds out that she has a young 
child in the next room.  Though this sequence is designed to win over the 
spectator to Stryker (implying that he has a heart of gold beneath his gruff 
exterior), there are two important implications that work toward establishing 
Stryker as a model enlisted soldier.  The first is that Stryker’s hiring the prostitute 
establishes his heterosexuality.  In the neurotic economy of war narrative, 
heterosexuality must be asserted, but only for the purposes of neutralizing 
homosexual panic.  With so many men working in such close proximity, an 
inevitability in the war narrative, the horrifying specter of homosexuality must 
be vehemently exorcised.  This sort of homosocial policing is a standard feature 
of most guy-guy relationships, but, as Eve Sedgwick notes, it is particularly 
heightened within a military context: 
The historical emphasis on enforcement of homophobic rules in the 
armed services in, for instance, England and the United States 
supports this analysis.  In these institutions, where both men’s 
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manipulability and their potential for violence are at the highest 
possible premium, the prescription of the most intimate male 
bonding and the proscription of (the remarkably cognate) 
“homosexuality” are both stronger than in civilian society—are, in 
fact, close to absolute.  (Epistemology of the Closet 186) 
The second implication is that because women present so large a castration 
threat, that heterosexuality must be deferred—engaging in actual sex presents an 
unmanageable threat to the soldier’s masculinity.  More so than the race-baitings, 
physical beatings, tortures, and humiliations that the soldiers under Stryker’s 
leadership must endure in order to toughen up, the most important key to real 
soldiery is the rejection of women.  This “festival of affects” comes into clearer 
focus in the novel From Here to Eternity, another narrative that concentrates on 
the lives of enlisted soldiers. 
James Jones was an enlisted soldier in the army—he was a combat 
sergeant in the Pacific theater during World War II—, and many of his novels 
(From Here to Eternity [1951], The Pistol [1958], The Thin Red Line [1962], and 
Whistle [1978]) reveal, in addition to deeply structured misogyny and 
homophobia, an anxiety regarding the enlisted rank’s relationship with the 
officer rank.  That tension between the officer and enlisted ranks is the 
motivating energy of From Here to Eternity.  The primary plot of the novel is a 
Christ fable, the destruction of Private Robert E. Lee Prewitt.  The secondary plot, 
far more interesting, is the story of a sergeant, Milt Warden, who ventures 
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outside the boundaries of enlisted rank containment by having an affair with the 
wife of his commanding officer.  This secondary plot provides a model for the 
attraction/revulsion dynamics associated with the enlisted rank.  The novel 
contrasts Warden’s hyperbolic super-soldierness with the snobbery and 
incompetence of the officers under whom he serves, notably Captain “Dynamite” 
Holmes, 2nd Lieutenant Culpepper, and Colonel Dilbert—all more interested in 
adultery, promotion, booze, and golf than in anything else.  But unlike narratives 
that present the bad officer only as a symptom which the text “treats” (e.g., Men 
of Honor, A Few Good Men, The Caine Mutiny, Attack!, Paths of Glory), Jones is not 
interested in rehabilitating an officer class he so clearly detests (bearing witness, 
perhaps, to his own experiences as a sergeant in World War II).  Rather, Jones 
ensures in From Here to Eternity that certain officer traits do not infect the enlisted 
rank: literacy, thoughtfulness, negotiation.  In From Here to Eternity, these 
characteristics are poisonous, not because they are beyond the grasp of enlisted 
soldiers, but rather because they are not manly.  For Jones the conventional traits 
of the enlisted rank—stupidity, bloodlust, poverty, whoremongering, gambling, 
and drunkenness—are crucial elements in its efficacy. 
 The greatest danger of all is woman.12  If there is an overriding theme to 
From Here to Eternity, it is that femininity represents the largest threat to real 
manhood, therefore to be avoided at all costs except under the strict 
confinements of prostitution.  For Jones, a man faces a challenge in the 
attainment of real masculinity: he must fuck women, but simultaneously avoid 
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the feminine taint.  Jones’ critique of the officer class therefore centers on its 
ostensible effeminacy, a theme played out in the affair between Sergeant Warden 
and Karen Holmes, the wife of Warden’s commanding officer (whose effeminate 
first name, Dana, functions as a “clue” in the text). 
 Like the drunken enlisted man, the love triangle is one of the enduring 
conventions of war narrative, present in an unusually large number of novels 
and films.13  Inasmuch as war narrative articulates power dynamics among men, 
a convenient mode of expressing that dynamic is microcosmically, i.e., “between 
men.”  In the case of From Here to Eternity, Karen Holmes is the conduit in the 
power relationship between Sergeant Warden and Captain Holmes.  Her 
presence, such as it is, serves merely to facilitate what Sedgwick calls the “play of 
emulation and identification” (Between Men 23) between the two men, a 
metonymic dramatization of the class tensions between the officer and enlisted 
castes.   
Karen Holmes’ presence in the novel is a cruel canard, her value related 
exclusively to her function as the exchange between Warden and Holmes.  “The 
woman,” says Lévi-Strauss, “figures only as one of the objects in the exchange, 
not as one of the partners” (115).  Unfortunately for Jones, who as a novelist 
seems ill equipped to deal with relationships across gender boundaries, that 
exchange must be articulated as heterosexual sex, which Jones sees as a threat to 
Warden’s masculinity.  This anxiety plays out in Chapter 9 of the novel where 
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Karen (significantly before their sexual union takes place) hides Warden in her 
closet so her nine-year-old son, Dana Junior, won’t discover them: 
After a while she made herself get up and go to open the closet 
door, sick with the humiliation of this unjust degradation of herself 
and Warden whom she could hardly face. 
 “I think you’d better go,” pulling back the door.  “It was the 
boy.  He’s gone now and. . .”  She stopped, amazed, the words 
trailing off forgotten. 
 Warden sat crosslegged on the pile of his uniform in the 
cramped space, the skirts of several dresses draped over his head 
like a crazy turban.  (122) 
There is a double signification to this passage.  Not only does it express the threat 
that Karen’s femininity presents to Warden’s masculinity, but it also implies and 
foreshadows the danger that officer-ness presents to Warden’s super-
soldierness.14  This demasculinization threat materializes as a code15, comically 
reminiscent of the “broken fingers” sequence in Balzac’s Sarrasine, famously 
analyzed by Barthes in S/Z16.  Several days after consummating his affair with 
Karen, Warden mysteriously throws a pair of scissors over his shoulder: “He 
picked them up, and laid them, with a full inch of one point broken off, on 
Holmes’s desk” (157).  These broken scissors articulate the threat to Warden’s 
masculinity at the hands of the woman, and Warden’s subsequent gesture to 
hand it back to its rightful owner, the effeminate officer.  It is a threat 
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symptomatized to orient the reader toward the policing strategy of the novel: to 
ensure that Sergeant Warden stays in his proper position, the enlisted rank.  This 
latter aspect becomes clearer later in the novel when Warden considers applying 
for an officer commission—not because he’s a competent soldier (the narrator 
says, “his acceptance for a commission [. . .] was a foregone conclusion” [586]), 
but rather to satisfy Karen Holmes, who will not marry him unless he’s an 
officer. 
Warden targets Karen as a conquest because he despises her husband, the 
incompetent officer, Captain Holmes.  Not surprisingly, the “sex” between the 
man and the woman is poisonous, being formulated in the language of 
domination and sadomasochism.  Jones seems to invest Warden with a 
hyperbolic masculinity and virility—at one point Karen gushes, “Oh, I never 
knew it could be like this” (125).  However, Jones overloads the affair with 
castration and class anxieties, symptoms that Jones ultimately displaces onto the 
figure of Karen.  Though the affair is certainly about the “play of emulation and 
identification” between the sergeant and the captain, the woman must 
nevertheless bear the burden of that play’s weight.  Sedgwick argues that the 
homosocial/homoerotic element of the love triangle predetermines the 
marginalization of the woman.  Because identity politics of masculinity are based 
primarily on (homo)sexual proscriptions17, actual heterosexual sex never 
addresses that issue—in the case of From Here to Eternity, it never quite conceals 
the fact that the real relationship is between the two men.  This dynamic plays 
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out in that Warden’s affair with Karen is always in relation to her husband, an 
incongruous affair that the novel has from the outset policed. 
Sergeant Warden, of course, rejects the officer commission, thus 
facilitating his breakup with Karen (and with Captain Holmes).  But because 
Jones has overloaded the affair with so many anxieties, the reader has little 
choice but to breathe a big sigh of relief at this development.  Karen was not the 
point of the affair—Captain Holmes, and the class he represented, was.  
Warden’s rejection of that class repositions him to his proper realm, removes 
Karen physically from the narrative, thus restoring epistemological order to the 
text. 
Jones’ treatment of Karen Holmes in From Here to Eternity is, to borrow a 
term from Sedgwick, “virulently misogynistic.”  That should come as no 
surprise.  What is surprising, however, is her presence to begin with.  Most war 
narrative manages the feminine threat by completely excluding women.  Susan 
Jeffords says, “The defining feature of American war narratives is that they are a 
‘man’s story’ from which women are generally excluded” (49).  Jones includes 
women in his novel, and even invests Karen Holmes with a certain amount of 
intelligence and independence (the word moxie comes to mind)—dialogic 
elements that threaten to spin out of control unless she’s removed from the text—
but because his chief aim is to tell a “man’s story,” that inclusion serves only to 
reinforce their subordination in the masculine realm.  Perhaps Jones’ most 
disingenuous gesture in the novel is to enlist Karen Holmes into an agreement 
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with the novel’s misogynistic project.  At one point, she says to Warden, 
“Apparently that’s what I always do to men.  I touch them and they all start to 
crumble” (592).  It is a fetishist’s disavowal, cleverly projected, as in a 
pornographic film, onto the object of the fetish.  
The “dissociation of sensibility” between the artist and the narrative is an 
important dynamic with respect to enlisted rank representation: it is a dynamic 
repeated in almost all war narrative where the narrative is conscious of the 
enlisted rank’s occupying a completely different space than the officer rank.  Any 
sort of “attraction” to the enlisted rank is directly related to its negativity and 
difference, features crucial to its currency in cultural consciousness.  Those 
features—hyper-masculinity, violence, dangerousness, crudity, illiteracy, 
drunkenness—must be present in order to justify the enlisted rank’s existence in 
material culture.  Culture may in fact impose those exaggerated features onto the 
enlisted rank as a strategy of forestallment: the bottom line for militaries, their 
“business,” is that they must kill people; therefore there must exist a space for 
that killing’s resultant anxiety.   
The enlisted rank thus exists as a type of ideological “space.”  The 
important consideration here is that narrative reserves that space for a specific 
type of man, the killer.  This presents a double bind for the enlisted rank: insofar 
as it is tasked explicitly with the killing of other human beings, that task excludes 
it from occupying a certain social position in culture.  With respect to The Royal 
Tannebaums, had Henry Sherman’s son been a Navy seaman, wearing his white 
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“Donald Duck” uniform would not have created the same social effect as did the 
officer uniform.  Culture simply does not value the enlisted rank. This double 
bind serves the interest of the officer caste, which remains aloof and untainted by 
the fact of warfare, killing, irrespective of the officer rank’s material participation 
in that killing.   
The actual history of combat implies a resistance to killing, a history that 
challenges the legitimacy of narrative convention.  The most famous incident was 
the World War I Christmas cease-fire in 1914.  In An Intimate History of Killing, 
Joanna Bourke notes that during and after World War I, a large percentage of 
soldiers were in fact reluctant to kill: 
No amount of military training could deal with volunteers, 
conscripts, and even Regular servicemen who simply lacked that 
‘offensive spirit’.  During the First World War, it was commonly 
believed that only 10 percent of soldiers could be called brave, and 
many military commentators deplored the ‘live and let live’ 
principle in which servicemen on both sides came to agreements 
not to shoot if the other side restrained themselves too.  (61) 
It was thus the officer rank’s responsibility to inspire that killer instinct into the 
enlisted rank.  For example, Robert Cole, the officer in charge of the United States 
502nd Parachute Infantry in World War II, noted that during combat, “Not one 
man in twenty-five voluntarily used his weapon [. . .] I walked up and down the 
line yelling ‘God damn it! Start shooting!’  But it did very little good.  They fired 
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only while I watched them.”18  This historical phenomenon is not easily 
translated to narrative, which has a tendency to crumble beneath the weight of 
convention.  Nevertheless, that reluctance to kill extends power to the officer 
rank in two measurable ways: it can modulate killing without suffering any 
associated taint, and it can impose “cowardice” onto the enlisted rank in the 
absence of killing.  So many negative “divestments” fix the enlisted rank into its 
socio-ideological position.  Narrative enforces that fixation, ensuring that those 
who occupy that space must remain in it, lest they threaten the immunity of the 
officer class.   
 A peculiar side effect of the negative representational trajectory of the 
enlisted rank is that the enlisted rank actually colludes with it.  That rank, treated 
with such unconscionable contempt in wars—and in the narratives that describe 
those wars—becomes a key player in the legitimation of that oppressive system.  
The enlisted rank is simultaneously demonized and infantilized (they are usually 
referred to as “our boys” by the both the military establishment and its media 
functionaries).  Veterans’ organizations, such as the American Legion and the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars, whose membership is overwhelmingly former-
enlisted, rather than challenging that praxis instead become key players in its 
perpetuation.  Alfred Vagts says that ex-soldiers play a key role in mass 
militarization because they can be recruited in the romanticization of military 
affairs:  
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[High ranking officers] ascertained that the ex-soldiers, who felt the 
urge to combine on the basis of their common experiences in the 
armies, would not be the type to oppose military service and 
institutions.  Once the men had left the service, much as they might 
have grumbled under it, they seemed glad to romanticize the 
soldiers’ life.  (356) 
 In military fictions, the officer functions as the perfectly equipped 
empowerment for capital insofar as he legitimates—and simultaneously 
surrogates—the twin systems of class and economic domination.  Within the 
context of film, that empowerment is doubled because of the phenomenon of 
spectacle, or to borrow a term from Mulvey, “scopophilia.”  The doubling 
element is the officer uniform, the visual symptom of officer rank fetishization.  
Christian Metz says, “the fetish represents by synecdoche the whole body of the 
object as desirable” (Psychoanalysis and Cinema 75).   
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U.S. Navy Officer Uniforms 189919 
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                                   Still from the CBS Television program JAG (2003) 
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As one can see in Figures 1 and 2, the officer uniform is itself a spectacle, a wildly 
over-the-top adornment that seeks, because it is literally attached to the officer, to 
link its wearer with all that is good.  I would like to suggest that the officer 
uniform is so obviously a fetish—both as a material object and as a feature in 
fictions—that, because of its gaudiness, it (here Žižek comes to mind) seems to 
appear as not a fetish.  A crucial aspect of the efficacy of military propaganda 
(and to be certain the propaganda film) is that it asserts that the synecdoche is 
reversed: it is the officer who is what Christian Metz would call the “good 
object,” and the uniform is its effect.  In order for the propaganda film to have 
currency, it must have something in/about it that attracts the spectator, that is, 
the thing about cinema that “give[s] the spectator the ‘spontaneous’ desire to 
visit the cinema and pay for his ticket” (Psychoanalysis and Cinema 7-8).  The most 
visual example of the fetishization of the officer rank is its visual component, the 
officer uniform.  Nowhere is that fetishization more obvious than in the U.S. 
Navy, where there is a stark contrast between the gaudy officer uniform and the 
humble, even comical, enlisted uniform (see Figure 3).  
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                                    Fig. 3 
                                    World War I Recruiting Poster (ca. 1919) 20 
 
That discrepancy is strategic, a contrast that plays right into the hands of 
mainstream filmmakers who are quick to identify with the beautiful officer.   
Navy movies, for whatever reason, are particularly adept at this sort of 
class management.  Mainstream filmmakers disguise this policing phenomenon 
under the shroud of nostalgia.  Any degree of self-consciousness or discomfort 
regarding the legitimacy of rank separation hopefully dissolves in the nostalgic 
object, the function of which, according to Žižek, is “precisely to conceal the 
antinomy between eye and gaze” (Looking Awry 114).  Surely the observant 
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spectator would notice the profound socioeconomic (and literal) distance 
between the officers and the enlisted men: but it’s in the past.  Rather than using 
the medium of film to interrogate the past, the filmmakers, seduced by nostalgia, 
instead use the past to rehabilitate the present, to legitimate that socioeconomic 
distance.  Disturbing examples can be found in two contemporary submarine 
movies, U-571 (Jonathan Mostow, 2000) and K-19 (Kathryn Bigelow, 2002).  These 
films’ militaristic and elitist projects are somewhat concealed because the time of 
the story is in the past: U-571’s in World War II and K-19’s in the Cold War.  In 
both films, the submarine crews address and solve some sort of problem, but 
embedded in each respective superplot is a subplot that articulates the officer 
triumphing over an incompetent enlisted problem. 
 Though the basic plot of U-571 is of an American submarine’s capture of 
a German U-Boat, the narrative element—the “story”—describes the coming-of-
age of a good officer.21  The crucial action in the film occurs when the American 
submarine’s captain dies, and the crew looks around desperately for someone to 
lead them.  Initially, they choose the elderly Chief Henry Klough (played by 
Harvey Keitel) rather than the young executive officer, Lieutenant Andrew Tyler 
(played by Matthew McConaughey), to take command of the boat.  This 
thoroughly sensible option (the Chief is experienced and competent; the young 
officer is inexperienced and incompetent) is thwarted by both the Chief and the 
film.  Klough’s rejection of leadership (not quite convincing) is more effectively 
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reinforced by the fetishistic mechanism of the film rather than by the 
machinations of the screenplay.  Klough says to Tyler,  
This is the Navy, where a commanding officer is a mighty and 
terrible thing—a man to be feared and respected.  All knowing, all 
powerful.  Don’t you dare say what you said to those boys back 
there—‘I don’t know.’  Those three words will kill a crew, dead as a 
depth charge.  You’re the skipper now, and the skipper always 
knows what to do, whether he does or not. 
The director, Jonathan Mostow (also the screenwriter), here imposes a World 
War II propaganda film bathos on this scene in order to render the spectator 
incredulous.  It is a gambit that fails, so Mostow defaults to the most 
rudimentary and manipulative cinematic technique to engineer the spectator’s 
sympathy towards the officer: Tyler is beautiful and young; Klough is ugly and 
old.  There seems to be no question but that the spectator, long accustomed and 
conditioned to this cinematic semiology, will agree with the film’s class 
management: no mainstream film can bear the burden of physical ugliness.  This 
semiology has backed the spectator into a rhetorical corner—no closure for the 
film exists other than that Tyler will take the mantle of power. 
K-19 is, even by Hollywood standards, one of the more disingenuous 
treatments of the enlisted rank.  Because it is an American film of a Russian 
submarine, the filmmakers concentrate on the relationship between two officers, 
Alexei Vostrikov (Harrison Ford) and the man he replaces as ship’s captain, 
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Mikhail Polenin (Liam Neeson).  This relationship is apparently devised to 
neutralize any Cold War-era anxieties American audiences might feel regarding 
a movie about Russians, “officer and gentleman” considerations apparently 
overriding other ideological concerns. 
The K-19 was an actual Russian nuclear submarine that suffered a reactor 
emergency in 1961.  Eight sailors died in that incident, all voluntarily sacrificing 
their lives by going into the reactor compartment to repair a coolant leak.22  The 
first man to go into the reactor compartment was a 22-year-old lieutenant, Boris 
Korchilov, who was followed by seven enlisted men.  That poignant fact is a 
burden the film K-19 cannot bear.  It reverses the historical order of events in 
order to integrate a “redemption” sub-plot, having the reactor officer, Vadim 
Radtchenko (Peter Sarsgaard), conquer his cowardice in order to save the 
submarine.  Seeing the repair crew, vomiting from their exposure to radiation, 
exit the reactor compartment earlier, Radtchenko became too frightened to enter 
when it was his turn.  When the repair fails later, Radtchenko summons up his 
courage and enters the compartment to fix the botched repair of the enlisted 
sailors.  The film overdrives this officer element in two ways.  First, it shows 
Radtchenko stay in the compartment three times longer than his enlisted 
subordinates—thereby underlining his superiority to them physically, 
technically, and morally.  And then, finally and most absurdly, Captain Vostrikov 
enters the reactor compartment, completely unprotected, to check on 
Radtchenko’s progress.  Radtchenko, like the seven sailors before him, dies from 
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radiation poisoning, but Vostrikov suffers no ill effects from exposure (except for 
a nasty cough), thereby underlining the film’s sensitivity to degrees of rank. 
Captain Vostrikov’s presence in the reactor compartment provides a 
model for mainstream cinema’s cooperation and collusion with American 
culture’s obsession with military affairs.  It makes no difference that such a thing 
could never happen “in the real world.”  His imperviousness to the effects of 
radiation mirrors the officer rank’s immunity to evaluation and interpretation in 
the arena of war narrative.  Nostalgia, with its distancing and displacing effects, 
has immunized him. 
The most obvious complication regarding officer rank fetishization is that 
persistent convention, the bad officer.  The convention is so persistent, in fact, 
that it’s tempting to say that most military fictions contain bad officers.  But those 
officers rarely—if ever—function as critiques of the officer/enlisted division.  
They are merely straw men that the texts knock over in order to further 
legitimate that division.  In narratives such as From Here to Eternity23, Men of 
Honor, Attack!, Williwaw, The Caine Mutiny, The Naked and the Dead, Mr. Roberts, 
Catch-22, and A Few Good Men, the bad officer plays a central role in the plot.  But 
in almost every case, those texts, self-consciously realizing the destabilization 
threat presented by the bad officer, neutralize him by means of the host of good 
officers, or the one good officer.  In this way, the status quo is not threatened, 
and the legitimacy of the rank division is further reinforced.   
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The model for the ostensibly anti-officer text is Stanley Kubrick’s 1957 
film, Paths of Glory.  In the film, the officers are presented as self-serving, vain, 
despicable men who do not hesitate—for the specific purpose of furthering their 
own military careers—to sacrifice their own men.  This would appear on the 
surface as an indictment of the rank system: the overwhelming majority of men 
whom they sacrifice are the enlisted soldiers suffering in the trenches.  The 
indictment, however, is only of bad officers: the real hero of Paths of Glory is a 
young officer, Colonel Dax (played by Kirk Douglas), who is not only a brave 
soldier but also a keen lawyer.  The film articulates its hatred of the enlisted caste 
by addressing it in relation to the virtuous officer.    
In the film, two corrupt French generals (General Broulard, played by 
Adolphe Menjou; and General Mireau, played by George Macready) devise a 
scheme to further their professional careers: an attack on the front lines of an 
impregnable fortress called “The Ant Hill.”  Command of the endeavor falls to 
Colonel Dax.  He at first hesitates to carry out the order—knowing that it is a 
suicide mission.  But when his masculinity is questioned (General Mireau 
suggests that he lacks the courage to sacrifice his men), he acquiesces: 
Mireau: If a commanding officer lacks countenance, what can we 
expect of his men?  Naturally, I don’t want to relieve you, but I 
must have your enthusiastic support.  Not once have you said that 
your men can take The Ant Hill. 
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Colonel Dax: We’ll take the Ant Hill.  If any soldiers in the world 
can take it, we’ll take The Ant Hill. 
The mission, of course, fails, and the unit retreats.  Viewing the retreat from a 
safe distance, the enraged Mireau orders an artillery attack on his own retreating 
soldiers, an order that is refused. 
It was this order to fire on friendly forces that prompted Francois Truffaut 
to call the film unrealistic.  Subscribing fully to the officer fetish, Truffaut cannot 
believe that an officer could be so “cowardly and cynical” as to order an artillery 
barrage on his own soldiers: 
The film’s weakness—what keeps it from being an irrefutable 
indictment—is a certain lack of psychological credibility in the 
“villains’” behavior.  There were, certainly, during World War I, a 
number of similar “war crimes,” barrages aimed at our own troops 
out of error and ignorance and confusion rather than from personal 
ambition.  (117) 
Truffaut is here perhaps betraying a certain amount of defensiveness: French 
authorities prohibited Kubrick from filming it in France (it was filmed in 
Germany), and the film was barred from French theaters for 20 years because of 
its negative portrayal of French officers.  To placate the general’s anger, three 
enlisted men from the unit are chosen by lots to stand trial for cowardice.  Dax 
defends the soldiers in their ensuing trial, but it is a kangaroo court, and the men 
are sentenced to death in front of a firing squad. 
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Kubrick is especially elitist in his representation of these enlisted soldiers.  
Kubrick attempts to balance the officers (two bad, one good) with the privates 
(two bad, one good), but his representational strategy heightens the intellectual 
and social gulf between the ranks.  The privates appear as tropes rather than as 
people.  While this representational flaw is perhaps even truer in Kubrick’s 
representation of the two bad officers, the appearance of the one good officer 
more than offsets the bad.  There is no offsetting private, though it actually 
appears as if Kubrick wants to balance Dax with an enlisted doppelganger, 
Private Arnaud (Joe Turkel).  But as in most war cinema, the film cannot bear the 
burden of the enlisted rank having similar stature as the officer.  The “good” 
private, trying to keep a stiff upper lip, collapses under the pressure of his death 
sentence, the film thereby oreinscribing his inferiority to Dax, “proving” the 
verdict of the kangaroo court.  The private, especially in comparison to the 
officer, does not count.  He is a cipher.  This narrative, as in most narratives 
including the bad officer, simply cannot bear the burden of that bad officer: can 
the text bear the destabilization threatened by the disappearance of the fetish?  
For Paths of Glory, there must be a Colonel Dax to counterbalance the bad officers.  
Conversely, the text can certainly bear, because of his many negative divestments, 
the burden of the bad private. 
Kubrick’s representational strategy reaches its apex in the film’s final 
sequence.  At a bar where the enlisted soldiers are boozing up before being sent 
back to the front, the saloon manager brings onstage a young German girl as 
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“entertainment.”  At first, the crude, drunk soldiers leer and curse at the girl, but 
when she breaks nervously into a German song, the soldiers become “tamed,” 
even humming along to the song.  Kubrick highlights these soldiers’ negativity 
by showing quick facial close-ups, a strategy perhaps designed to elicit pathos 
from the spectator.  However, the soldiers seem less men than overarching 
caricatures of the lower class—drunk, dirty, and stupid.  The effect seems rather 
to stress the soldiers’ expendability, as if the camera were seeing the scene from 
the perspective of the Generals who had earlier ordered their deaths.  Hearing 
the ruckus from outside the saloon (he certainly wouldn’t be inside the saloon), 
Colonel Dax starts to break it up, but pauses and decides to let the soldiers have 
their fun.  This sort of noblesse oblige exposes any sort of egalitarian agenda the 
film may have earlier projected as a sham.  Its caveat—its disavowal—is that the 
officer must be a good officer.  Paths of Glory in its policing function is ultimately 
indistinguishable from a propaganda film such as In Which We Serve.  Both films 
subscribe to the notion of “officers and men,” as if they were two separate 
species. 
Correlative to the thematic policing of social groups that is one of the key 
features of war narrative is the deeper-structured phenomenon of epistemological 
social management.  Because of the economic dynamics of society, narrative itself 
is resistant to a critique of social hierarchies; as these dynamics pertain to 
military narrative, the relative legitimacy of social rank is always present in the 
officer—he is the constant reminder of hierarchical desire.  Within American 
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culture, the officer rank is perhaps too heavily invested with virtue.  This 
becomes clear when one compares police narratives with military narratives.  As 
Miller has noted, the police in fiction are prima facie incompetent: that 
incompetence is a crucial element inasmuch as it is the narrative itself that 
polices and restores order.  One can gauge this effect in police narratives, both in 
fictional and even so-called “True Crime” narratives.  Even in the scenario where 
a detective manages to solve the crime, he or she operates outside of the 
boundaries of the regular police machinery.  Dirty Harry’s real victories are not 
over transgressive criminals, but rather over the girly-men bureaucrats in San 
Francisco who rely too heavily on the effeminate expedients of negotiation and 
due process.  The effective real-man detective must be an outsider, moreover one 
who does not hesitate in the exploitation of violence to effect epistemological 
order. 
No such analog exists in the military fiction.  The military officer, unlike 
the police officer, is an insider.  Most war narrative suggests that the military 
superstructure is basically good, an a priori that renders rank structure 
particularly resistant to critique or interpretation.  Unlike the detective who must 
work against the system to solve the crime, the military officer already operates 
within a system of virtue and competence, those features being pre-connoted 
within the superstructure of war narrative.  As a matter of praxis, the conventions 
of competence are reversed in the military narrative: in the detective fiction, the 
system is populated by incompetent bureaucrats; but in the war fiction, the 
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system is populated by the virtuous—it is the bad apples that have to be weeded 
out.  In the detective novel, the bad apple is the only one who can crack the case.   
Miller asserts that the police in narrative are confined to an 
epistemological “ghetto.”  This is because the police’s “intrusiveness posits a 
world whose normality has been hitherto defined as a matter of not needing the 
police” (3).  On the other hand, the military officer—that other uniform wearer—
exists in a world that desperately desires his presence.  It is a desire on a larger 
scale than the intrusive policeman’s beat.  Like the policeman, the military officer 
exists “to serve and to protect,” but those things he serves and protects are less 
definable and therefore more easily engineered to serve the purposes of capital—
things like “liberty” and “freedom,” words that are, like “leadership,” attractive 
and hypnotizing primarily because they have no real meaning.  As a result, the 
military officer, because of his fetishistic investments, has evolved into an agent 
operating completely without impediments in American culture—his claim to 
work as a servant of society a clever, insidious disavowal that further loosens the 
constraints of public scrutiny. 
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Notes  
 
1 Patrick M. Regan uses this term to great effectiveness in Organizing Societies for 
War: The Process and Consequences of Societal Militarization (Westport, CT: Praeger, 
1994) as a substitute for “The Military-Industrial Complex.”  See, especially, 
Chapter 5, “Societal Symbols and Societal Militarization.” 
 
2 Miller speaks of “The policing power that never passes for such.”  D.A. Miller, 
The Novel and the Police (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988) 17. 
 
3 For an in-depth analysis of the Sergeant Stryker trope, see Katherine Kinney, 
Friendly Fire: American Images of the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000): “John Wayne is the model by which young American men accept 
duty and responsibility” (12). 
 
4 Kaja Silverman explores this anxiety in “Historical Trauma and Male 
Subjectivity” in Psychoanalysis and Cinema.  Ed. E. Ann Kaplan (London: 
Routledge, 1990): 110-127. 
 
5 The “normal prototype of fetishes is a man’s penis.”  Sigmund Freud, 
“Fetishism” in The Complete Psychological Works vol. 21 (London: Hogarth, 1991) 
157. 
 
6 This is not to say that the war novel resists that visual strategy, e.g., “He was 
perhaps nineteen, small and gaunt, with a face blackened half by stubble and 
half by grease, and covered with pimples.  Long, coarse black hair fell over his 
tiny squinting eyes.  He wore no hat.  He was addressed by the other sailors as 
‘Horrible.’”  Herman Wouk, The Caine Mutiny (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1951) 82. 
 
7 James Jones, From Here to Eternity (New York: Signet, 1951) 77. 
 
8 A secondary consideration is that this sort of incongruity directly articulates 
Jones’ frustrations as an intellectual enlisted soldier during World War II: he was 
likely subordinate to many corporals and sergeants whom he considered stupid. 
 
9 “[G]ambler, fixer, blackmarketeer, who ran Fort Baxter in Kansas, hoodwinking 
the dim nominal commander, Paul Ford's Colonel Hall, and twisting Hall's wife 
around his finger.”  Philip French, “Soldier of Misfortune.”  The Guardian 
Unlimited <http: //film.guardian.co.uk/ News_Story/ Critic_Review/ 
Observer_Film_of_the_week/0,4267,1001697,00.html>.  The television program 
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was also made into a shockingly bad film starring Steve Martin (1995, dir. 
Jonathan Lynn). 
 
10 E.g., in Daniel Lang’s Casualties of War (New York: Pocket Books, 1989), the 
four enlisted soldiers convicted of the kidnap, rape, and murder of a Vietnamese 
teenager received the following sentences: life, 15 years, 10 years, and eight 
years.  Those soldiers’ sentences were later reduced to a combined 11 years.  
 
11 In addition to Kinney’s Friendly Fire, see Garry Wills, The Politics of Celebrity 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997); Lawrence Suid, Guts and Glory: The 
Making of the American Military Image in Film (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 2002); Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, Hollywood Goes to War 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Stephen Vaughn, “Political 
Censorship During the Cold War,” in Movie Censorship and American Culture, ed. 
Francis G. Couvares (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996); and Paul 
Fussell, Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War (New York, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
 
12 True not just in From Here to Eternity, but also in The Thin Red Line wherein 
Private Witt is undone as a soldier because of his obsession over his Dear John 
letter. 
 
13 E.g., Crash Dive, Wings, The Finest Hour, Pearl Harbor, Swing Shift, Air Cadet, 
Peasants in Distress, Enemy at the Gates, Star Wars, All the Brothers Were Valiant, 
Who Goes There?, Casablanca, Submarine, The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, What 
Price Glory, Hell’s Angels, Today We Live, Hanover Street, The Charge of the Light 
Brigade.  This theme reaches its fullest articulation in the 1992 film, A Midnight 
Clear, where six soldiers “share” the girl. 
 
14 If there were one trump card that the enlisted rank had over the officer rank as 
a convention, it was its mythological sexual virility.  The conflation of sexual 
virility and soldier competence is crucial to the construction of the enlisted rank 
as a fixed position.  But the officer rank is resilient, having managed in the post-
World War II discursive space to co-opt that virility, simultaneously handing off 
erectile dysfunction (to go with all its other dysfunctions) to the enlisted rank 
(see The Men, Coming Home, and Born on the Fourth of July) as a reciprocal 
assertion of rhetorical power.  As a result, a film like Pearl Harbor can “correct” 
the incongruous class dynamics of cuckoldry in From Here to Eternity by seizing 
that sexual virility aspect from the enlisted rank. 
 
15 Lucien Dallenbach, in Mirror in the Text, classifies this sort of device as mise en 
abyme du chose, i.e., an object that serves as a clue to the meaning of the text. 
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16 Viz., “a man must know [. . .] not to cry out when he is hiding in a closet and 
the maid breaks two of his fingers as she shuts the door on them” (Sarrasine 223-
24).  Barthes: “As for the castrato himself, we would be wrong to place him of 
necessity among the castrated: he is the blind and mobile flaw in this system; he 
moves back and forth between active and passive: castrated, he castrates” (S/Z 
36). 
 
17 “[T]he men who were more or less firmly placed on the proscribed end of the 
homosocial spectrum have also been united powerfully by proscription and have 
worked powerfully to claim and create a difference—a difference beyond 
proscription.”  Sedgwick 202. 
 
18 Qtd. in S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in 
Future War (Washington: Infantry Journal, 1947) 72.  See also George Juskalian, 
“Why Didn’t They Shoot More?” Army Combat Forces Journal 5.2 (1954). 
 
19 http://pre1900prints.com/USMilitaryHistory/USnavyuniformsB1899.htm 
 
20 http://memory.loc.gov/service/pnp/cph/3g10000/3g10000/3g10000/ 
3g10030v.jpg. 
 
21 Cf. The Dawn Patrol, The Road to Glory, Crash Dive, Glory, The Caine Mutiny, In 
Harm’s Way, An Officer and a Gentleman, A Few Good Men. 
 
22 The eight men who died were Boris Korchilov and Seamen Savkin, 
Kharitonov, Kashenkov, Ordochkin, Starkov, Ryzhkov and Penkov.  Typical for 
official military discourse is that the seven enlisted men who died do not warrant 
having their first names added to the official record.  See <mailman. 
mcmaster.ca/mailman/private/cdn-nucl-l/0207.gz/msg00091.html>. 
 
23 I’m speaking here of the film version of From Here to Eternity (1953), which 
“corrects” Jones’ novel by having only one bad officer, Captain Holmes.  The 
Department of Defense, uncomfortable with the novel’s depiction of officers, 
refused to offer the film support and access unless the anti-officer elements were 
removed.  As a result, all the other incompetent officers in the novel appear in 
the film as reinscriptions of the standard World War II propaganda officer: 
stalwart, intrepid, faultless.  Jones’ critique of the officer rank reaches its apex in 
the novel where Holmes’ incompetence is rewarded with a promotion to the 
rank of Major.  In the film, Holmes is stripped of his commission—it was the 
only condition under which the War Department would permit the presentation 
of a bad officer.  See Lawrence H. Suid, Guts and Glory: The Making of the American 
Military Image in Film (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002): “The 
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Army’s image clearly benefited from the removal of Holmes rather than simply 
his humiliation” (147). 
106 
CHAPTER IV 
WAR NARRATIVE AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL INCAPACITY 
 
Wherever a despot and his army pass, 
doctors, priests, scribes, and officials are part 
of the procession. 
  —Deleuze and Guattari 
 
All real Americans love the sting of battle. 
  —George S. Patton 
 
Any film that portrays the military as 
negative is not realistic. 
  —Philip Strub 
 
A phenomenon vexing Marxist theorists in the last twenty or so years is 
the decline in the “popularity” of Marxist literary theory, as if the validity of the 
method had passed its “sell by” date.  In 1995 Terry Eagleton said, “Marxism is 
at present enduring the most grievous crisis of its fraught career—a crisis which 
involves nothing less than the question of its survival” (“Marxist Literary 
Theory” 246).  This crisis in the American academy coincides with other 
phenomena: the increasing gap between the rich (now richer than even Thorstein 
Veblen could have imagined) and the poor, the dissolution of populist labor 
movements, the unconscionable exploitation of third world labor, and the 
reactionary seizure of mainstream media.  These are virulent phenomena, it 
seems to me, that bear witness to the crucial necessity of Marxist analysis.  The 
desire that has produced those disturbing phenomena materializes as symptoms 
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in culture, culture being the site, according to Eagleton, “where power is 
crystallized and submission bred” (“Marxist Literary Theory” 251).  The power 
dynamics displayed in the American war narrative—especially in the post World 
War-II era—project the persistence and durability of the systems of domination 
at work in society.  What I wish to suggest in this chapter is that the American 
war narrative provides a compelling gauge of the degree to which entrenched 
systems of power are immunized from threat.  It is the rare artist who can 
disencumber him- or herself from the fetishization practices that empower 
militarism, those practices functioning as compelling attractions in war narrative. 
This chapter will examine the persistence and irresistibility of war 
narrative.  Why are we still attracted to the war story?  What about it seduces us, 
often betrays our better judgment?  Why, in spite of our knowledge that war is 
bad, are we nevertheless obsessed with war?  Though there are certain visceral 
“thrills” associated with war stories—the dog fights, flying bullets, explosions, 
and threats of impending death—I’d like to suggest that class and patriarchal 
desires to a large degree produce the plaisir of the war narrative, plaisir equally 
seductive to both artist and reader/spectator. 
Though it is incongruous to juxtapose the chauvinistic, chest-thumping 
propaganda of the television program Jag with a “great” novel such as V., as I 
did in Chapter II, both “texts” nevertheless take themselves seriously as 
narratives, and both suffer from similar representational problems.  Both lean 
heavily on the expedients of convention to effect a narrative currency.  Both V. 
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and Jag present the drunk, stupid enlisted man as an instantly recognizable 
figure.  But surely there is a difference between Jag and V., a difference extending 
beyond the ideological desire those texts expose and that we as readers/ 
spectators impose on them.   
In the monologic Jag, the dissonant, dissident voice is “permitted” (such 
as, for example, that of an Islamic fundamentalist as he tortures an American 
officer), but only as a complication to be quickly and efficiently neutralized—as 
Bakhtin says, “decided in advance.”  The monologic narrative, says D.A. Miller, 
is “always speaking a master-voice that corrects, overrides, subordinates, or 
sublates all other voices it allows to speak” (The Novel and the Police 55).  In a 
dialogic text such as V., on the other hand, the dissident voice flourishes, often as 
self-critique, often as parody and self-parody.  To be fair to Pynchon, an author 
who exploits all the ambiguous/ambivalent trajectories of dialogism, can the 
reader be certain the conventional device in V. exists to reinforce the legitimacy 
of the convention, or rather to expose how conventional narrative practices 
engage in a type of rhetorical extortion?  In other words, to satirize the sort of 
rhetorical practice openly endorsed/embraced by Jag?   
But the problem is that invoking convention, even for the purpose of 
subversion, rings a certain bell that, once struck, cannot be unrung.  Satire and 
parody may increase the jouissance of the text, but they do not neutralize 
connotation.  They may bear witness to narrative’s diagnostic power, but do they 
merely bear witness to that power?  “Why,” asks Žižek, “in spite of its 
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interpretation, does the symptom not dissolve itself; why does it persist?” (The 
Sublime Object of Ideology 74).  The answer (beyond the subtle joke that nothing 
dissolves itself), it seems, is that the symptom is kept on a sort of life-support 
system by desire.  In her essay “Desire in Narrative,” Teresa de Lauretis suggests 
that the desire underpinning many narratives is a yearning for patriarchal order, 
a phenomenon easily measured in historical texts, whose “value [. . .] is 
conferred by the historian’s desire for a moral order underlying the aesthetic 
aspect of historical representation” (128).  Because war fictions so closely 
simulate “real events” (e.g., Jag’s diligence in incorporating Afghanistan and Iraq 
subplots into their stories), their embedded patriarchal codes aren’t so difficult to 
decode.  That desire, in addition to its patriarchal “work,” tends to incapacitate 
narrative trends toward a democratization of power, a praxis that can be gauged 
in the war narrative. 
Viewing the novel as a historico-political force, Bakhtin had high hopes 
that the novel’s exploitation of language along the entire ideological spectrum 
would literally redirect power via a process of “refraction”:  
The prose writer makes use of words that are already populated 
with the social intentions of others and compels them to serve his 
own new intentions, to serve a second master.  Therefore the 
intentions of the prose writer are refracted, and refracted at different 
angles, depending on the degree to which the refracted, heteroglot 
languages he deals with are socio-ideologically alien, already 
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embodied and already objectivized.  (“Discourse in the Novel” 299-
300) 
Bakhtin recognized the Pandora’s box potential of the novel, that the dissonant 
voice can be disruptive on a real political level.  However, even insofar as the 
dialogic narrative hyperextends and distorts conventional figures, dialogism is 
no guarantee that power will be subverted, that the putative intent of the 
narrative can be countenanced or—as we will see—even materialize. 
 In the case of most war narrative, the putative intent is always the same, 
anti-war.  Almost all war narratives profess an anti-war project.  Unfortunately, 
that profession is often a sham: few of them are legitimately anti-war—
irrespective of any dialogic elements present in the text.  James Jones provides an 
over-the-top example of this complication in his dedication in The Thin Red Line: 
This book is cheerfully dedicated to those greatest and most heroic 
of all human endeavors, WAR and WARFARE; may they never 
cease to give us the pleasure, excitement and adrenal stimulation 
that we need, or provide us with the heroes, the presidents and 
leaders, the monuments and museums which we erect to them in 
the name of PEACE. 
Having come across this non sequitur, can the reader reasonably expect an anti-
war narrative to follow, that any dialogic element in the novel has a chance to 
override Jones’ bellicose master-voice?   
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The superstructure of narrative itself often becomes an unmanageable 
hurdle for the artist wishing to tell an anti-war story, a phenomenon attesting to 
the incapacitating power of militarism.  As Ross Chambers says in Story and 
Situation, “narrative does have powers greater than those claimed for it by the 
narrator and that these are powers of seduction” (211).  The structural drama that 
plays out in many anti-war narratives is that the author becomes seduced by the 
mechanism of war narrative, and the anti-war project dissolves.  Seduction itself 
can be gauged because of the way the artist perceives his mode of production 
and his productivity in relation to culture.  Gramsci asserts in “The Intellectuals” 
that the legitimate intellectual is the one who resists his own cooption into 
hegemony by recognizing the State as “the biggest plutocratic organism” (315).  
War narrative for the most part provides a cautionary tale for how willingly 
artists surrender to narrative seduction.  It is the rare filmmaker or novelist who 
perceives himself in the way Gramsci prescribed the artist “role”; instead, these 
artists perceive themselves in exactly the same terms as the military officer 
perceives himself: at best (or worst) the cream of the cultural crop, at worst (or 
best) a servant of society. 
As I have done in the previous chapters, I will provide a European 
example of war narrative as a way of introducing a crucial issue in American war 
discourse.  The American rank system follows a European model, and as such is 
fraught with European-style class anxieties.  As Alfred Vagts demonstrates in A 
History of Militarism, the feudal aristocracy’s appropriation of the European 
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officer system not only created a cult of exclusion, but also stigmatized soldiers 
from the lower classes.  It was an appropriation whose psychic effects—both for 
the officer class and against the enlisted class—extended far beyond military 
circles.  In simplest terms, culture conferred honor on the officers, but not on the 
rank and file soldiers.   
Those class vectors, as it turns out, can be very a seductive arrangement to 
the artist who more often than not identifies with the glamorous officer rather 
than the simple private.  As a result, the seductiveness of the officer rank itself 
materializes in many war narratives.  For example, Jean Renoir’s 1937 film Grand 
Illusion is considered by many critics one of the classics of anti-war cinema, but it 
is a film that wholeheartedly subscribes to officer fetishization.  However much 
Renoir manages to avoid the primary seduction of war narrative (the 
glorification of war itself), he nevertheless subscribes to certain aristocratic 
notions of officership, a trace that appears in practically all subsequent war film, 
especially American war film.  Grand Illusion is populated almost exclusively by 
officers, as the key characters in the film are officer prisoners of war segregated 
into officer-only stalags.  The tension in the film arises from the socioeconomic 
disparity between the aristocratic officers (Captains de Boeldieu and von 
Rauffenstein) and the bourgeois officers (Lieutenants Marechal and Rosenthal).  
No enlisted rank appears at all, except for the incompetent German prison 
guards.  Though Renoir appears to interrogate that disparity, he nevertheless 
reinforces its legitimacy.  For example, in one sequence, the two aristocrats, von 
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Rauffenstein (the stalag warden) and de Boeldieu (a French POW) discuss the 
possibility that the Great War will eliminate the European aristocracy:   
Boeldieu: May I ask you something?  Why do you make an 
exception for me by inviting me to your quarters? 
Rauffenstein in close up: Why? Because your name is Boeldieu, 
career officer in the French army, and my name is Rauffenstein, 
career officer in the imperial German army. 
Boeldieu in close up: But. . . all my friends are officers, too. 
Rauffenstein disdainfully: You call Maréchal and Rosenthal. . . 
officers? 
Boeldieu: They are very good soldiers. 
Rauffenstein with contempt: Yes! .  .  . The charming legacy of the 
French Revolution. 
Boeldieu smiling: I am afraid we can do nothing to turn back the 
clock. 
Rauffenstein: I do not know who is going to win this war, but I 
know one thing: the end of it, whatever it may be, will be the end of 
the Rauffensteins and the Boeldieus. 
Boeldieu: But perhaps there is no more need for us. 
Rauffenstein: And don’t you find that is a great pity? 
Boeldieu: Perhaps! 
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de Boeldieu, perhaps speaking for Renoir, says that he will welcome the change.  
Are we then to interpret that the aristocracy will give way to a bourgeois 
economy?  If so, it is a disturbingly elitist bourgeois economy: the gap between 
the aristocrat officer and the bourgeois officer is, within military circles, a purely 
social one (a fact underlined within the film: the bourgeois Rosenthal, heir of a 
Jewish banking family, has bought up the chateaux that the de Boeldieu family 
can no longer afford).  Moreover, that gap is meaningless outside the context of 
rank: whether the officers are bourgeois or aristocrat is entirely without meaning 
to the private who has to wash their clothes.  The gap between officer and 
enlisted ranks is social and economic, perhaps too large a hurdle for Renoir to 
manage.  
Ultimately, Renoir treats the enlisted rank somewhat akin to the way 
Merchant/Ivory films treat the servants: barely visible, and certainly not factored 
within his compartmentalized economic critique.  The advantage, if it can be 
called such, with a Merchant/Ivory film is that the servants are present as a sort 
of mise en scene that exposes the surreptitious class fantasies at play—the 
democratic gestures in the film, e.g., the community of officers from various 
socioeconomic backgrounds1, are a sham.  With respect to Renoir, the absence of 
the enlisted rank problematizes any egalitarian project with the film: the officer 
cannot surrogate a commoner.  By film’s end, Renoir validates both ends of the 
officer spectrum: de Boeldieu, in an over-the-top act of noblesse oblige, sacrifices 
his life so that Marechal and Rosenthal can escape the stalag.  And Marechal, in a 
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parallel act of nobility, conquers his anti-semitism so that he and Rosenthal can 
cross the Swiss border together. 
The problem posed by Grand Illusion is its ambivalent politics: does it 
celebrate a transition to a bourgeois economy (signified by Marechal and 
Rosenthal’s successful escape across the Swiss border)?  Or does it Eliot-like 
yearn for a time when civilization was more ordered, more “civilized”?  Renoir 
himself says of the film: “In 1914, men’s spirits had not yet been warped by 
totalitarian religions and racism.  In certain ways, that world war was still a war 
of formal people, of educated people” (8).  Both Truffaut and Bazin asserted, 
coincidentally using the same word, that Renoir demands in the film that the 
traditional class system must “subsist2.”  Renoir seems in Grand Illusion to 
articulate a conservative weldschaaft inherited from the nineteenth-century 
Romantics, for whom, as Erich Auerbach says bitterly, “the fulfillment of 
beautiful possibilities lies entirely in the flowering of aristocratic cultures” (395).  
Though a French film, Grand Illusion provides a blueprint for the sort of officer-
only utopia that one sees in much American World War II propaganda film and 
post-war narratives such as Star Trek, Star Wars3, Apollo 13, The Right Stuff, and 
Top Gun, narratives which forestall class anxieties by altogether excluding the 
subaltern ranks. 
How is it that so many novels wind up glamorizing the very thing they 
wish to condemn, the very thing—war—that should be condemned the most?  
Perhaps because of its many ideological, libidinal, social, and economic 
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investments, the war narrative has effectively managed that potential for 
“refraction.”  War narrative seems uniquely resistant to the threat presented by 
dialogism and heteroglossia.  Though the war narrative may desire to condemn 
warfare, it is often compelled due to problematics associated with genre to 
contradict that project.   The novel as a political force, after all, has not ushered in 
a glorious age of peace, so how has it participated in peace’s counteraction?  This 
is not a problem associated with heteroglossia but rather with the ideological 
pressures weighing on the genre of war narrative.  Though literary theorists in 
the post World War II age point to a postmodern practice of dissidence wherein 
marginalized groups seize certain narrative platforms to articulate a 
counteraction, a phenomenon Susan Ruben Suleiman calls “postmodern 
resistance” (and which Eagleton calls the “subversion thesis”), we shouldn’t 
neglect how well immunized hegemony is from that resistance.  The war 
narrative bears witness to that immunity insofar as it gauges how efficiently 
hegemony coopts forms of resistance to reassert its dominance.  Twentieth-
century war films and novels offer a compelling lesson about that strategy of 
cooption.  The early twentieth-century novel theorists Bakhtin and Lukács saw 
the novel as perhaps the most effective form of political insurgency, but even 
they recognized that as a genre, the novel was easy prey for the reaction.  Lukács 
says, “[T]he novel is the most hazardous genre” because it can be seized by 
forms whose “superficial likeness can almost lead to the caricature being 
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mistaken for the real thing” (73).  These “caricatures” not only attempt to defuse 
forms of resistance, but also empower the machinery of domination.   
It seems highly unlikely that in a relatively benign novel such as The Man 
in the Gray Flannel Suit, Sloan Wilson desires to buttress the powers of hegemony, 
but inasmuch as he does not interrogate the programs that contribute to that 
reinforcement (one of the more pressing is, as I hope to have demonstrated in 
Chapter II, his insistence on presenting the military officer as a person deserving 
higher status in and out of the military), he legitimates the class distinctions 
presented in the novel.  What should be clear from these complications is how 
careful the democratic artist must be in order to participate in a liberatory 
process.  What the anti-war artist must understand is that in order to effect an 
anti-war statement, he or she must work against the will of the state. 
In his famous essay “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses,”Althusser asserts that many art forms are “a reproduction of the 
ability to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of exploitation 
and repression, so that they, too, will provide for the domination of the ruling 
class ‘in words’” (133).  In the war narrative’s relative incapacity to interrogate 
the state’s machinery of repression—indeed it may be a crucial cog in that 
machinery, often with the full endorsement of the artist (see, for example, the 
works of Tom Clancy, W.E.B. Griffin, and [believe it or not] Oliver North, whose 
works are the “caricatures” Lukács warns against)—the genre may almost 
preclude anything but its participation in repression and domination, thus 
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becoming a participant in what Althusser calls “surplus value extortion” (137).  It 
is tempting then to conclude that the state is too powerful a force—it has 
absorbed the anti-war narrative into its machinery4.  But that is not true.  There 
are, to be sure, legitimately anti-war narratives.  First World War texts such as 
Erich Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front and the poetry of Wilfred 
Owen and Siegfriend Sassoon are real condemnations of war.  Their efficacy, 
however, is rooted, not so much in their articulation that war is bad, but rather in 
their resistance to the fetishisms usually present in war narrative.  Their realism 
centers in that fact of warfare too often elided in the fetishistic discourse of war: 
the deliberate, strategic killing of human beings.   
The state distorts that fact by reformulating it in two special ways.  First, it 
presents warfare as a historical inevitability that it has no control over.  This sort 
of artful dodge can be seen in the official discourse on warfare.  In 1898, 
President William McKinley said America’s participation in the Spanish-
American War happened because “the march of events rules and overrules 
human actions.”5  He was thereby able to displace his culpability in America’s 
colonial expansion onto the ethereal agent of “destiny,” a strategy of 
displacement that has become a favored rhetorical strategy for many subsequent 
American Presidents.  Second, the state capitalizes on certain nebulous 
investments related to warfare to enlist the populace into participation—
heroism, glory, courage, honor, sacrifice, and duty.  But we mustn’t infer from 
this particular reformulation that the state needs coercion to spur its people to 
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war: society’s inclination toward war has been fostered by centuries of narratives 
bearing witness to the glory and desirability of war.  Perhaps the most reliable 
indicator of how fetishism may be the controlling impetus for American-style 
warmaking is that war is always “avowed” as the state’s last option even though 
empirical evidence since the Korean War suggests that war may be the state’s 
first option. 
A side effect of the durability and persistence of the conventional war 
narrative tropes is that they push to the margins the affects that the anti-war 
artist must interrogate.  The drunk, illiterate sergeant as a trope endures because 
its currency is desire (we want his divested, caricatured condition to appear 
“natural”), and also that the trope is seemingly based on reality, even though 
that reality is no more “real” than the lazy Negro or the inscrutable Chinaman 
(tropes that have clearer political strategies).  Though the conventional device, as 
D.A. Miller suggests (see Chapter III), serves primarily to immunize certain 
aspects of the narrative project from analysis, on a macrocosmic level the 
persistent trope as a cultural practice participates in immunizing dominant 
culture from the democratization of power.  What should be clear from historical 
analysis, though it certainly is not, is the eugenicist agenda of warmaking, 
effected through a strategic maintenance of marginalized groups (i.e., that the 
prejudices about “them” are really true) and the subsequent tactical expenditure 
of their lives during war6.  Though the artist may express a desire to end warfare 
in general, or a war in particular, his or her participation in conventional 
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representational practices reifies the power of the dominant/dominating cultural 
institutions—the institutions that have the most to lose in the absence of war.   
The attraction of the stereotype, particularly the negative—or divested, in 
the case of the enlisted man—stereotype, is its comforting fixity.  As Homi 
Bhabha argues in his essay, “The Other Question,” the fixity of stereotypes 
“connotes rigidity and an unchanging order as well as disorder, degeneracy and 
daemonic repetition” (66).  The war narrative presents that disorder and 
degeneracy, but the reader/spectator delights in that presentation because he or 
she knows that the narrative can (and will) regulate it.  With respect to 
conventional representations of the enlisted rank—in and out of war narrative—
its comically hyperbolic negativity functions as a political expedient: ensuring 
that any anxiety about war, the military, and militarism is channeled toward the 
“correct” ideological terminus.   
The separation of ranks into officer and enlisted compartments is 
completely nonsensical except for its ingenuity.  One would think that, at least in 
a democracy, military rank would be contingent exclusively on merit.  It seems 
reasonable that a sergeant with 22 years of service would be the one barking 
orders to a 22 year-old lieutenant fresh out of West Point.  But that scenario does 
not exist in the military—the lieutenant has the sort of authority and 
mystical/magical power beyond the reach, but not beyond the comprehension, 
of the sergeant, characteristics that increase with each increment in rank.  By the 
time that high school quarterback achieves the rank of general or admiral, he is 
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as close to being a god that one can be in American culture.  The ingenuity of this 
system, above and beyond the mystical aura, is that the psychological 
divestments of the enlisted rank operate as a type of cultural “sign” that redirects 
cultural dysphoria about warfare away from the military in general and onto the 
enlisted rank in specific.  Lawrence Suid’s encyclopedic history of American war 
cinema, Guts and Glory, provides dozens of examples of the Department of 
Defense’s unwillingness to provide support to films that show officers in a 
negative light.  The Department of Defense understands the profound impact 
that film has on American culture, and subsequently that a negative portrayal of 
officers threatens the aura and immunity of the officer caste.  Inasmuch as there 
is no aura, only divestments, associated with the enlisted rank, the Department 
of Defense does not care whether the sergeant is portrayed negatively.  Or, more 
accurately, that the Department of Defense tries to ensure, so as to capitalize on 
the film industry’s economy of fetishism, that any negative portrayal must be by 
the enlisted rank.   
While my project is not to reverse the trajectories of enlisted and officer 
representation, I still think it important to assert that the primary strategy of the 
conventional tropes in war narrative is to deflect warfare dysphoria away from 
the rank, in the persons of the high ranking officers who are “in charge,” that 
wages war.  Narrative practices have actually subscribed to and colluded with the 
belief that the upper echelons of the officer rank may function as a deterrent to 
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war, a phenomenon that has no basis in reality but nevertheless has an enduring 
currency. 
As it is now, those representational strategies (officer = good / enlisted 
man = bad) are entrenched in the political unconscious.  Why, it seems 
reasonable to ask, is there an officer/enlisted distinction in militaries—
particularly in militaries of democratic states?  Why is it that almost no artist 
interrogates that archaic system?  Perhaps there is too strong a trace of class 
anxieties holding over from the New Model Army and the French Revolution, 
systems wherein soldiers from the lower castes seized a power up to that time 
denied them, a power to be sure often abused.  But those anxieties arise primarily 
from the historical fact of their having power more so than of their uses and 
abuses of that power.  Insofar as the Western aristocratic nobility monopolized 
the officer rank for centuries, those novel redistributions of military power 
always carried with them the taint of illegitimacy.  Montesquieu articulated this 
anxiety in the eighteenth century:  
All is lost if the lucrative profession of the trader should succeed by 
its riches in ever becoming an honored profession. . . A disgust then 
seizes all the other estates, honor loses all its esteem, the slow and 
natural means of distinguishing oneself do not apply any longer, 
and the government is stricken in principle.7 
Were the bourgeois to poison the officer rank, one of the last markers of real 
nobility, then nobility itself would lose its luster.  The American model of 
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officership implies a nobility of the soul: it is only via merit that an American can 
obtain a commission8, a clever system that fetishistically disavows antiquated 
notions of nobility.  The germane consideration here is that irrespective of the 
relative legitimacy of officership, there is no quality for the enlisted rank to 
compensate for its cultural divestment. 
To be sure, there are novels that gesture towards an interrogation of the 
immunity of the officer rank9.  But the fetishization of the officer rank is a 
powerful epistemological seduction, and thereby prompts the narrative to 
compensate for that interrogation.  A compelling example can be found in 
Norman Mailer’s The Naked and the Dead (1948), a work that weakly attempts to 
expose certain negative elements of the officer rank.  It is a novel that almost 
challenges the legitimacy of the rank division.  Unlike James Jones, whose 
depiction of the officer rank centers on his belief that it is effeminate, Mailer’s 
critique focuses on the officer rank’s socioeconomic prerogative: he presents all 
but one officer as reactionary, elitist, and contemptuous of their subordinates.  It 
is perhaps Mailer’s contempt of the officer rank that motivates the narrative, but 
as in Paths of Glory, that suggestion of officer critique creates a narrative vacuum 
that necessitates a compensatory “good” officer, one who counterbalances the 
bad.  It is this compensatory strategy in the novel that bears witness to its 
investment in the fetishistic economy of war narrative. 
The representative bad officer in The Naked and the Dead is General 
Cummings, a reactionary bully.  Similar to the generals in Paths of Glory, 
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Cummings’ effectiveness as a military commander is directly proportional to his 
contempt for his enlisted subordinates (what the American military seems to 
regard as good officership, according to “Army Professionalism, The Military 
Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century” [see Chapter II]).  The novel is a 
fictional account of the American army’s attack of “Anopopei,” an island in the 
Pacific, during World War II—a thinly disguised Guadalcanal.  The crucial 
campaign in the novel involves an attack behind enemy lines, an attack whose 
efficacy centers on its placing its soldiers in an untenable position, a position 
ensuring a large number of casualties.  The sensible alternative is to attack the 
enemy’s frontline with the American army’s overwhelming numerical majority, 
but Cummings rejects that option because the rear attack has a certain 
“psychological soundness”: “The men who would land at Botoi would be in the 
enemy rear without any safe way to retreat, and their only security would be to 
drive ahead and meet their own troops.  They would have to advance” (326).  
Cummings perceives his unconscionable contempt for the enlisted rank as a 
crucial necessity for successful fighting, saying at one point, “The Army 
functions best when you’re frightened of the man above you, and contemptuous 
of your subordinates” (152).   
Chapter 8 of the novel, wherein the officers enjoy a beach party (as 
enlisted soldiers guard the perimeter), crystallizes the officer critique: 
“Oh, I have to tell you this,“ Dove was saying now.  “We 
had a party once at Fischler’s place in the Wardman Park Hotel, 
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Lieutenant Commander Fischler, an old sidekick of my brother’s at 
Cornell, hell of a swell fellow and knew a lot of VIPs, that’s how he 
got the room in Wardman Park, but he gave this party, and in the 
middle of it he started wandering around pouring a couple of 
drops of liquor in everybody’s hair.  Good for dandruff, he kept 
saying.  Oh, it was wonderful.”  Dove giggled remembering it. 
Hearn stared at Dove.  Lieutenant (sg) Dove, USNR.  A 
Cornell man, a Deke, a perfect asshole.  He was six feet two and 
weighed about a hundred and sixty pounds, with straight ash-
blond hair cut close, and a clean pleasant vacuous face.  He looked 
more like a Harvard clubman, varsity crew.  (204) 
Though the point of this scene seems to be to spotlight the absurd affectations of 
the officers, that point is too heavy a burden for the narrative to bear: there must 
be a “good” officer to counteract the bad.  Standing in sharp relief to these 
absurd officers is the “good” character, not surprisingly an officer, Lieutenant 
Hearn, whose moral superiority is effected by his self-consciousness: he has the 
decency to feel contempt for his snobby colleagues and guilt about the 
socioeconomic gulf between himself and his enlisted subordinates.  Hearn is, like 
Captain Kinross in In Which We Serve and Colonel Dax in Paths of Glory, the sort 
of super officer whose pseudo-liberal sensitivities putatively neutralize any 
anxiety about officership, about the fact(or) of the officer/enlisted division.   
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Mailer compounds that compensatory strategy by hyperbolizing the 
negativity of the major enlisted character, Sergeant Croft, who is in addition to 
being a terrific warrior, almost indescribably evil.  At various points in the novel 
he kills a striking coal miner, abandons his pregnant girlfriend, steals the gold 
teeth from dead soldiers, and murders a Japanese POW who is showing him 
pictures of his wife and children.  Because the enlisted soldier is a priori divested 
in the American political unconscious, these behaviors do not require any sort of 
compensation in the novel. 
 What this ostensibly critical narrative reveals is how resistant the officer 
caste is to criticism, and, as a correlative effect, how seductive it is to the artist.  
Lieutenant Hearn is the character that the novel most clearly identifies with.  
And he is certainly the character Mailer—who, like James Jones, was a sergeant 
in World War II—most clearly invests with sensibility and humanity. 
Though it is an uneasy relationship that The Naked and the Dead fosters 
with the officer rank, that rank is ultimately the bar of legitimacy in the novel.  A 
compelling example occurs in Chapter 12, where an enlisted soldier attempts to 
secure for himself a “Section 8,” a psychological discharge.  The soldier, Private 
Minetta, is shot in the leg during a skirmish and is sent to a field hospital.  There 
he finds out to his dismay that his wound is only a scratch, and that after 48 
hours he will be sent back to his unit.  However, he does not want to go back into 
action, so he removes his bandages and reopens his wound.  The next day, the 
doctor re-dresses the wound and gives him another 24 hours of convalescence.  
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Minetta then devises a scheme where he will act crazy so that he will be sent to a 
psych ward.  But the doctor is not fooled: 
“All right,” the doctor began, “let’s cut this out, Minetta.  
You’re not going to get away with it.” 
“Fug you, you wouldn’t get the Jap,” Minetta screamed. 
The doctor shook him.  “Minetta, you’re talking to an officer in 
the U. S. Army.  If you don’t answer civilly, I’ll have you court-
martialed.”  (306) 
This confrontation prompts Minetta to grumble about the unfairness of the 
officer/enlisted division, thinking to himself, “The goddam officers, they think 
the whole Army is set up for them to have a good time [. . .] I’m as good as 
anybody else; why should some sonofabitch give me orders?” (309).  Here 
Minetta articulates the officer/enlisted tension that the novel as a whole desires 
to address; however, because the novel projects Minetta as a derelict (a projection 
compounded by his Italian ethnicity), those concerns are, if not de-legitimized, 
then certainly problematized.  The officer perspective here performs the 
epistemological arbitration, that is, it functions as the position of legitimacy.  While 
it would be disingenuous to assert that this passage exposes Mailer’s 
interrogation of rank privilege as fraudulent, it certainly bears witness to the 
power that rank wields, and perhaps to how poorly equipped Mailer is in this 
novel to tackle the enduring problem of class difference: The Naked and the Dead 
ultimately submits to the power and aura of rank and privilege.  As with James 
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Jones, Mailer’s insistence on projecting the enlisted rank conventionally aligns 
The Naked and the Dead with unproblematic, hagiographic officer-texts, such as 
the Master and Commander series by Patrick O’Brian or The Killer Angels by 
Michael Shiarra, texts which present the virtuous officer as a cast-iron figure 
beyond the reach of cynicism, beyond the tentacles of interpretation. 
 If there is any element legitimating the officer critique in The Naked and the 
Dead, it is that Mailer’s reformatory officer, Lt. Hearn, is sacrificed.  General 
Cummings penalizes Hearn’s humanitarian and sympathetic relationship with 
the enlisted subordinates (Hearn’s noblesse oblige) by giving him command of a 
suicide mission.  Hearn, of course, dies in the mission, a textual development 
suggesting that Mailer’s putative critique is “genuine,” i.e., that the military 
machinery may be “beyond” rehabilitation.  I bring up this complication to 
highlight the persistent difference between war film and war novel: in a film 
version, officer iconography trumps class anxiety (see note 7).  In the Hollywood 
version of The Naked and the Dead (1958, dir. Raoul Walsh), Lt. Hearn, played by 
Cliff Robertson, survives.  His narrative death was apparently too large a burden 
for the film—and by extension the Department of Defense—to bear. 
Though it is inaccurate to classify The Naked and the Dead, like its close 
cousin From Here to Eternity, an anti-war novel, it nevertheless explores the 
frustration regarding class in the military.  An under-explored phenomenon in 
war narrative criticism10 is that those novels were written by novelists from the 
enlisted rank.  Both James Jones and Norman Mailer were Army sergeants in 
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World War II.  As it turns out, many American novels most clearly projecting a 
legitimate anti-war sentiment were written by novelists whose military service 
was in the enlisted rank.  Those novelists’ adroitness is to a large degree 
informed by their positions as subalterns in the military, a position that strongly 
modulates their critique.  This enlisted novel tradition rises from the 
groundbreaking novels The Red Badge of Courage by Stephen Crane and All Quiet 
on the Western Front by Remarque, novels narrated from an enlisted perspective 
(and, in the case of Remarque, written by an enlisted soldier).  The American 
anti-war novels emerging from this tradition are V. and Gravity’s Rainbow by 
Thomas Pynchon, Slaughterhouse 5 by Kurt Vonnegut, Battle Cry by Leon Uris, 
Meditations in Green by Stephen Wright, The Things They Carried and Going After 
Cacciato by Tim O’Brien, and Williwaw by Gore Vidal.  The novelist in this 
tradition sees himself in a sort of military purgatory: as an intellectual in the 
subaltern rank, he identifies with the officer psychically, but with the enlisted 
man physically.  For example, the narrator in Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse 5 
(Vonnegut himself) says of a retired officer acquaintance, “He used to ask me 
sneeringly sometimes why I hadn’t been an officer, as though I’d done 
something wrong” (10).  The narrative challenge, then, is to resist the impetus to 
align the narrative with the elite rank, whose auratic seductions undermine a 
resistance to warmaking. 
In large measure, this subaltern development evokes the analyses of 
Bakhtin and Lukács, who see the novel’s historical role that of subverting 
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entrenched power systems.  Those systems, however, do not cede their power 
willingly.  While a novel from the subaltern perspective may create an 
epistemological rupture11, forces within the superstructure of culture work 
quickly to manage that rupture—ideological damage control, most often effected 
in war narrative by (quickly) replacing the bad officer with the good.  The sharp 
rise in the subaltern war perspective, beginning with Crane and rising to a peak 
in Vietnam war novels, parallels the rise in populist labor movements, 
movements whose power was fueled by a democratic belief that all men really 
were created equal (an extraordinarily dangerous notion in military ranks).  But 
that rise, like the labor movements, does not develop unimpeded.  There is, 
beginning with the communist paranoia rising after the first World War (a 
paranoia coinciding with the metastasis of late-capitalism industrial growth) a 
process of cultural containment that materializes in novels and films, a type of 
class “correction” that can be traced in pre-World War II mainstream cinema 
(where we learn that the insouciant rich really do have our best interests at 
heart).  Frederic Jameson notes in Signatures of the Visible that in the 1930s 
“Hollywood’s images of domesticity [. . .] suddenly came to be seen, not as 
‘realism’ but as compensatory wish-fulfillment and consolation” (174).   And 
then in the post-World War II war novel, we learn that the officer class, a class 
transcending class, represents an American aristocracy of the soul.  Where 
despite our discourse on government-by-the-people, our praxis reveals at worst a 
plutocracy, at best a dangerous meritocracy where the “best” of certain 
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socioeconomic groups are excised from the ghetto and subsequently grafted into 
dominant culture.   
In the Lukácsean “caricature” novel, such as The Hunt for Red October by 
Tom Clancy, one can see how the novelist cannot work fast enough in that 
alignment.  Clancy spends no energy interrogating the problems associated with 
reaction, nationalism, and xenophobia—for Clancy, those are virtues.  The 
dissident or interrogative novel, however, desires to present a strategy of 
resistance.  But the paucity of narrative elements in the war story (rarely is the 
plot about the nation versus the enemy—usually the story involves internecine 
rivalries) may work to align the narrative in conventional vectors.  The most 
obvious and persistent story in the American war narrative is the “real” hero 
triumphing over the “fraudulent” hero.  Most often, of course, it is the officer 
whose aristocracy is in his heart rather than the effete officer whose aristocracy is 
on paper (i.e., false).  However antidotal this narrative strategy may appear, it 
nonetheless restates the necessity of hierarchy, legitimate now instead of 
artificial.  It bears repeating that this “drama” persists in marginalizing the 
enlisted rank, a strategy of exclusion that exposes elitist traces in the “otherwise” 
dissident novel.  Both the dissident and the jingoistic novel, therefore, have a 
tendency to participate in the exclusion of the preterite. 
An under-analyzed war narrative that articulates this American version of 
aristocracy is Gore Vidal’s first novel, Williwaw, written in 1946.  The novel has 
experienced a renaissance of sorts in the last few years (a new edition from 
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Abacus appeared in 2003) because of the presence of an openly gay character 
(Lieutenant Hodges).  The interesting aspect of this novel with respect to class 
considerations is that it is written/narrated from a perspective straddling the 
enlisted and officer ranks—the warrant officer’s.  This mid-perspective serves as 
a helpful gauge for measuring how the American war novel directs its class 
vectors.  Technically, the warrant officer is an “officer,” but there is a stigma 
attached to the rank implying a certain illegitimacy.  “Regular” officers 
sneeringly refer to warrants as “sergeants who eat in the officer’s club.”12  
Warrant officer therefore is a sort of purgatorial caste located between the 
enlisted and officer ranks.  Gore Vidal himself enlisted in the Army Air Force in 
World War II, but was promoted to warrant officer at the age of 19, a fact 
doubtlessly influencing the class tensions present in the novel.   
Williwaw provides compelling evidence demonstrating how the American 
war story often works toward elitism and exclusion.  The hero of Williwaw, 
Evans, is a warrant officer who commands an Army Air Force transport boat in 
Alaska during the last period of World War II.  Williwaw is war novel only in the 
sense that its action takes place during the war.  A subtext is that the Japanese 
had abandoned the Aleutian chain long before the novel’s action, a non-
development focusing attention toward the class/masculinity complications that 
are often refracted in the straightforward war novel.  The complication in the 
novel rises when Evans is ordered to transport a conventional Army officer, 
Major Barkison, from one small island in the Aleutian chain to another.  
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Barkison, characterized by the same over-the-top class affectations as the officers 
in From Here to Eternity and The Naked and the Dead, demands to be transported to 
his headquarters despite Evans’ warnings that the weather might turn rough on 
the voyage.  Insisting that he “would never have a boat sent out in weather like 
this unless it were important” (8), Barkison’s rank overrules Evans’ reticence.  
Implied in the narrative during the voyage is that there had been no imperative 
for the voyage other than Barkison’s suspicion that he would be promoted to the 
rank of lieutenant colonel upon his arrival.  During the voyage, a freak storm 
known as a “williwaw” severely damages the ship, almost sinking it.  Despite a 
broken mast and a dreadful crash against rocks, the ship survives the voyage and 
makes it to base.  Greeted at the pier by high-ranking officers, Barkison finds out 
that he has indeed been promoted.  He then chastises Evans for embarking on 
such a dangerous voyage: 
“I’m quite appreciative of what you, ah, did.  I’m not quite 
sure in my mind, however, that it was a wise thing to do, to take a 
ship out in such bad weather.” 
Evans was surprised and a little angry.  “What do you mean, 
Major, I mean Colonel?” 
“Nothing at all except that some might say, now mind you I 
don’t, but some might say you showed bad judgment.”  (166) 
Though the class tensions of the novel are clearly between Evans, an 
officer coming from a working class family, and Barkison, a conventional East 
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coast patrician, the novel shies away from that confrontation (though both Evans 
and the third-person narrator often satirize Barkison), instead transferring those 
tensions to two relatively minor characters, Bervick and Duval.  Bervick, a 
sergeant, and Duval, another warrant officer, “play out” the class warfare 
suggested by Evans and Barkison.  Their rivalry correlates to Evans and 
Barkison’s insofar as both pairs project the frustrations of the class difference 
entrenched in the American military.  The drama that unfolds in the Bervick-
Duval rivalry is the conventional love triangle, both characters vying for the 
affections of a prostitute named Olga.  When the ship pulls into the port of “Big 
Harbor,”13 Bervick rushes off to buy a present, a pillowcase with the words To 
My Sweetheart sewn on it, for Olga.  When he goes to the restaurant where she 
works as a waitress, he finds Duval talking to her.  The ensuing confrontation 
highlights the socioeconomic difference between the two men: 
“What are you doing tonight?  Are you going to see this 
guy?”  Bervick asked.  Olga flushed and thought a moment.  
Bervick knew already what she would answer.  Olga liked money 
too well.  But, knowing this, he still wanted her. 
Olga decided to be angry.  “What makes you two think 
you’re so good you can tell me what to do?  I think you’re both 
conceited.  Maybe I ain’t interested in neither of you.” 
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“Maybe you’re right,” said Duval.  “I guess I’ll just pay for 
some coffee and get on out.”  Then he opened his wallet and let her 
see the thick sheaf of bills.  Her eyes narrowed. 
“What you in such a hurry to go for?  My gracious, you’d 
think I was poison or something?”  A customer yelled for food and 
she went back into the kitchen. 
“I’d like to break your back,” said Bervick very deliberately, 
making each word a curse. 
“Don’t get upset, Sergeant.  I just got more than you.”  (43-
44) 
Like Karen Holmes in From Here to Eternity, Olga’s sole function in Williwaw is to 
mark “the play of emulation and identification” between two men, a play that 
underlines the homoerotic element in the rivalry dynamic.  That factor 
notwithstanding, the Bervick-Duval rivalry exists in the novel primarily to 
manage the class anxieties suggested in the Evans-Barkison rivalry.  Because 
Evans “performs” the officer fetish in the novel, he is excused from acting on the 
frustration brought on by the presence of the absurd Major.  The novel, as a 
result, “enlists” Sergeant Bervick, who has been libidino-economically divested 
by losing the rivalry to Duval, to neutralize that tension.  When, late in the novel, 
Bervick throws a hammer at Duval, causing him to fall overboard, he has done 
more than exact revenge on the guy who stole his girl: he has in effect taken 
management of the class tensions presented by Evans and Barkison.  However, 
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that closure of the diegetic complication has reinforced, rather than subverted, 
the class dynamics aboard the ship.  The novel, in the end, protects the immunity 
of the officer class, “handing off” the epistemological dirty work to the sergeant. 
Williwaw’s and The Naked and the Dead’s politics demonstrate the degree to 
which the officer perspective, even when it is a modulated officer perspective, has 
a tendency to align war narrative with the will of the state.  I believe this 
phenomenon occurs because of the extraordinary power that culture exerts on 
narrative production—a praxis devastatingly measured by the Frankfurt School.  
The American military officer, insofar as he surrogates a so-called legitimate class 
system (a system predicated on merit rather than blood), is a cultural insider, a 
condition insulating him from the subaltern and thereby projecting his attitude 
toward the subaltern as one of noblesse oblige.  This is the drama playing out in 
The Naked and the Dead, where the subalterns are inferior to Lieutenant Hearn, 
and not just in terms of rank.  A notable exception to this phenomenon of officer 
rank seduction is A History of Militarism, by Alfred Vagts, a writer who spares no 
effort in his vitriolic attack on the artificiality of the European/American rank 
system.  Vagts, who was himself an officer in the German army during World 
War I, is unique in both his resistance to rank seduction and in his understanding 
of how the two-tiered rank system is a crucial element in the proliferation of 
militarism.  But A History of Militarism is a work of historical analysis, not a 
novel, thus excused from submitting to certain narrative conventions14.  The 
seductions inherent in the officer rank tend to direct narrative elements in 
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conventional trajectories.  The best chance, it seems, for war narrative to resist the 
seductions inherent in the genre—and inherent in rank—is for it to be 
constructed from an outsider’s perspective.  “The truest eye,” says Homi Bhabha, 
“may now belong to the migrant’s double vision” (5). The great American war 
novels, I believe, are written from the enlisted rank, if not from the enlisted 
perspective, and that rank’s subaltern position has a tendency to destabilize a 
genre that is more comfortable working in the service of hegemony.  
Most often this narrative destabilization takes the form of parody.  What 
comes immediately to mind is the parade of outrageous officers in the Pynchon 
canon. V. and Gravity’s Rainbow, for example, present their officers in a willfully 
exaggerated fashion.  Lieutenant Slothrop (whose erections act as homing 
beacons to V-2 rockets), General Pudding (paying his penance for being 
incompetent by literally eating the shit of the double agent Katje Borgesius), 
Major Marvy (one of the more delightfully over-the-top evil characters in all of 
war literature), and Captain Blicero seem to be designed as cartoonish distortions 
of conventional officers.  However, inasmuch as those characters often work in 
close narrative proximity to the genocidal General Lothar von Trotha (who 
appears in both novels), a historical figure responsible for the deaths of 80,000 
Herero men, women, and children in 1904 Namibia, Pynchon’s distortions don’t 
really seem like distortions at all.  Which may be the point entirely.  The 
troubling aspect of Pynchon’s rank sensibility, though, is that he is an equal 
opportunity parodist—the enlisted characters are drawn in similar fashion.  The 
138 
closest one gets to finding a sympathetic enlisted character in Pynchon is V.’s 
Benny Profane (who is ex-enlisted during the action of V.), a typical Pynchonian 
schlemiel.  Profane is a character closer to a conventionally divested subaltern 
such as Gomer Pyle, Gilligan, or Forrest Gump, and as such aligns with a more 
state-sanctioned prescription for the enlisted rank.  However much one may 
wish to find an enlisted character in Pynchon who functions as an antidote to the 
pathological officers Pynchon so gleefully presents, none exists in Pynchon’s 
arsenal, at least not to the degree that Oedipa Maas contrasts against her 
environment in The Crying of Lot 49.  However troubling it may be that Pynchon 
conventionally presents the enlisted rank, those representations seem to be 
“corrections” to the diseased officer rank only in terms of distortional degree. 
In the post-Pynchon culture of the American war novel, one novelist is 
particularly resistant to the genre’s conventional seductions, Tim O’Brien.  His 
two great Vietnam War novels, Going After Cacciato (1978) and The Things They 
Carried (1990), spring from O’Brien’s experiences as an enlisted soldier.  Both are 
narrated from the foot soldier’s perspective, a perspective more commonly 
associated with divestment, infantilization, and sentimentality.  A key aspect of 
the ideological efficacy of these novels is that O’Brien resists the fetishisms 
usually associated with war fiction: he is, starting with Going After Cacciato15, 
immune to the allurements of the officer rank, and, significantly, resists any 
associated compensation for the enlisted rank.  O’Brien’s project with the two 
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novels is to critique the way readers approach the war narrative genre, a reading 
strategy often comfortable with the ideological alignments of the state. 
As an example of this conventional alignment that O’Brien seeks, in no 
uncertain terms, to expose as completely fraudulent occurs when the first private 
dies in the shockingly reactionary film, We Were Soldiers (2002, dir. Randall 
Wallace), his last words being, “I’m glad I died for my country.” This sort of 
brazen pathos has always been the nationalistic text’s trump card: eliciting 
sadness from the reader/spectator has a tendency to blunt any anxiety about 
politics16.  Furthermore, the sacrifice soldiers make in combat has a tendency to 
evoke overwhelming feelings of awe and national pride, feelings that historically 
engender a desire for the platform that produces that sacrifice.  The problem is 
not that we are desensitized to war, as Dalton Trumbo suggests in Johnny Got his 
Gun17, but rather that we are perhaps too sensitized to it.  Acutely aware of these 
sorts of epistemological hazards, O’Brien’s narrator in The Things They Carried 
warns the reader not to look for a “moral” in the war story: 
A true war story is never moral.  It does not instruct, nor encourage 
virtue, nor suggest models of proper human behavior, nor restrain 
men from doing the things men have always done.  If a story seems 
moral, do not believe it.  If at the end of a war story, you feel 
uplifted, or if you feel that some small bit of rectitude has been 
salvaged from the larger waste, then you have been made the 
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victim of a very old and terrible lie.  There is no rectitude 
whatsoever.  There is no virtue.  (76) 
O’Brien in this famous passage reveals his remarkable sensitivity to the politics 
that war narrative is traditionally in the service of, and he announces his 
resistance to those politics.  Like his literary hero, Wilfred Owen, he realizes that 
war stories conventionally terminate on the worst sort of genocidal lie: dulce et 
decorum est pro patria mori.  In his memoir, If I Die in a Combat Zone. . . Box me up 
and Send me Home, he calls it “an epitaph for the insane” (174).  The challenge 
then for O’Brien is to resist the gravitational pull seemingly inherent in the 
epistemology of war narrative.  Though Pynchon, Heller, and Vonnegut deploy 
irony and distortion to manage that pull, O’Brien instead utilizes a form of 
realism mixed with saturating self-consciousness, an admixture given credibility 
and immediacy due to O’Brien’s own experiences as a subaltern in the Vietnam 
War.  O’Brien’s project, especially in The Things They Carried, brings to mind 
Jameson’s suggestion in The Political Unconscious that realism “has as its historic 
function the systematic undermining and demystification, the secular ‘decoding,’ 
of those preexisting inherited traditional or sacred narrative paradigms which 
are its initial givens” (152). 
 That divested sensitivity, or what Homi Bhabha would call a “partial 
presence,” materializes in If I Die when O’Brien says, “Can the foot soldier teach 
anything important about war, merely from having been there?  I think not.  He 
can tell war stories” (32).  Though there has been much analysis of O’Brien 
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recently18, very little of it takes notice of O’Brien’s enlisted status.  It is that 
subaltern status that to a large degree motivates O’Brien’s anti-war project.  In 
Going After Cacciato and The Things They Carried, officers occupy central roles, but 
in each novel, O’Brien encodes a critique of the officer rank. 
 There are three prominent officers in the two novels, Lieutenants Martin 
and Corson in Going After Cacciato, and Lieutenant Cross in The Things They 
Carried.  All of them are incompetent, and all of them have the specific diegetic 
role of killing the men under their command.  This homicidal role materializes 
most obviously in The Things They Carried, where Lieutenant Cross’s obsession 
over his girl back home—a girl, it should be noted, completely uninterested in 
him—indirectly results in the death of one of the soldiers under his command.  
While O’Brien is careful not to be overtly didactic in his novels, the incompetent 
officers in his two novels serve as a surprisingly ironic terminus for war 
dysphoria—an almost unique phenomenon in American war narrative.  Unlike 
the bad officers in texts such as Paths of Glory, The Naked and the Dead, Attack!, The 
Caine Mutiny, or A Few Good Men, the bad officers in O’Brien stand 
uncompensated.   
O’Brien’s divestment strategy actually culminates with an anti-
compensation in Going After Cacciato.  The first officer, Lieutenant Martin, is a by-
the-book gung-ho commander who exhibits the sort of “leadership” that is 
perceived as good officership in officer discourse, that is, someone who treats his 
subordinates with contempt: 
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The lieutenant had been trained in common sense and military 
strategy.  He had read Theucydides and von Clausewitz, and he 
considered war a means to an end, with a potential for both good 
and bad, but interest was in effectiveness and not goodness.  A 
soldier’s interest is in means, not ends.  So the young lieutenant 
prided himself on his knowledge of tactics and strategy and 
history, his fluency in German and Spanish, his West Point 
training, his ability to maximize a unit’s potential.  (163) 
O’Brien crystallizes this leadership pathology in a sub-plot involving the famous 
Vietnamese tunnels.  The by-the-book procedure in the Vietnam War was to 
inspect the tunnels before blowing them up.  Because that practice resulted in an 
extraordinarily high number of American casualties, the procedure was often 
adjusted to include merely the “blowing up.”  Lieutenant Martin always ordered 
the men to inspect the tunnels first, an insistence that costs the life of two of the 
unit’s soldiers, Frenchie and Bernie.  After Frenchie’s death, the soldiers refuse to 
inspect subsequent tunnels.  When the unit comes across another tunnel, the 
tension comes to a head: 
“Sir,” Oscar said.  “I don’t aim to be disagreeable.  It’s not my 
nature.  But, honest, there’s not a man here, not a single soul, who 
is gonna put hisself down that hole.” 
 Lieutenant Sidney Martin took a notebook from his pocket.  
“Go down,” he said. 
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 “No.”  Oscar smiled.  “I don’t believe I will.”  (232-33) 
Lieutenant Martin then writes the name of every soldier in his notebook, all of 
them refusing to go into the tunnel.  Unholstering his .45, he then crawls into the 
tunnel himself, during which the men decide to kill him.  Insisting that every one 
agree to the “fragging,” they all symbolically touch the grenade they will throw 
into the next tunnel Lieutenant Martin enters.  Significantly, so as to avoid the 
seductive violence of retribution, O’Brien does not “narrate” the fragging: 
Lieutenant Martin’s death is implied by the appearance of his replacement, 
Lieutenant Corson.   
Though Lieutenant Corson’s role in the diegesis of Cacciato exists 
primarily in Paul Berlin’s fantasized journey from Vietnam to Paris, his 
significance is that he does not compensate for the divested officer he replaces.  
Unlike the youthful Martin, Corson is old and tired.  If anything, he is Martin 
twenty years older, with the added disability of chronic dysentery—perhaps a 
comical vengeance wrought by the enlisted novelist.  In O’Brien’s fiction, no 
officer strides in boldly to restore order; furthermore—and just as significantly—
no sergeant either, as in From Here to Eternity.  O’Brien is extraordinarily careful 
to avoid those conventional elements, knowing as he does the “work” those 
conventions perform.  But there is an honesty to O’Brien’s work that 
problematizes his officer critique.  In Cacciato, there is a curious incident during 
the “journey” from Vietnam to Paris involving Lieutenant Corson.  Bearing the 
unbearable burdens of stupidity, laziness, drunkenness, and illness—
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divestments conventionally associated with the enlisted rank—Corson finally 
collapses in Delhi.  Before passing out, he orders the men to leave him in Delhi 
and to abandon their search for Cacciato (Italian for “the hunted”).  But they do 
not obey the orders: citing the axiom that you don’t leave a man behind, the 
soldiers grab Corson by the arms and legs and carry him on their journey.  There 
is an ambiguity to this passage, suggesting that the officer is a burden that the 
enlisted carry—but also that the agency associated with their carrying implicates 
them in the insanity of their mission19. 
The image of the enlisted soldiers carrying their incompetent officer 
through the streets of Delhi works nicely as a crystallization of O’Brien’s 
negotiation with the officer-enlisted problem.  While he is explicit in his disdain 
for the officer class—clearly articulated in the description of Lieutenant Martin, 
he is careful not to epistemologically compensate with a distorted enlisted 
antidote (as Jones does in From Here to Eternity).  In O’Brien’s fiction, all are 
implicated, not the least of whom being the reader, whose motivations for 
reading war narrative are seriously interrogated.  
The great shift in officer iconography occurred, if not in the Vietnam War, 
then in the Vietnam War narrative.  It seems unlikely that a narrative before 
Vietnam could have countenanced an incompetent officer such as Lieutenant 
Wolfe from the film Platoon—at least to the degree that it would let him stay in 
the narrative.  Such an officer might have appeared, for example Lieutenant 
“Dynamite” Holmes in the film version of From Here to Eternity, but only as a 
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cancer to be excised from the narrative so as to restore narrative health (and to 
appease the Department of Defense, who provides materials to films only under 
the condition that the officer class remain untainted20). 
 But the officer rank, as a sort of Foucauldian metonymy of power, has 
remained resistant to critique.  The conventional diegesis in Vietnam War 
narrative is to criticize the government for its inability to adequately support its 
military (the implication for Rambo’s famous question in Rambo: First Blood Part 
II, “Do we get to win this time?” is that the soldiery was competent enough to 
win Vietnam, but it was betrayed by a Quisling government), a critique which 
presents the American military machinery as, ironically, a victim of the war.  
Susan Jeffords suggests in The Remasculinization of America that Vietnam, rather 
than serving as an interrogation of patriarchy and militarism, instead is the site 
where those phenomena are reasserted.  For example, even in the shambolic 
Rambo model of “critique,” Richard Crenna’s Colonel Trautman remains 
immune, his aura redirecting the frustration and dysphoria away from the officer 
rank.  Thus the immune officer in the Rambo films is indistinguishable from the 
countercultural officers in M*A*S*H, both being excused from taking 
responsibility for the insane machinery of death. 
There is a fantasy we entertain in America that suggests that the Vietnam 
War changed the way we read war narrative—we cannot, so it is supposed, read 
war narrative with the same sort of naïve wonder we allegedly did back in the 
good old days.  It seems that only in the post-Vietnam era can a writer like Tim 
146 
O’Brien call himself, as he does in If I Die in a Combat Zone, a “conscripted Nazi.”  
Though nowadays there seems to be more war narratives that interrogate the 
conventions of war fiction, the class dynamics remain intact.  Since the Vietnam 
War, there has in fact been an explosion of reactionary war novels and films (a 
trend exacerbated by the 9/11 tragedy).  While we can justly interpret a film such 
as The Green Berets as the most egregious sort of over-arching propaganda film, it 
actually provides a blueprint for subsequent war narratives, narratives that re-
assert, rather than interrogate, the traditions of war fiction.  For every one Tim 
O’Brien, there are a dozen Tom Clancys and W.E.B Griffins, a dozen Pearl 
Harbors and We Were Soldiers.  With respect to class dynamics, officer fetishism is 
even more strongly asserted in the Nixon-Reagan-Bush era, though the fetish is 
often covert.  The most common disguise is a hyper-sexualized masculinity that 
erases any residue of effeminacy from half-century-old conventions.  The 
fetishized officer in postmodern America is still homologous to his World War II 
counterpart: non-ethnic white Midwesterner.  Nowadays he may actually utter a 
curse word or two and even have sex (with a woman), but these developments 
are merely improvements on last year’s model.  Most crucial to the practice of 
officer fetishism is that the gap between the officer and enlisted castes is still the 
same.  The enlisted caste remains divested and despised, a persistence that 
exposes culture’s hierarchical desire. 
 In terms of narrative, the American officer has ridden out the storm of 
Vietnam (and the not insignificant complication of Lieutenant Calley) to appear 
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in the so-called postmodern world identical to his World War II patriarch.  If 
anything, in the bellicose amnesia of America’s post 9/11 zeitgeist, the 
hagiographic American officer may even be a bolder assertion of his World War 
II predecessor. 
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Notes 
 
1 Viz., the working class Marechal, the actor Carette, the teacher Daste, the 
aristocrat de Boeldieu, the Jew Rosenthal, and the engineer Modot. 
 
2 Cf. Andre Bazin, Jean Renoir (Paris: Champ Libre, 1971): 238; and Francois 
Truffaut, “Orvet Mon Amour,” Cahiers du Cinema 47 (1955): 32. 
 
3 More specifically The Empire Strikes Back and Return of the Jedi, wherein the 
heroes of Star Wars are rewarded with officer commissions: Han Solo becomes a 
captain in Empire and then a general in Jedi.  Luke Skywalker becomes a 
commander in Empire, and then sublimates to the rank of Jedi Knight, a rank that 
exposes the desire of all military rank. 
 
4 A compelling example is the long-running television program M*A*S*H.  
Though the show frontloaded its liberal political stance, it participated in the 
protection of the military rank system by exclusively locating virtue in the officer 
rank.  There were only two significant enlisted characters, Radar and Klinger, 
and they were projected as clearly inferior to the more important characters 
Captain Pierce, Captain McIntyre, Major Houlihan, Colonel Blake, Captain 
Hunnicut, Major Burns, Major Winchester, and Colonel Potter.  The show simply 
could not bear the weight of the bad officer, either eliminating them from the 
show (Burns and Blake) or, in a Dickensian twist, rehabilitating them (Houlihan 
and Winchester). 
 
5 Qtd. in Walter Karp, The Politics of War (New York: Harper & Row, 1979) 4. 
 
6 Minorities and the white working class populate the American military enlisted 
rank.  For a insightful analysis of their sacrifice in the Vietnam War specifically, 
see Christian Appy, Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993).  Despite the fact that 
minorities suffered disproportionately in Vietnam and the first Gulf War (see the 
Department of Defense’s Directorate for Information Operations and Reports 
Race/Ethnicity Summary at http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/casualty/RACE-
OMB-WC.pdf), there has been in the conservative press a virulent backlash 
against the legitimacy of those statistics.  See, e.g., Mackubin Thomas Owen, 
“The Color of Combat: The Minority Disproportion Myth,” National Review 
Online 4 October 2002. < http://www.nationalreview.com/owens/owens 
100402.asp>. 
 
7 Qtd. in Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism:Civilian and Military (New York: 
Meridian, 1959) 68-69. 
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8 Even this notion is a fantasy.  Positions at the American military academies are 
obtained by congressional recommendation: a high school senior writes to his or 
her state senator and asks for a recommendation.  That senator’s staff, ostensibly 
noting the applicant’s qualifications, writes the recommendation—most of the 
time without the senator’s ever having interviewed the applicant.   
 
9 It’s crucially important to make the distinction here between war novels and 
war films.  The American security elite exerts a tremendous amount of pressure 
on the film industry to ensure that the officer rank remains untainted.  In 1915, 
for example, the Department of the Navy refused to lend materials and 
personnel for the filming of The Son of Nobody because it portrayed a Naval 
Academy graduate unfavorably.  The acting secretary of the Navy, W.S. Benson, 
explained to the Gaumont Company that the Navy would not provide services 
for a film that placed “naval officers before the public that is very discreditable to 
them and [that] has no foundation in fact” (qtd. in Lawrence Suid, Guts and 
Glory: The Making of the American Military Image in Film [Lexington: University 
Press of Kentucky, 2002] 14).  In 1997, Steven Spielberg—wearing a baseball cap 
with a colonel’s rank insignia during filming—was extraordinarily careful in 
Saving Private Ryan to make sure that the enlisted characters performed all 
negative behaviors in the film. 
 
10 E.g., Kinney’s Friendly Fire and Jeffords’ Remasculinization of America offer 
brilliant analyses of the patriarchal contract in war narrative, but neither work is 
concerned with rank as an important element in war narrative’s attraction.  
However insightful and accurate anti-militarism works such as Nelson and 
Olsen’s Why War?, Bourke’s An Intimate History of Killing, and Regan’s Organizing 
Societies for War are, none are concerned with how the rank system works as a 
crucial component of the persistence of militarism.   
 
11 See, specifically, “The Epic and the Novel” chapter in Lukács’s The Theory of the 
Novel.  The novel disrupts the epic, whose landscape is “symbolically fixed” and 
“homogeneous.”  Lukács suggests that the novel’s presentation of an alternate 
world results in “estrangement.” 
 
12 The socioeconomic difference between the “real” officer and the warrant 
officer is most dramatically reflected in the pay gap between them.  A colonel 
with 20 years of service will receive a monthly salary of $7,233.00; the warrant 
officer with the same years of service will receive $3,705.90.  Upon retirement, the 
colonel will receive $5,424.75, the warrant officer $2,779.42.  A retiring sergeant 
with 20 years of service will, by the way, receive $1,712.47.  Source: <http:// 
www.military.com/Resources/ResourcesContent/0,13964,32587,00.html>. 
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13 Because the novel was published so soon after World War II, censors forced 
Vidal to change the geographical names in Williwaw.  Dutch Harbor became “Big 
Harbor”; Chernowski Bay became “Andrefski Bay.”  See <http://books. 
guardian.co.uk/review/story/0,12084,1090206,00.html>. 
 
14 This is not to say that histories resist the seduction of the officer rank.  
Historians seem as much enamored of the military officer as novelists. 
 
15 In If I Die in A Combat Zone, O’Brien is seduced by officer fetishism.  See 
Chapter Sixteen, where he says, “Like my fictional prewar heroes, Captain 
Johansen’s courage was a model.  And just as I could never match Alan Ladd’s 
prowess, nor Captain Vere’s intensity of conviction, nor Robert Jordan’s 
resolution to confront his own certain death [. . .], I could not match my captain.  
Still, I found a living hero, and it was good to learn that human beings sometime 
embody valor, and that they do not always dissolve at the end of a book or 
movie reel” (144-45). 
 
16 A contemporary example of this sort of reactionary pathos occurred in the 
aftermath of the death of the most famous soldier in the so-called War on Terror, 
Pat Tillman, a former professional football player who turned down a 3.6 million 
dollar NFL contract to enlist in the Army.  Rather than mourn the senseless death 
of a young man, the “Patriots For Bush” website said, “Unfortunately Pat 
Tillman's destiny is that of so many American Heroes, he died today in 
Afghanistan. He died so that others may breath [sic] free. For that, Pat Tillman 
will forever remain in my heart at the perfect example of the American Hero. He 
loved this country so much that he laid down his life in defense of the United 
States and the Afghan people so they may taste freedom from violent Islamo-
Fascist oppression.”  <http://www.patriotsforbush.com/ 25 April 2004>. 
 
17 I.e., “Numbers have dehumanized us.  Over breakfast coffee we read of 40,000 
American dead in Vietnam.  Instead of vomiting, we reach for the toast” (iv). 
 
18 E.g., Mark A. Heberle, A Trauma Artist:Tim O’Brien and the Fiction of Vietnam 
(Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2001); Tobey C. Herzog, Tim O’Brien (New 
York: Twayne, 1997); Steven Kaplan, Understanding Tim O’Brien (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1995); and Timothy J. Lomperis, ‘Reading the 
Wind’: The Literature of the Vietnam War (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987). 
 
19 Of course, I realize that this “reading’ is problematized by the fact that the 
entire “journey” from Vietnam to France exists only in the mind of Paul Berlin, 
an enlisted man who dreams up the whole thing while standing watch. 
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20 See, especially Lawrence Suid, Guts and Glory, and David L. Robb, Operation 
Hollywood (Amherst: Prometheus, 2004). 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Art, insofar as it is what film theorist Laura Mulvey calls a “formal 
preoccupation,” projects cultural desire.  The Officer Fetish seeks to gauge and 
interrogate that projection within a narrow arena: the American war narrative.  
Too often, American war narratives are—or become—fascinated with the officer, 
a figure who enjoys a unique prestige in American culture.  American society 
has, generally speaking, a remarkable aversion to egregious displays of wealth 
and power.  That aversion does not extend to the military officer: Americans in 
fact demand that officers project an aura of authority, power, virility, and 
aristocracy.  The Officer Fetish examines that aura, suggesting that the American 
cultural investments in the officer rank reveal a deep-rooted anxiety about 
democratic/egalitarian systems.  Fetishism, to paraphrase cultural theorist 
Henry Krips, is the difference between what we know to be right what we 
nevertheless do.  The military officer stands as a manifestation of fetishism (with 
its economy of cathexis and disavowal) inasmuch as he enjoys the prestige we as 
a culture don’t want to confess.  Furthermore, that prestige reveals a disturbing 
truth: our investment in the officer rank asserts our desire for domination—both 
over others, and, more significantly, over ourselves. 
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